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lüfrodUîctiôh to the Portfolio
This portfolio represents a seleetion of my work during the three yearn of the PsychD in 
Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. It includes 
my academic and research work as well as personal and professional experiences that 
contributed to my development as a counselling psycholo^st and practitioner. The work 
is comprised of three dossiers, the Academic, the Therapeutic Practice and the Research 
dossiers w^ hich represent the different aspects of my haining. As will be seen, my work 
in this portfolio draws heavily upon existential/phenomenological philosophy and the 
importance of theoretical pluralism and postmodern ideas. These positions, which have 
informed and guided my personal and professional development, continue to inform my 
therapeutic practice as a counselling psychologist. Î have therefore included a concluding 
chapter to my portfolio, where I discuss the contributions of existential/ 
phenomenological philosophy and their relevance to the field of counselling psychology. 
In this last work, I portray a personal view and use of die existential/phenomenological 
movements and discuss the ways in which they can inform eounsellihg psychology and 
therapeutic practice. Moreover, from this work the reader will be able to ger a better 
sense of my portfolio as a whole and a clearer view of my choices of research and 
academic topics.
The Academic Dossier contains papers diat I wrote in relation to the following two 
courses: 'Life-Span Development' and 'Theoretical Models of Therapy'. The essays 
reflect my affinity with dieoretical pluralism as well as my interest in psychoanalysis, 
postmodernism, and existential philosophy. The Therapeutic Dossier contains a 
deseiipdon of my clinical placements, where I worked as a trainee and my final clinical 
paper, where I explore my personal and professional development as a practitioner. 
Finally, the Research Dossier is comprised of each year's research papers (i.e. a 
literature review and two empirical investigations) that reflect my academic and 
epistemological interests.
Throughout the portfolio the anonymity of clients and research participants have been 
preserved; pseudonyms have been used and any potentially identifying information has 
been omitted. As this is a public document, client studies, process reports, placement 
logbooks, and supervisors' reports are not included. These documents are available in 
the confidential appendix which is submitted separately. What follows is a brief guide to 
the contents of this portfolio which reflect my personal, academic, and professional 
journeys. Although this is a partial representation of my work, I believe it symbolises 
aspects of myself as manifested in my choices of research, therapeutic, professional, and 
ethical stances.
î entered my current training after having completed a number of courses in art history 
and philosophy as well as an undergraduate degree in psychology and a masters degree 
in psychoanalysis. Looking back at my studies, I realise that I have always felt a sense of 
disquiet which I believe stemmed from my fear of feeling 'trapped' within one way of 
seeing (be it theoretical or experiential). I have always believed that one dimensional 
thinking, apart from being rigid and constraining, is also naive and arrogant as it is often 
coupled by equally partial valuations regarding psychotherapeutic and ethical issues.
After spending a year in Boston, USA, where I studied philosophy and psychology, I 
came to England, where I enrolled and successfully completed a BSc in Psychology at 
the University of Essex, During iny undergraduate years I never stopped hoping that I 
would gain an understanding and insight into the human psyche. However, contrary to 
my expectations, I found m y^lf measuring and controlling human behaviour in search 
of possible causes which were thought to explain and predict the human predicament. 
My disillusionment with experimental psychology led me to the field of psychoanalysis 
which felt like an oasis in the desert landscape of my previous experience. Indeed, my 
year at UCL, where I completed my MSc in Theoretical P^choanalysis and attended a 
number of psychoanalytic workshops and talks, was not only inspiring, but also decisive 
for the course of my future training. It was during that time that I entered personal 
analysis with a psychoanalyric psychotherapist and decided to become a therapist 
myself. However, despite my affinity with psychoanalytic ideas and true to my fear of 
being consteained by one dimensional drinking, 1 drove away from the possibility of an 
exclusive psychoanalytic training and decided to proceed with my current doctorate and 
training as a counselling psychologist
My decision to be trained as a counselling rather than clinical psychologist was based on 
a number of principles and values which include counselling psychology's humanistic/ 
existential heritage, its pluralistic and integrative stances, and its devotion to an 
exploration of clients' subjective meaning(s) and ways of being in the world. Indeed, all 
of these attitudes were reflected in the nature of my training, which promoted the 
acquisition of both theoretical and experiential knowledge (i.e. workshops, group 
supervision, and experiential group) and which enhanced a wide range of academic and 
research interests. I therefore felt that such training tallied with my own interest in 
pursuing a therapeutic career which is not constrained by specific theoretical ideas and 
psychotherapeutic orientations.
Moreover, on a broader level, counselling psychology's ethos reflects my personal ideas 
and values regarding the notion of individual difficulties, the rejection of the medical 
attitude, and the importance of subjective experience. Indeed, the field's non- 
pathologising and anti-discrinrinatory stances, which are coupled witii a promotion of
equality and mutuality, cultivate a dialectical approach to therapy which - in my view - 
lies at the heart of the therapeutic endeavour. It is an attitude which facilitates co-creation 
of m ^ n g  within the therapeutic relationship and promotes an exploration, description.
As will be seen, my work is highly infïîuenced by existential/phenomenological ideas 
which have informed both my academic training and therapeutic practice. My affinity 
with these ideas is reflected on my belief that an adequate understanding of human 
beings can only be achieved through a consideration of a range of ontological 
perspectives that give rise to different theoretical and methodolo^cal approaches. 
Implicit in this stance is a disavowal of final conclusions. In other words, there is no 
such thing as an ultimate, knowable reality which exists beyond our personal 
interpretations and evaluations. At best, we can only speak of different perspectives and 
theoretical standpoints which are equally 'true' and valuable. With these thoughts in 
mind I embarked on a journey through different theories and therapeutic models that 
often provided contradicting views of the person, psychological difficulties, and 
therapeutic conduct. It was inevitable that - due to my personal world views - 1 developed 
'affinities' with some, rather than all of the theories I encountered. Nevertheless, in line 
with a pluralistic perspective, my emphasis was in drawing upon a conversational 
approach which allowed space for difference without having unity and integration as a 
goal.
Moreover, my interest in the notions of self and identity is reflected in my choices of 
research and academic work. Studying the concept of self from a postmodern 
perspective became the impetus for further research on the topic from the vantage point 
of existential thinking (see academic dossier). Knowing that existential psychotherapy 
sprung out of a philosophical movement which criticised orthodox epistemology and 
mainsteeam psychology, I set out to explore ideas which challenged traditional ontology 
and specifically the artificial gap between ' self-consciousness' and the ‘external world’ 
(i.e. the Cartesian legacy).
There is no doubt that the questioning of long held truths, values and beliefs was 
disquieting; however it also led to an insatiable quest for an intellectuWly satisfying 
position that allowed room for plurality of ideas and for a more open attitude towards 
existing conflicts, disputes, and disagreements within the therapeutic and academic 
worlds. With these thoughts in mind, I embarked on a criticism of the Cartesian legacy 
and traditional epistemology through a reading of the contributions made by radical and 
innovative thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. This quest was 
followed by an intellectually stimulating period during which I immersed myself in a 
phenomenologcal analysis of the notion of self as viewed by a number of 
existential/phenomenological practitioners in the UK. It was a period which led to the
choice of my final year’s research topic, which focused on counselling psychologists’ 
perceptions of their identity as a scientist-practitioner its effect on their attitude
As will be seen, my academic interests also had a profound effect on my way of working 
with clients (see 'Final Clinical Paper’). A pluralistic stance proved to be helpful in my 
professional life as I found myself working within the specified guidelines of the British 
Psychological Society and the MHS. As these guidelines did not always fit with my own 
therapeutic views and ethical values, pluralism allowed me to deal with a considerable 
amount of tension and conflict by adopting a position that recognised the quality and 
power of contextual influences upon my way of working wifii clients. For example, my 
interest in an exploration of ray clients’ difficulties was often restricted by the 
constraints set by the therapeutic settings I was working in. For example, I initially 
found it particularly challenging to work within a time-limited (i.e. six sessions) 
framework and/or within an environment that cultivated a  problem-solving attitude rather 
than an emphasis on individual experience and choice. My pluralistic stance, helped me 
to identify such position’s strengths and qualities and to cultivate a professional/ 
therapeutic stance that can make full use of the advantages of time-limited work.
Hence, I can now see the value of even a small number of sessions that can be beneficial 
for the client; time limited work can offer a space where the client can gain a sense of 
structure, clarity, and insight of her difficulties and issues. When working within such a 
framework, I tend to explore and use the notion of time in a much more direct and 
creative way as it constitutes the basis upon which the therapeutic relationship and 
dialogue take place. It is therefore imperative for the practitioner to retain an engaging 
and collaborative therapeutic stance which mms at empowering the client and promoting 
a transparent relationship and a holding environment. Hence, I believe, that a strong 
therapeutic and working alliance, which is based on trust, positive collaboration with the 
client, and an emphasis on description, clarification, and co-construction of meaning, is 
sufficient for therapeutic progress to take place.
To the above ideas, I would like to add the importance of ethical awareness and 
constraints while working with clients. Due to my personal beliefs and values it was very 
difficult for me (and still is) to reconcile with the idea that suicidal intent is a sufficient 
justification for detaining a person. 1 believe that an individual has the right to make her 
own decisions which have their roots in one’s capacity to make informed choices. To me 
suicide is a human right which should be respected. LucMly, my ethical stance in relation 
to suicide was tested during my final year of training when I had started feeling much 
more grounded in my own working with clients. Nevertheless, it was only then that I 
realised the real difference between my personal, humanitarian arguments, and the raw 
reality of political and legal systems! I am in debt to my supervisor’s experience and
attitude towards me; he not only supported me dirough attending to my inner conflicts, 
but also reminded me of the difference between personal and professional values. Hence, 
I came to the realisation that promoting and strengthening a client’s personal freedom 
and capacity to make informed choices is not as clear cut as I initially thought; a number 
of dimensions - such as the mental health and legal systems - that reign outside the 
therapeutic relationship, need to be taken into consideration.
Retrospectively, 1 feel that my work with suicidal and severely disturbed clients have 
acted like catalysts for my professional development as a therapist. I came to the 
realisation that there is no such thing - even in the private sector - as woridng in a 
vacuum. In other words, the therapeutic relationship and engagement with clients is 
always contextual and based upon mental health, legal, and political systems.
To conclude, in an effort to promote clarity and understanding of my work, a brief 
description of the contents of each dossier is included at the introduction of the 
portfolio’s relevant parts (i.e. academic, therapeutic, and research).
Academic Dossier
Introdiicdon
As mentioned in the introduction to the portfolio, the academic dossier includes essays 
written in relation to courses that focus on life span development and theoretical models 
o f therapy and my final clinical paper which reflects my personal and professional
The first essay which is entitled "Decentring the Self; a Postmodern Critique o f the 
Traditional view o f Identity and its Implications for Therapeutic Practice', was written 
during my first year of training as part of the life span development course. As betrayed 
by the title, the paper focuses on the notion of identity from the vantage point of 
postmodern ideas and theories and on the effect that postmodern thinking has on 
therapeutic practice. For reasons of conceptual clarity the structure of the essay is such 
that it permits a comparison between the modem and postmodern constructions of the 
notion of self.
The second essay entitled "Heidegger's Notion o f Dasein and its Application in 
Existential/Phenomenological Approach to T her^y' is part of the theoretical models of 
therapy course. It is also written during my first year, which was devoted to the study of 
humanistic/existential theories and approaches to therapeutic practice. This initial phase 
in my training proved to be pivotal for my development as a practitioner, as I began to 
form my personal attitudes and stances towards psychological theories and practice. In a 
sense, the essay acted as a catalyst since it paved ground upon which my first year’s 
literature review and second year’s research topic were based.
Finally, the third essay entitled "The Concept o f Psychic Reality and its Relation to the 
Phenomenon o f Transference' reflects my psychoanalytic background and interest in 
the concepts of psychic reahty and transference in therapeutic practice. Much of my 
knowledge of these concepts was gained during my masters degree; however, it was my 
personal analysis and experience of working therapeutically from a psychodynamic 
perspective which enriched my understanding of these notions with experiential 
knowledge.
‘Decentring’ the Self; 
a Postmodern Critique of thé ‘TraditioîiàF ViéW of Identity and its 
Implications for Therapeutic Pmc^ce.
The emergence and development of the concept of 'identity’ and its phenomenal 
simplicity and overuse in different contexts among psychologic^ texts has contributed 
to the notorious difficulty of its definition and usage. ‘Identity’ veiy often overlaps with 
and occasionally is treated as equal to other similar concepts such as 'personality’ and 
‘self’. Consequently, different schools of thought, when attempting to provide an 
elucidation of the term me erroneously faced with a vast volume of theoretical ideas 
which are often contradictory and which attempt to describe its nature.
The present essay approaches the notion of ‘identity’ from modem and postmodem 
theoretical standpoints. The first part is devoted to a brief but concise presentation of the 
‘traditional’ view of the ‘self’ and the socio-cultural reasons that gave rise to it. During 
the second part, it will be argued tiiat the modem notion of ‘identity’ has become 
outdated. Hie deliberate omission of socio-cultural influences from modem research has 
led to a construction of a 'se lf that cannot survive the plurality and fluidity of the 
postmodern world. It will be argued that in a postmodern worid adjustment to rapid 
changes and overload of information requires the development of a pluralistic sense of 
self. In line with the social constructionist arguments, ‘identity’ will be perceived to be 
the outcome of linguistic discourses that are highly dependent on the historical, cultural 
and institutional sites within which they are used. Hence, attention m this second part 
will be drawn to the works of Rom Harré, Grant Gillett and Luk Langenhove in relation 
to Second Cognitive Evolution Theory and Positioning Theory respectively.
Finally, the last part of the essay will concentrate on how social constructionism and 
postmodern ideas could inspire therapeutic practice in general. For reasons of clarity it 
should be noted that ‘identity’ is used interchangeably with ‘self and ‘personality’ in 
order to avoid confusion and unnecessary contradictions with authors who use the three 
concepts interchangeably.
Psychology in the Era o f Modernity; the Power ofthe Machine.
The metaphor of the individual as a ‘machine’ is perhaps the most accurate description 
of the psychological ‘subject’ ? taken that this description is given from a modemist 
perspective. Modernism emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and with it came a 
new ideology that influenced not only ways of life but also the political, academic and 
scientific scenes. The temi ‘modernity’ (Giddens, 1991) is used in the context of the 
Western world and refers to an industrialised age, where ‘Capitalism’, 
institutionalisation, financial power and macMnery production thrived. In this respect, the
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concept of ‘identity’ is closely related to the technological and scientific advancements 
of the period as well as to assumptions about truth and knowledge perceived through the 
lenses of the natural sciences.
In line with Gergen’s (1991) conception of modem consciousness and its effect on the 
view of the ‘self’, the ‘psychological subject’ is carefully designed to fit the modem 
ideology and the socio-economic stracture of Western culture. As a result, scientific 
psychology - following the path that was forged by the natural sciences - set out to 
discover the objective facts surrounding the nature of ‘identity’. Hence, ‘traditional’ 
psychological research treats the ‘self in the way that the natural sciences treat the 
physical world; both are perceived to be subjects to rational and objective scmtiny that 
can lead to the discovery of universal objective truths. The shift that was undertaken by 
psychological research (Kvde, 1992, Durrheim, 1997) can be traced back to two basic 
empirical assumptions. The first is that of a knowable world and the second, is the belief 
in the systematic application of reason and observation, which is freed from any 
subjective interference (i.e. in truth through method). In other words, psychological 
research has fallen prey to what Harré called “scientific ontology” - that is the 
ideological assumptions that lie behind the formulation of all hypotheses (Harré and 
Gillett, 1994: 13).
The result of this emphasis on rational forms of procedure together with the so called 
“Grand Narrative of Modermsm” (Gergen, 1^1: 30) that promised a future of unity, 
achievement and peace led to a conception of the ‘self as a unique, autonomous, and 
unified rational agent that strives for growth and personal development In the world of 
Modernism that gave birth to cognitive theory, the metaphor of the machine became a 
reality. By treating the person as a machine, knowledge of the ‘self became knowledge 
of material; the ‘self was now open to observation. As a consequence, a whole new 
vocabulary was introduced, words such as “cognitive structures”, “perceptual 
network”, and “personality traits” became common. Finally, assuming machine-like 
essences when describing the nature of the ‘se lf led to the constructidn of ways of 
measuring them. Hence, consistent with the modem ethos a “mental testing industry” 
(Gergen, 1991: 46) was formed, which produced a variety of psychological and mental 
tests that claimed to measure and even predict a person’s attitudes, motivation, 
personality etc. The ‘self had now become the kernel of psychological research.
DeLamater et al. (19^) in their study on the formation of sexual identity summarised 
the assumptions of the modem ideology under the term “modem essentialism” 
(DeLamater et al., 19^: 10). What followed their research is that modern essentialism 
retained two important characteristics of the classical essentialist view. The first is a 
belief in the existence of underlying universal essences of a specific kind, which endow 
humans with a particular nature (for e.g. homosexuality and heterosexuality) and tlie
second, is a belief in the essences’ constancy and stability over time (both historical and 
individual time).
To summarise, at the heart of die modem cognitive theoiy (Eysoick & Keane, 1996) lies 
the belief in the existence of a stmctured, rational, unified agent, who possesses innate, 
universal and stable essences (i.e. attitudes, personality traits, and mental dispositions) 
that are perceived to be measurable and responsible for his/her behaviour and identity 
formation. Consequently, the assumptions following the notion of Cartesian dualism 
are maintained; hence, ‘identity’ development takes place within the person’s imier 
worid which is clearly demaicated and independent fmm external reality.
Postmodern Identity; A Plea for Plurality
The central argument of this section is that modem essentialism and its implications 
regarding the formation of ‘identity’ proves to be inadequate when seen from the 
vantage point of postmodem thinking. In a postmodern world of rapid communication 
that is marked by plurality of perspectives, fhe ‘self’ becomes an object of continuous 
construction and deconstruction. Postmodern culture (Conner, 19^ ; Gergen, 1991, 
1999) is in constant flux; clear boundaries between reality and fantasy, trathfulness and 
falsity become blurred. The acquisition of knowledge and understanding is perceived to 
he a social process, that is the products of cultural and historical influences and not the 
outcome of sterilised laboratory research. Hence, in the context of the present essay 
postmodernism is defined as “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1984: 2). It 
is an expression of disbelief in the modemist appeal to grand narratives - such as ‘the 
emancipation of truth’, ‘the faith in method’, ‘humans as rational agents’ etc. In other 
words, the modem project and particularly the belief in objective truth and the 
assumption of things in themselves is being criticised (Lyotard, 1984).
Contrary to the modemist view, ‘identity’ in postmodern theories is historically, 
culturally, and context specific (Gergen, 1999). In this sense, language, technology, 
values, and politics become powerful contributors to the formation of ‘self’. Hence, a 
postmodern culture of multiplicity and pluralism requires a ""pluralistic individuaF 
(Rowan and C<K>per, 1999: 99) who is capable of dealing with simultaneous changes in 
multiple settings - such as economical, political, and interpersonal ones. In this light, the 
plural self IS characterised by cognitive and behavioural flexibility, a high level of moral 
relativism, and an ability to contain ambiguity and complexity (Rowan and Cooper,
In line with postmodern ideas, social constructionism (Burr, 1995; Gergen, 1985,1999) 
sets out to deconstruct the ‘traditional’ view of the self by emphasising the role of 
language and that of societal, cultural, and inters subjective influences. In other words,
10
the construction of a person takes place within language; hence, the plea for plurality and 
multiplicity - so central to postmodern ideas - is met by the social constructionist view of 
the ‘self’ as a linguistic construct that takes its shape through available ‘discourses’. It 
should be mentioned that ‘discourse’ is here defined as “a set of meanings, metaphors, 
representations, images, stories, ... , that in some way together produce a particular 
version of events” (Burr, 1995: 48). In this respect, any discussion surrounding the 
concept of ‘identity’ is constrained within the limits of existing discourses. Hence, 
‘identity’ ceases to be an indi\dduai project, it instead becomes the product of experience 
and participation in social interaction (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1989).
It is my contention that the postmodern plural self cm  he addressed from the vantage 
point of the idea of positioning (Davies and Harré 1990, Harré and Langenhove 1999) 
which has its roots in Harré’s and Gillett’s (1994) second cognitive revolution theory. 
In line with postmodern thinking this theory reflects a radical shift in the perception of 
the psychological subject. At its heart lies a renunciation of Cartesian dualism in favour 
of the discursive mind. In other words: “The mind is not a substance. The mentality of 
people comprises certain of their skills and abilities” (Harré and Gillett: KX)), which 
emerge from the individual’s inevitable participation in a material worid (i.e. the 
physical) and a symbolic world - that of language.
From this vantage point the discursive mind is no longer perceived to be a set of inner 
mechanisms which - by performing logical operations - lead to an accurate 
representation of the external world. Instead it is a "meeting point' of structuring 
influences such as ‘signifiers’, ‘signifieds’ and their resulting ‘discourses’ that 
comprise the symbolic world of language. Harré and Gillett (1994) drawing upon 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) later work argue that “mental activity is not essentially a 
Cartesian or inner set of processes but a range of moves or techniques defined against a 
background of human activity” (Hairé and Gillett, 1994: 19). As a result, the realm of 
cognitive understanding is decentred; it no longer passively resides within the individual, 
instead it is found in an active use of linguistic symbols and discourses. In line with 
Derrida’s (1976) thinking, who became notorious for his statement "there is nothing 
outside the text', it can be argued that everything (i.e. concepts, emotions, feelings etc.) 
exists within language and is constrained within the number of discourses that represent 
it. Consequently, the ‘self’ (Harré and Langenhove 1999) is regarded as a grammatical 
construct which through exposure to binary oppositions (Sarup, 1993; Burr, 1995) - 
such as meiyou, masculine/feminine - acquires an erroneous sense of an autonomous 
individuality. Moreover, individuals’ tendency to define and perceive themselves through 
narratives (Gergen, 1999) inevitably leads to the misleading conclusion of a coherent and 
unified representation of an agent that exists and acts in a consistent, linear fashion, 
which has a past, present, and future.
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It is in the context of this radical theoretical shift that pasitfomng theory and its role in 
the formation of identity has a place. Seen from this vantage point, individuals come to 
identify themselves through what Davies and Harré (1990) refer to as positioning, that is 
“the discursive process whereby selves are located in <x>nversations as oWervably and 
subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines” (1990: 48). The 
theory's social and interactive nature presupposes the existence of a creative social and 
linguistic space within which an individual's sense of 'identity' develops, grows, and 
gets modified. In this respect, a human being (Campbell and Muncer, 1998, Gergen, 
1999) from the moment of its birth finds itself in a social environment, where discourses 
are taking place and within which it is inevitably positioned. Hence, even before the 
acquisition of language the baby throng its interaction with others becomes part of a 
narrutive(s) which will influence its later repertoire of pogîtionings and linguistic aetipn-
Seen in this light, contrary to the modem view, the formation of a sense of ‘self is a 
dynamic construction, a discursive activity that takes place among people - in their 
interactions - and not an entity waiting to be (hscovered within an individual. This 
dynamic nature of positioning is twofold; it is both an emancipating and constraining 
act. Liberating in the sense that it allows a person to impose, accept or reject a position 
and enslaving because discursive actions are both limited in number and constrained to 
what Buit (1995) called their ""structure o f rights" (i.e. a set of rules that defines the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of a behaviour (1995: 141). Indeed as is the case 
with discourses, in every positioning (Burr, 1995, Harré and Langenhove 1999) there is 
an embedded cultural and societal meaning which although arbitrary (i.e. not intrinsic), 
nevertheless influences implications and usage.
To summarise, in concordance with the postmodern idea of a plural self, ‘identity’ from 
the vantage point of positioning theory is in a state of constant flux. Each person 
through manoeuvring him/herself in the discumive symbolic space can take up a variety 
of subjective positionings and thus be defined in a multiple and often contradictory 
ways. Finally, ‘identity’ is a product that emerges from infinite forms of language 
exchanges and social interaction, it therefore has both a subjective and an intersubjective 
stamp of authenticity and is open to a plethora of transformations.
IP
ÎTî line with what has been discussed so far the modem ideas of pathology and 
therapeutic intervention - as they are currently perceived and addressed by medical and 
psycholo^cal theories - are in direct opposition to soda! construcüoiûst ideas. At the 
heart of this opposition lies a rejection of any therapeutic model that situates “ill” 
behaviour within the individual’s psyche. Consequently, a social constructionist 
understanding of pathology requires its being relocated from within the individual to 
within sodety as a whole.
In line with Burr and Butt (1993, as found in Burr, 1995) such a relocation enables the 
individual to take an active role in the questioning and understanding of the existing 
discourses (and consequently positionings) surrounding ‘pathologisation’. Two 
immediate benefits arise from this approach: i) the individual takes up a position of 
power that gives him/her control over his or her emotional state and ii) it takes into 
account the power and impact of smaller groups (e.g, family). In relation to the first 
benefit it should be added that this sense of power is partially (if not totally) lost in most 
traditiond therapeutic models, where the therapist positions him/herself as the ‘expert’ 
and the person as the patient. However, this approach does not come without its 
drawbacks.
Challenging a long standing discourse can be an extremely difficult task due to the 
dynamics that lie within its constitution. The nature of the difficulty and the resilience of 
certain discourses can be understood by taking into account Michel Foucault’s (1967) 
work on Madness and Civilisation whem he contested that throughout die course of 
history the groups of people that were marginalised and/or pathologised were those that 
constituted some sort of threat to the society’s statm quo. Hence, it follows tiiat the 
whole issue of pathology and therapy should also be perceived from a political 
standpoint. To conclude, a social constructionist account o f die therapeutic encounter 
should entail an analysis of the peison’s subjective position, that of immediate 
surroundings and finally a careful consideration of the power relations that lie behind the 
construction and maintenance of the relevant discourses.
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Heidegger’s Notion ofDasein and iis AppHcation in 
Existentiàl/Phénoniéiiologieal Approach to Psychotherapy
7  Exist therefore I  Think'; such was Heidegger’s response and indeed the response of 
existential phenomenolopste, such as Jeah-Paul Sartre (1965) and Maurice Merieau- 
Ponty (2000) to the Cartesian philosophical tenet "cogito ergo which has 
dominated Western thought and ruled philosophy and science ever since.
With this radical statement Heidegger set out to deconstruct the traditional view of 
human existence, which can be traced back to Plato’s division of the physical realm from 
the realm of ideas and which during the 17th century became even sharper with 
Descartes’ separation of the mind (res cogitans) from the body (res extensa). This so 
called Cartesian dualism, apart from alienating human beings from their environment, 
also created the still unresolved epistemological problem of explaining how the ideas in 
our mind can be true and valid representations of external reality (Kuhn, 1962). It is 
Heidegger’s contention that Western tMnking has imprisoned itself in what could be 
described as a mental-representation approach to die worid and at the same time has 
fallen prey to the erroneous belief that ‘reality’ can ultimately be known by means of 
detached contemplation - that is by total withdrawal from everyday practical concerns 
(Olafson, 1987).
In his work Being and Time Heidegger (1927) made it explicit that any enquiries into 
knowledge presuppose an understanding of existence (ivC. what sort of beings we are). 
As argued by Cooper (1996), Heidegger demanded a reversal of this tradition of 
epistemolog); over ontology, a reversal which implies a leap from enquiries into 
knowledge to an understanding of existence. It is on these grounds that Heidegger 
developed his hermeneutic phenomenology which stands in opposition to Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology and focuses on the understanding of the phenomenon 
(i.e. “that which shows itself-in-itself’) by means of interpretation. (1962:54 [3IJ).
Contrary to Husserl, Heidegger (1962) argued that phenomena cannot be studied 
directly because they show themselves in a disguised form and always against a 
contextual background within which they are embedded. Hence any attempt at 
describing them by means of ‘bracketing’ (as Husseri’s phenomenological method 
suggests) was according to Heidegger futile since all interpretations and meanings are 
contextual. Moreover, he believed that every analysis is always to some extent biased by 
factors such as die interpreter’s beliefs, language, and practices. Hence, based cm these 
assumptions he claimed that “our investigation itself will show that the meaning of 
phenomenological description as a method lies in interprétation” (1962:61 [37]).
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This radical stance towards the world, the mind, and the relationship between the two has 
influenced both the development of existential thought and its application to therapeutic 
practice. The essay focuses on Heidegger’s (t% 7) ontological enquiries into human 
existence, that is, inescapable and intrinsic aspects diat constitute our being. The 
first part consists of a review of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein and its inextricable 
connection to the world and others. Although, scholars distinguish between many 
aspects of existence, the so called existential givens, and although Dasein cannot be 
conceived of outside of these, due to the limited space this essay I will focus on two 
ontological concerns, that of embeddedness and interrelatedness. This will be followed 
by a discussion of the relevance of these themes in relation to existential psychotherapy 
with specific reference to the work of Medard Boss (1963) on the conceptualisation and 
treatment of neurosis.
P A R TI
Being~in-the~World bv wav of Dasein 
In his philosophical treatise Being and Time (1927) Heidegger introduced Dasein as
an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically 
distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being that Being is an issue fo r i t ... This 
implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being ... And 
this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in 
its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly... Understanding o f Being 
is itself a definite characteristic ofDasein's Being (1 ^ 2 :3 2  f 12]).
He made it explicit that existence is a way of being that only humans can share, since 
they are the only species who have the capacity to reflect upon tiieir life and thus clmm it 
as their own (i.e, own it). “We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The being of 
any such entity is in each case mine" (1962: 67, [42], author’s emphasis). Dasein in 
colloquial German means ‘eveiyday human existence’, it is however being translated in 
English as being there. Cohn (2000) argues that the emphasis is on there, however, it 
should not be interpreted only as a spatial relationship. In other words, ‘beiug-there’ - 
that is ‘in-the-world’ - is not a location, but as Cooper (1996) argued it stresses 
Dasein's engagement and involvement with the world and other people.
It is for this reason that Heidegger (1927) used the proposition “in” with its two 
distinctive attributes (i.e. the physical/spatial and the relational/involving). Dreyfus 
(2001) argued that it is the later attributes which Heidegger used in order to show the 
existential sense of what it is for humans to be in the world. Hence, “being-in as being 
involved is definitive of Dasein” (Dreyfus, 2001:43). Based on tiiese ideas a number of 
scholars have interpreted Dasein as a realm of openness, a realm of illumination where it 
discloses itself (Boss, 1963; Cohn, 1997; Cooper, 1996).
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In the ZoUîkaner Semimre Heidegger ( 19^) stated diat.
Human Existence is essentially never just an object that is somewhere présent, 
least o f all an object closed in itself Rather, this existence consists o f 'mere' 
potentialities to perceive and be aware o f all that encounters and addresses it 
... this new 'ground* o f human existence should be catted Dasein or 'Being-in- 
the-World'(trans, by Cohn, 1996: 22-25)
Explicit in this statement is Heidegger’s opposition to the Cartesian notion of a human 
being as a ‘res cogito’, that is as an ego rtmt is capable of existing separately from a 
world to which it relates in terms of ‘mental representartons’. As Dreyfus (2001) 
argued, Dasein is not a ‘‘conscious subject” 13) or a static entity that can e^dst in 
isolation; it is a state of being which in order to ‘stand out’ needs the world and others. 
In other words relatedness and involvement are for Heidegger existential givens which 
are intrinsic to human existence. This engagement and interrelatedness is accentuated by 
the intentional use of hyphens which are there to indicate that ‘Being-in-the-World-with- 
Others’ is a unitarv phenomenon. Dasein’s definition has also major implications on the 
notion of human nature or essence. Indeed as Cooper (1996) argues, “Dasein is its 
possibilities in that no sense can be made of a person’s existence, except in terms of the 
projects, out of the many available, upon which Whe is engaged” (my emphasis, 1996: 
27). Dasein’s openness and freedom of choice is made explicit in the following passage 
by Heidegger,
Dasein always understands itself in terms o f its existence - in terms o f a 
possibility o f itself: to be itself or not itself Dasein has either chosen these 
possibilities itself or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the 
particular dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold o f or 
by neglecting. The question o f existing never gets straightened out except 
through existing itself (1962:33, [13])
Further down Heidegger states, "The essence o f Dasein lies in its existence’’(author’s 
italics, 1962: 67, 142]) In the above passage, the implications of Dasein’s unique 
existence to its nature are made explicit Dasein does not have a pre-defined nature or 
essence. As Dreyfus argued human beings are “essentially simply self-interpreting” 
(2001: 23); they interpret and define themselves according to the ways they exist in the 
world, their projects, and the choices they make.
Before proceeding into a brief analysis of Dasein’s modes of being, it should be kept in 
mind that Heidegger (1927) has warned the reader explicitly that when he refers to 
Dasein or being-there, he does not refer to an individual self, or a self-contained meaning 
giving subject (as Husserl would argue). Instead he talks about humans’ mode of being 
in the world, their mode of existing. Hence it follows that when he speaks of a Dasein 
that can own itself, he refers to a way of being and not to a private sphere of ownness. 
Bearing this in mind, Dasein can “own up, disown, or fail to take a stand on its way of 
being” and on its understanding of its possibilities and choices (Dreyfus, 2001: 26).
1ft
These modes are by no means devetopmental stages, in other words a person can be in 
each one of them at any time in  its life and can indeed fail to reach the last mode of 
authentic existence. Based on Dreyfus’ (2001) analysis, Dasein initially is thrown into 
the world where it will be expected to socialise according to the particular understanding 
of the culture it is in. In this mode Dasein has not yet taken a stand on itself; it is only 
when anxiety arises and forces the individual to ask herself the question “Who am I” 
that Dasein begins to manipulate its possibilities. It is this call, what Heidegger called 
call o f conscience that wih force a person to either choose a unique position within 
his/her society and culture, or passively accept the social role s/he grew up in (this is the 
second mode).
According to Heidegger (1927) in the final mode Dasein’s full understanding of 
existence and its groundlessness liberates it from the ordinary, inauthentic way of being 
and leads it to the ownership of its own authentic creation. As Wolf (1999) argues it is 
only in this mode that Dasein is open to its possibilities and so overcomes the obstacle 
of getting lost in the They’ (i.e. the ‘general public’ which can potentially inhibit 
Dasein’s authenticity).
Being-in-the-world-mth-others
The presentation of Dasein’s way of being would not be complete without a reference to 
Heidegger’s notion of the world and what it means to be in it as a being-in-the-world- 
with-others (i.e., Mitsem). For Heidegger (1927) nothing exists in isolation; everything - 
whether humans or objects - belongs to a totality, “a grand, structural whole of 
meaningful connections”, that he calls the world (Cooper, 1996: 25). Moreover, 
following the discussion of Dasein’s existence it should be clear that for Heidegger 
(1^7) there can be no such thing as my world, or a private sphere of ownness (as 
Husserl and Sartre would argue). Humans are always in-relation. As has been explained 
'in* as a preposition imidies involvement, which for Heidegger (192?) denotes concern 
(i.e. Sorge). Indeed care is for Heidegger (1927) Dasein’s mode of existence. 
Consequently, it is through our concern and involvement that we relate to the world and 
others and not via mental representations as traditional epistemology has it. In other 
words Heidegger (1927) criticises the traditional view of relating to the world by means 
of our consciousness as an emerging quality or the product of mental process; for him 
there is no gap between the physical and the mental and so consciousness becomes a 
state of interrelatedness.
To conclude, things and people in the world reveal themselves to us through our concern, 
practical activity, and personal manipulation and engagement with them. Contraiy to 
Husseri’s ideas things do not have an ‘essence’ in themselves; instead they acquire their
Ip
meaning (hrongh our practical engagement with Üiem and only within a contextual 
background of everyday activity. Consequently, what follows from this argument is that 
any understanding or interpretation of these Things’ and/or ‘others’ can only be 
achieved through direct involvement and not through detached observadon (Cooper, 
1996). For Heidegger (1927) “the social context is the ultimate foundation of 
intelligibility” where ‘things’ acquire their ‘essences’ and people create themselves 
(Dreyfus, 2001: 7).
PART II
[Dmeimamlysis': an ExistenRaUPhenomenological Approach
to Therapy.
As will be shown, Dasein and its way of being has direct implications for therapeutic 
practice. Humans can no longer be perceived as isolated self-contained subjects who 
understand and give meaning to the world by means of mental representations. When 
viewed from the vantage point of Heideggeiian theory, their being is dependent upon the 
world and others. Moreover, the idea of human essence is also being challenged; there is 
no inner/natural constitution which predefines who we will be in the world. Human 
beings by confronting the givens of their existence (i.e. their facticity) are always in a 
process of change and self-creation.
It follows that the therapeutic aim is no longer an exploration of the client’s intrapsychic 
world. Emphasis is now placed on the clients’ relation to the world, other people, and the 
physical, social, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of their existence (Deurzen, 
2002). As argued by Cohn (1999), “there is no need to construct bridges between a 
person’s ‘inner’ world and what is ‘outside’ it - the person is always ‘in’ the world 
outside” (1999: 9).
In this last section I will show the relevance of the concept of Dasein’s being in the 
phenomenological understanding of illness and its effect on therapeutic treatment The 
discussion will concentrate on the work of the Swiss psychoanalyst Medard Boss 
(1963) who was very much influenced by Heidegger’s work and with whom he wrote 
Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis. Boss (1963), by overcoming the frontiers of his 
original training, made it explicit that Daseinsanalysis aims at the phenomenological 
understanding of the patients’ world and existence; an understanding which lies on a 
hermeneutic interpretation that does not dependent upon any theoretical model of 
understanding. In other words his therapeutic approach is literally the analysis of 
Dasein’s beingdhere, which here denotes “the realm of illumination which human 
existence is” (my emphasis, 1963: 39). This emphasis on Dasein as a realm of
on
illumination, which is its sphere of understanding and openness to perception and 
experience, has direct implications for the conceptualisation of ‘illness’ and its 
treatment.
Boss (1963) argued that Dasein’s sense of well being depends on the degree of 
openness of its illuminating realm; a wide realm of openness implies a great capacity for 
engagement with the world and others, as well as, tolerance and ability to embrace all 
aspects of being (i.e. the existential gvens). Although he did pay tribute to Freud and his 
efforts to deal with the mind/body dichotomy by means of the Unconscious, psychic 
apparatus, and the work of defence mechanisms, he argued that the reductionistic and 
mechanistic nature of psychoanalytic theory failed to encompass the basic aspects of 
human existence. In his critique of psychoanalytic theory he wrote: “if  man and his 
world did actually consist of originally isolated, somato-psychic, telescope-like 
apparatuses and objects of the outer world, not even one single ‘act of consciousness’ 
would be possible” (19fô: 79). He continued by saying that Psychoanalysis and 
Daseinsanalysis do not disagree on the nature of disturbance -which in both cases is 
viewed as an unacceptable and disowned aspect of existence- but on its location. 
Psychoanalysis places disturbance within the individual’s psychic realm, whereas 
Daseinsanalysis locates it in-between the Dasein and its relation to the world and others. 
In other words, disturbance is located in Dasein’s point of meeting with the world, that is 
its realm of illumination. It follows that in Boss’s theoiy a number of psychoanalytic 
notions - such as the system Unconscious and repression - which draw upon an 
intrapsychic understanding of human existence are perceived as misconceptions and 
misunderstandings of what it means to exist.
The following vignette provides an illustration of Boss’s psychotherapeutic work and 
conceptualisation of illness:
The patient was a 32 year old young woman who from a very young age had 
suffered from colitis and diarrhoea, which not only incapacitated her, but 
threatened her existence. In the two years o f analysis, it became apparent what a 
devastating influence her mother had upon her daughter's development. She 
described her as overpowering, infatuated with cleanliness and extremely 
prudish. The first complaints the patient made concerned snakes and worms, 
which appeared in masses the moment she closed her eyes; these apparitions 
were exceedingly distressing and terrifying to her. Upon the analyst request she 
begun to draw these loathsome creatures in an effort to describe them in the 
greatest possible detail. However, to the patient's dismay, these caricatures 
seemed to intensify her fear and worsen her diarrhoea (1963:147-154).
Boss, despite the apparent deterioration of her condition and the patient’s relentless 
resistance, persisted in his questioning and inquiries into the patient’s personal 
understanding of these creatures. Instead of looking for symbolic interpretations (e.g. 
the snake as a symbol of the phallus), he “listened attentively to hear what kind of a
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world and what possibilities of behaviour the snakes themselves spoke to the patient” 
(19^: 149-150). Above all he tried to remain open to the patient’s own reflections, 
without imposing his own understanding of the situation.
What Boss (1963) tried to show in this clinical vignette is the importance of the 
hermeneutic-phenomenological approach on tiie understanding of the notion of 
disturbance and its therapeutic treatment. Through out her treatment he refused to make 
any distinction between her physical and mental symptoms. Instead he approached her 
disturbance as a gestalt which acquired its meaning within the patient’s contextual 
backg-ound and her own phenomenological understanding. This emphasis on the 
patient’s perceptions is explicit in his refusal to engage in any symbolic interpretations 
which imply a pre-set meaning outside the patient’s referential totaI% and contextual 
background. Moreover, by prompting her to elaborate on the nature of her experiences 
and by retaining his own openness to eveiy realm of her existence, Boss aimed at the 
broadening of her sphere o f acceptance and her realm o f openness and illumination. 
Indeed, by the end of her treatment she had come to accept what she had previously 
loathed, feared, and rejected as just another part of her being.
The patient’s illumination is described by Boss (1963) as “a radiant light within her” 
(1963: 154); a light powerful enough to emsure the emandpation of her potentialities as 
‘ being-in-the-world (with-others).
9 9
REFERENCES
Boss, M. (1963). Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, timis. Ludwig B. 
Lefebre. New Yoik: Basic Books Inc.
Cohn, W. H, (1997). Existential Thought and Therapeutic Practice. 
London: Sage.
Cohn, W. H. (1999). ‘Why Heidegger?’. Journal for the Society for 
Existential Analysis, 10.2:2-9.
Cohn, W. H. (2000). ‘Heidegger’s Way to Psychotherapy’. Journal for the 
Society for Existential Analysis, 11.2:2-9.
Cooper, E, D. (1996). Heidegger. London: Claridge Press.
Denrzen, E. van (2002) Existential Counselling and Psychotherapy in 
Practice. London: Sage.
Dreyfus, L. H. (2001) Being-indke^World. A Commentary on 
Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Heidegger M. (1927). Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1962).
Heidegger, M. (1993). Basic Writings. Introduction D. F. Krell. London: 
Routledge.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure o f Scientific Rexfolutions. Chicago: 
University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). The Phenomenology o f Perception, trans. C. 
Smith. London: Routledge (2000).
Olafson, A. F. (1987). Heidegger and the Philosophy o f Mind. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
Solomon, C. R. (1987). From Hegel to Existentialism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,
9  ft
Spinelli, E. (1989). The Interpreted World. An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Psychology. Wndon: Sage
Wolf, D (1999). ‘Heidegger’s Conscience’. Journalfor the Society for 
Existential Analysis, 10.2: 54-62.
OA
The Concept of Psychic Reality and its Relation to the Phenomenon 
of Transference
Psychic Reality: its phenomenal simplicity and overuse in different contexts among 
psychoanalytic texts has contributed to the notorious difficulty of its definition. 
Depending on the school of fiiought, psychic reality has often been equated to tibe 
individual’s inner, private world, which is considered to be the only knowable reality, or 
the product of an interaction between external and internal worfds.
In attempt to define the term and its position within psychoanalytic theory and the 
therapeutic relationship, the present paper is divided in two parts. The first part is 
dedicated to a discussion of the contributions of the two most representative 
psychoanalytic schools of thought (i.e. Freudian and Kleinian). Due to the word limit of 
the present essay, special emphasis will be placed on the term’s origins within classical 
Freudian theory; hence the term will be discussed from the vantage point of both the 
topographical and structural models of the mind. What will follow is a concise 
presentation of Klein’s contributions to the understanding of the term with special focus 
on her views on ‘unconscious phantasy’. The second part of this essay will look at the 
relation between psychic re^ ty  and the phenomenon of hansference. It will be argued 
that transference has its roots in the patient’s psychic reality and can be perceived as a 
manifestation of her internal world. In other words, a person’s overt behaviour and 
fomiatiott of relationships are considered to be mere reflections of her inner psychic 
world; they are the outcome of a complex mental activity (most of which takes place on 
an unconscious level) which leads to highly idiosyncratic evaluations and experiences.
PARTI
Beginnings
The term psychic reality owes its existence to Freud’s (1895) early postulations 
regarding the ori^ns of hysterical symptoms. In his collaborative work - Studies on 
Hysteria (1895) - with Joseph Breuer, he argued that hysterics suffer from 
reminiscences and that their symptoms constitute a disguised recollection of actual 
traumas that had taken place eariy in their lives. Subsequentiy, Freud (1^7) discovered 
that most d  his patients’ accounts of traumas were fictitious, pure representations of the 
their unconscious phantasies and wishes. Hence, the idea that outer reality constitutes the 
locus of the pathogenic impact was no longer plausible and Freud, much to his dismay, 
abandoned his theoiy of seduction. In one of his letters addressed to his friend Wilhelm 
Fliess and written as early as 1897 Freud wrote:
I  no longer believe in my neurotica... There are no indications o f reality in the 
unconscious, so that one canmh distinguish between truth and fiction that has 
been cathected with affect (as found in Masson, 1985:264)
Later in his life, Freud clarified the above statement in tiiC following way.
When I had pulled myself together, I  was able to draw the right conclusions 
from my discovery : namely that neurotic symptoms were not related directly to 
actual events but to wishfid phantasies, and that as fa r as the neurosis was 
concerned, psychical reality was o f more importance than material reality
With these confessions, Freud abandoned his physical theory of hysteria and his 
emphasis on the external world and shifted his gaze to the inner depth of the human 
psyche (i.e. the unconscious). By 1897, he had discovered that the system Unconscious 
apart from containing actual memories that were long forgotten and kept at bay by a 
process he called repression, also included phantasies* and wishes that were intimately 
related to instinctual impulses. As a result his attention was drawn away from material 
facts - such as traumatic events - and concentrated on the relationship between memory, 
impulses, and phantasies. From then on, any reference to external reMity was based on 
the individual’s psychic reality or her inner perspective looking outward.
As argued by Caper (2000) Freud came to the realisation that unconscious phantasies, 
which arose from instinctual impulses inevitably merged with perceptions of external 
reality in order to give them “an idiosyncratic psycholo^cal agnificance” (2000:21). 
Hence, psychic reality was invoked in order to argue that unconscious phantasies can 
have real effects. Based on this assumption, it was argued that individuals showing 
neurotic and hysterical symptoms experience their wishful phantasies as if they Were 
real, that is as having an objective reality.
In his seminal work the Interpretation o f Dreams, Freud (1900) argued that "the 
Unconscious is the true psychical reality" (19(K): 613, italics added). Henœ, from a 
classical Freudian perspective, psychic reality, when viewed from the vantage point of the 
topographical model, is a mosaic of unconscious phantasies, which, despite their illusory 
nature and alienation from the outer world, retain a significant psychic weight for the 
individual.
As Freud put it with utmost clarity,
“[phantasies J possess a reality o f a sort. It remains a fact that the patient has 
created these phantasies for him self... The phantasies possess psychical as 
contrasted to material reality, and we gradually learn to understand that in the 
world o f the neurosis it is psychical reality which is the decisive kind (Freud,
It follows that Freud (1911, 1917) viewed psychic reality as having its roots in a 
person’s earliest stages of development. It is therefore intimately related to wish JulfiUmg 
phantasies m é  to one’s inherent need for enhancing pleasure and avoiding pain and
’ In line with James Strachey’s translation of Freudian works phantasy with ‘ph’ designates its 
unconscious nature and is used in opporition to conscious fantasies or daydremns.
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discomfort Moreover, since psychic reality emerges out of the Unconscious, it functions 
according to the pleasure principle and is thus governed by primary process which is 
characterised by unhindered psychic energy and gives rise to dreams and artistic 
creativity as well as pa&oloÿcal symptoms and halludnations. It follows, that psychic 
reality pre-exists awareness of material reality and the so called reality principle and 
secondary process which develop later in life (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988).
In the light of these considerations psychic reality represents a person’s early psychic 
origins and reflects his/her unconscious wishes. When coupled with conscious 
functioning, it contributes to the development of artistic creativity and a unique 
perception of the world and others. However, a failure of conscious functioning can 
result in overwhelming emotions and an inability to discriminate between internal and 
external realities; such failure was according to Freud (1923, 1%4) the origins of a 
breakdown and a complete detachment from the world.
However, as argued by Sandler et. al. (1997) around the 1920s Freud became aware of a 
number of difficulties and inconsistencies in his view of the mental apparatus; it was a 
turning point for his theory, which led to the development of the structural model of the 
mind. In this, he presented a tripartite division of the mental apparatus which consisted 
of the id, the ego, and the superego. Although what follows is an oversimplificaticm of 
the terms, it could be argued that the jd  corresponds to the concept of the unconscious 
and functions according to the pleasure principle and primary process. The eg^can be 
perceived to be an ‘agent’ whose main purposes am self-preservation artd the 
maintenance of psychic balance between the id, the external world, and ethical, societal 
demands. It therefore functions on the basis of the reality principle and secondary 
process. Finally, the superego corresponds to the child’s intemalisation and 
identification with her parents and their prohibitions, as well as love and acceptance 
(Brermer, 1992).
From the vantage point of Freud’s later theoretical formulations, psychic reality is 
perceived as the outcome of a fusion - not necessarily in equal amounts - of the death 
drive and libido (i.e. sexual instincts) which in turn gives rise to unconscious phantasies 
containing both aggressive and sexual elements.
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The Contributiom o f the Kleinian School
Freud set the scene, but it was Melanie Klein’s (1921, 1927) studies on aggression, 
unconscious phantasy, and projective identification that shed light on the nature of 
psychic reality and its manifestation in observed behaviom. As it became the focal point 
of her interest (especially in her work with children), Klein developed the so called 
playing technique as a means of exploring the child’s inner world. It was a technique 
that gave her access to what Freud had previously thought to be a terra incognita (Caper, 
2000).
In the course of her analysis of young children, Klein (1932, 1955, 1959) found that 
their psychic reality - as expressed in their play which was accompanied by vivid verbal 
representations - was dominated by extreme polarities of bonndless love and sadistic 
hate. She postulated that such extreme and rapidly shifting emotions have tiieir roots in 
equally fluid and extravagant unconscious phantasies that in turn represent the child’s 
aggressive and erotic drives. Moreover, she argued that the infant’s phantasy world, 
coupled with its need for survival give rise to the formation of a powerful internal world 
that is dominated by concrete images which are either good or bad. It is a world that is 
created by the infant’s capacity to introject (in phantasy) her parental imagos which are 
in turn inevitably distorted by its own projections (mainly intense feelings). According 
to her tiieoiy, this internal world is laden witii psychological significance and colours the 
perception of extemal reality throughout an individuars life. In other words, a person’s 
psychic reality depends on these early intrqjections and projections of extern^ objects 
(Klein, 1959).
Consequently, after a series of theoretical modifications regarding the nature of 
transference, superego, free association, and unconscious phantasies, Klein (1921, 
1927a,b) concluded that the unconscious is virtually dominated by psychic reality. 
Together with her colleague Isaacs (1952), Klein (1936, 1940, 1952a) gave a broader 
perspective to the notion of phantasy which was qualitatively different to the Freudian 
conceptualisation. Indeed, her insistence that psychic reality constitutes the basis of all 
conscious activities and therefore colours an individual’s perception of the extemal 
world and others led to the creation of a theoretical rift between the two views. From a 
Kleinian perspective, psychic reality (i.e. unconscious phantasy) is always active; it 
colours an individual’s conscious perceptions in highly idiosyncratic ways and 
influences all mental activities (conscious or unconscious), as well as, processes 
(primary or secondary).
Laplanche & Pontalis (1988) have written on the distinction between the Kleinian and 
Freudian thinking by pointing to Freud’s distinction between imaginary and conscious 
perception which leads to a view of phantasies as “illusoiy productions” (Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1988: 315). In contrast, Klein (1957) made no such distinction; to her there is
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no such thing as ‘pure’ conscious experience which is devoid of unconscious phantasy 
elements.
To conclude, from the vantage point of Kleinian theory, psychic reality is the interplay of 
internal and extemal worlds; in other words the line of demarcation between psychic and 
extemal realities is never clear. As argued by Caper (2000) die quality of an individual’s 
conscious experience is al ways determined by the nature of her unconscious phantasies, 
it is not the product of pure rational thinking.
PARTlh
The Phenomenon of Transference
In the light of the above considerations regarding the notion of psychic reality 
transference can be regarded as an inevitable consequence of the mere interaction 
between the therapist and the patient, it is an interaction of two complete psyches with all 
their assumptions, values, and psychological idiosyncrasies. Throughout the history of 
die psychoanalytic movement, the phenomenon has been through a number of revisions 
and reconstmction which often contradict each other (Waelder, 1965; Loewenstein, 
1969; Sandler, et al., 1992, 1997). Hence, different schools of psychoanalytic thought 
emphasised different aspects of the term. Once again, due to the word limit of the 
present paper emphasis will be placed on Freudian and Kleinian thinking.
Historical Origins o f Transference
Freud (1895) initially viewed transference as an obstacle to analysis; it was seen as the 
patient’s sabotage and resistance to treatment. It was only later in his career, during the 
phase of die topographic^; model of the mind, &at he began to realise the phenomenon’s 
indispensable qualities. As argued by Sandler et al., (1997) from the vantage point of the 
topographical model, transference was equated with the vicissitudes of the patient’s 
unconscious impulses and wishes. In other words it was seen as the manifestation of 
instinctual energies. Consequently, Freud (1905) viewed transference, which was by now 
seen as a repetition of past feelings and attitudes, as “new editions or facsimiles o f the 
impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress 
o f analysis" (1905 [1901]: 116). He concluded that for the sake of analysis both 
positive and negative transference must be inteipreted and should therefore not be 
ignored or played into by die analyst As a result transference inteipretations became a 
condition for psychoanalytic treatment and the analyst’s “most powerful ally" (1905, 
[1901]: 117).
By 1912, Freud had developed the notions of positive and negative transference; the 
fomier referred to the patient’s poritive feelings towards the analyst which were 
perceived as facilitators of analytic treatment, whereas the latter referred to a constellation 
of negative feelings and actions that hindered therapeutic work. Moreover, he also spoke
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of an erotic transference by which he meant the patient’s unconscious transference of 
sexual wishes. Finally, in 1914, Freud developed the notion of transference neurosis, 
which was perceived to be present iu every patient and which portrayed the ways in 
which previous relationships and affects moulded present feelings towards the analyst. 
Within this context, transference was viewed as an intermediate region where psychic 
and objective realities met. It was a space where the analyst was able to interpret and thus 
intervene in the psychic world of the patient.
However, the advent of the structural model of the mind led to a gradual recognition of 
the ego’s and superego’s influence on transference. As a result, the term has become 
more than a repetition of childhood experiences and relationships to important others 
(Freud, 1909, 1912,1914) and includes a range of manifestations such as trcimference 
of defence 1936), character transference {Saa^m;, 1970), and total transference
(Joseph, 1985). It could be argued that the main reasonwhich led to an expansion of the 
concept of transference is the importance of contributions made by object-reJation 
theories especially in the area of unconscious phantasy (i.e. psychic reality).
Kleiman views on the Origins o f Transference
A  careful review of the Kleiman papers shows that transference and transference 
inteipretations are central to her theory. In her view transference is the reflection of 
unconscious phantasies and wishes in relation to the introjected otgects from infancy 
and childhood. In other words, it portrays the patient’s psychic reality as expressed in 
the analytic situation. Transference is therefore intimately linked to her notion of 
projection, by which she meant a patient’s attempts to project positive as well as negative 
intern^ psychic elements onto the analyst (Klein, 1946).
From the vantage point of Kleinian theorists, the transference “is not ... merely a 
repetition of old attitudes, events, and traumas from the past; it is an externalisation of 
unconscious phantasy here-and-now” (Hinshelwood, 1989: I^ . This argument is in 
line widi Spillius (19^) view who traced the roots of the phenomenon in Klein’s 
conceptualisation of unconscious phantasy (i.e. psychic reality) and its pervasive effect 
on conscious experience. She argued that unconscious phantasy underlies every 
conscious thought and should thus be perceived as part of a continuum and not as a 
distinct categoiy of thought and feeling. Hence, from a Kleinian stand point, transference 
encompasses a much broader area. Unlike the classical Freudian view that sees 
transference as a mere repetition of early experiences, Kleinians see it as inextricably 
linked to a person’s internal world (i.e. psychic reality).
Hence, in object-relation theories, hansfcience analysis consists of an Interpretation in 
the here-and-now; by that it is meant the patient’s enactment of intemalised object
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relationships and of the vicissitudes of the instincts as manifested in unconscious 
phantasies and wishes (Klein, 1946). Consequently, from the vantage point of Kleinian 
theory whatever goes on within the analytic hour is part of the transference phenomenon; 
it follows that the analyst must have the capadty to contain the patient’s projections 
without fulfilling his/her need to join in. Instead she needs to focus on their 
interpretations and on making emotional contact with the patient so that his/her psychic 
reality can be grasped.
My theoretical understanding of the concepts of psychic reality and tranËerence has 
been invaluable to my therapeutic work (especially in relation to transference 
inteipretations). The power of these two phenomena and their manifestation within the 
therapeutic session was particularly evident in my interaction with a young female patient 
of mine. Susan^ was a twenty-year-old woman who was referred because of acute 
feelings cf anxiety and a persistent fear of being “observed” and “persecuted”. As I 
am currently working within a multidisciplinary team, I often have to attend meetings 
together with social workers and psychiatrist who are involved with clients’ care. A few 
weeks ago I had to sit together with Susan in one of these meetings. The following week 
she came in feeling particularly anxious and looking distraught; she began talking about 
her mother whom she described as very “intrusive” and “overprotective”. She 
remembered how observed she felt as a child and how impossible it has been for her to 
retain her “private space”. As she was talking I noticed that she was becoming more 
and more angiy, almost shouting (a behaviour that in the space of two months, she had 
never exhibited before).
My understanding of this sudden angry outburst reflected not only something important 
about my chent’s past and her relationship to her mother but also as conveying 
something about our relationship. Specifically, I felt that last week’s meeting tested the 
boundaries of our relationship; possibly I was also experienced as an intruder myself, as 
someone who entered her ‘private space’ without her consent. Wlien viewed from this 
vantage point, it could be argued that Susan used her eariy memories and feelings 
towards her moflier as a means of communicating her feelings towards me.
To conclude, it has been shown that transference is inextricably linked to one’s psychic 
reality, nevertheless, it is my contention that it would be a misconception to view ah 
client’s material as tiansference. Such a  generalisation would be detrimental for the 
therapeutic relationship, since it would neglect the function of the therapist as a real 
person who has an effect on both the client’s psychology and the relationship per se. In 
line with Sandler et al. (2002) I prefer viewing transference as a “technical artefact 
deriving from the view tiiat only inteipretations of the transference bring about psychic 
change” (Sandler, et. al., 2002:51).
 ^My client’s name together with certain information given have been altered in order to protect her 
anonymity and confidentiality.
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PART II 
Therapeutic Practice 
Dossier
Introduction
This dossier provides a context for my therapeutic practice and experience throughout 
the course. It is comprised of brief descriptions of each of my climeal placements 
together with my ‘Final Clinical Paper’ which provides an account of important and 
decisive factors which influenced my development as a counselling psychologist and my
As specified in the introduction to the portfolio potentially identifying information 
related to clients have been either altered or omitted in order to maintain confid^tiahty.
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First-Year Clinical Placement: 
Counselling within an Ot^anisational Setting, 
October 2001 - August 2002
During my first year of training I worked within an Employee Assistant Programme 
(EAP), that operated as part of a major transport network situated in the South East of 
England. The programme provided time-limited therapy (usually 6 sessions) and was 
available for all employees (clients) who had either sought assistance themselves or were 
refen-ed by their manager, supemspr and/or company’s doctor.
The EAP was at the time managed by a senior counsellor and included two clinical 
psychologists and seven therapists who were working mainly from a humanistic 
perspective. The therapeutic team also included several trainees and a health 
psychologist. As a trainee, my role involved both individuM and joint psychological 
assessments, conducting individual therapy with clients from the waiting list, utilising 
weekly indMdual supervision sessions, and attending work meetings and seminars. The 
client group attending die programme was predominantly male and varied in terms of 
age, ethnicity, and race. Overall, clients presented with difficulties that were of low to 
moderate severity and related to a number of issues such as depression, anxiety, trauma, 
relationship difficulties, and stress arising from work based conflicts.
In addition, I had the opportunity to relate and leam from members who worked within 
the company’s drug and alcohol unit which offered long-term psychotherapy to those 
employees who had drug and alcohol related problems.
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Second and Third Year Clinical Placement: an NHS 
Commnnily Mental Health Team (GMHT) 
January 2003 - August 2004
During my second and third year of clinical training I worked within a community 
mental health team situated in South East England. The team was multidisciplinary in 
nature and was comprised of a number of psychiahists, clinical psychologists, social 
workers, community psycMatric nurses, and support workers. The service also included 
two psychotherapeutic teams comprised of fifteen professionally qualified 
psychotherapists who worked from a number of psychotherapeutic orientations (e.g., 
psychodynamic, humanistic, cognitive-behavioural, gestalt, etc.). The client population 
was mixed in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status. Presenting 
difficulties were often of a severe and enduring nature, including chronic depression, 
anxiety, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive, and personality disorders. Due to the 
severity of the clients’ symptoms the CMHT was medically led; each client was offered 
both psychiatric and psycholo^eal help and was managed by a combination of 
pharmaceutical and psychotherapeutic interventions.
Referrals to the psychology and psychotherapeutic services came from local G.P.s, or 
members of the psychiatric team working within the same premises. Individual cases 
were discussed during weekly interdisciplinary meetings in order to assess their severity 
and to proceed with service provision decisions. Overall, clients were seen for 
assessment within two to three weeks of referral and were then placed on a waiting list 
for the duration of four to five months.
As I spent almost two years in this placement, I had Ihe opportunity to attend a large 
number of both psychoanalytic and cognitive-behavioural groups as well as monthly 
psychology meetings and weeMy case discussion meetings. During the first part of my 
work within the team I practised from a psychodynamic perspective under the 
supervision of a Kleinian psychotherapist. Therapy sessions were once weekly and 
lasted for 50 minutes, their duration was flexible (6 months to a year). During the 
second part of my placement (i.e. third year of training), I was practising from a 
cognitive-behavioural perspective under the supervision of a cognitive-behavioural 
psychotherapist. During this year the number of sessions was limited (usually 20) and 
lasted for one hour each week.
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Âddîtîoflal Professional Activities
Activity; Conference Date:
Annual Conference of the Society of Existential Analysis:
T^fae Im/Possibiiity of Research’
I was one of the three speakers who were invited to speak at the 
conference. I talked about my ongoing research on "The Construction of 
the Notion of Self from an ExistentiayPhenomenological Perspective^.
Nctwiiyi Teaching W inter&Sprmg
Terms 2005
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling
(NSPC)
I taught three modules which are part of the schoofs MSc programme in 
Existential Counselling Psychology.
Activity: Certificate in Existential Supervision W inter & Spring
Terms 2005
New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling
(NSPC)
I have attended two of the three course modules which lead to obtaining a 
certificate in Existential Supervision.
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Final Clinical Paper; Up Close and Clinical
Reflections on my Training in Counselling Psychology
Overview
My decision to train as a counselling psychologist evolved out of a passionate interest in 
art, literature, and philosophy. Although I was fortunate to begin my studies in 
universities that in-omoted a considerable amount of flexibility in the choice academic
subjects, my affinity with plurality began much earlier in my family environment, where I 
had the opportunity to be exposed to a number of different academic fields. While in 
England, completing an undergraduate degree in psychology and later a Master’s in 
theoretical psychoanalysis, I became familiar with a number of different discourses 
which were challenging and often diametrically opposed to one another (e.g. modem vs 
postmodern discourses). Such diversity broadened my perspective, tolerance, and 
personal stance within the academic field and influenced my decision to proceed with my 
current training in counselling pitychology.
The present paper is an attempt to explore my personal experience and development as a 
counselling psychologist. I perceive this to be an ongoing process which is highly 
influenced by academic theories and therapeutic practice. I have tiierefore tried to give an 
account of both, as well as to portray the impact of my personal idiosyncrasies as 
reflected in my accounts regarding my philosophy, supervision, and personal therapy. 
Although for reasons of clarity I treat each topic separately, in real life all these aspects 
form my personal way of working integratively.
The Field of Counselling Psychology
Counselling psychology is a distinctive profession that has emerged out of an 
existential/humanistic heritage which highlights a holistic understanding of human 
beings and promotes a psychological as well as ontolo^cal understanding of human 
existence. Woolfe (1996) defined the profession as “the application of psychological 
knowledge to the practice of counselling” (1996: 8) and argued that the field’s unique 
position, which lies somewhere between the scientific and psychotiierapeutic worlds, 
combines the values of major psychotherapeutic orientations with knowledge derived 
from formal psychological enquiry. Counselling psychologists are therefore seen as 
reflective, scientist-practitioners, who are capable of integrating different positions of
theories, as well as research, and practice. Moreover, their emphasis on interpersonal 
relationship and on the importance of subjective experience, meanings, and belids
2003).
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Epistemology & Research: the Scientist-Practidoner Paradigm 
The sdentist-practitioner idea, although noble in nature, is not without criticisms. 
Williams and Irving (1996) conceived it as a “conceptual impasse” (1995: 5) which is 
perpetuated by the attempt to combine opposing philosophies (e.g. empiricism and 
phenomenology). Spinelli (2001), an eminent existential psychotherapist and 
counselling psychologist, questioned its validity on the basis of an ^herent conflict 
between natural and human sciences and their views on human beings and the world.
I have always felt a sense of disquiet when it came to research and epistemology 
especially when viewed from a positivist/empiricist stance. The measurement of an 
‘objective reality’ is an alien concept to me, both philosophically and experientially. As 
shown by my research topics throughout this course, 1 have struggled with different 
discourses as is evident through my critique of traditional/positivist epistemology from a 
Heideggerian perspective. In line with a number of counselling psychologists (Corrie 
and Callahan, 2000; Cowie, 1999; Spinelli, 2001; Woolfe et al., 2003), I now believe that 
from the standpoint of counselling psychology, science needs to be redefined, as any 
claims of ‘objectivity’ are bound to be at odds with an emphasis on the uniqueness of 
the individual and subjective experience.
Despite my espousal of a humanistic view of science and its emphasis on qualitative 
methods such as discourse analysis, ground theory, and inteipretative phenomenological 
analysis, I feel it is also important to be informed of quantitative approaches. I therefore 
believe that counselling psychology can benefit from a pluralistic stance, which cultivates 
the possibility of an open dialogue between different approaches that in return can 
facilitate diversity and tolerance.
A Personal View of Integration: the Importance of FlnraUsm
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top o f 
a mountain, whence the stone would fall back o f its own weight. They had 
thought with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than 
futile and hopeless labour. (‘The Myth of Sisyphus’, Albert Camus).
Beginning the section with a Greek myth does not simply aim at creating a lyrical effect. 
To me, cultural heritage, which includes myths, philosophy, poetry, art, and history, lies 
at the very centre of one’s way of being and relating to the world and others (whether on 
a personal, social, or therapeutic level). It is my contention that integration is a state of 
being that is inexhicably related to one’s personal and political stance in the world. It is 
therefore not confined to the realm of theories. Contrary to other views I do not see 
integration as a simple and comprehensive combination of different theoretical models 
which are internally consistent (i.e. theoretical integration) or a mosaic of technical 
skills and techniques aimed at addressing specific psychological problems (i.e. technical
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eclecticism). To me mtegration encompasses a much broader area that includes 
theoretical and experiential elements.
While working with clients, my personal view of integration encompasses all areas of 
experience; it is above all a critical awareness of one’s own world view(s), lived 
experience, and personal philosophy, as well as, a respect for the existing diversity of all 
positions, beliefs and discourses. In other words, integration is not a fixed concept, it is 
an ongoing process. Consequentiy, in relation to therapeutic practice, it becomes highly 
dependent upon the uniqueness of each therapeutic encounter, as well as on the 
therapist’s and client’s ways Of being with each other <i.e. their interaction) and with 
themselves (i.e. their own sense and use of self).
Based on the above assumption, I find my position to be in line with those practitioners 
who place integration within the relationship (i.e. primarily in ‘the between’) and who 
argue for a plasticity in their ways of working therapeutically which is guided by the 
client’s needs (Clarkson, 1992; Hollanders, 2001). This stance was particularly evident 
in my work with clients coming from different cultural backgrounds and countries. Our 
interaction was constantly challenged by the diversity of each others’ experiences and 
perceptions of how we ‘should’ live and interact with others. Through these encounters, 
I discovered tiiat the identification of concrete therapeutic aims and goals is not always 
possible, as most of the times my clients’ needs were deeply rooted in their difficulty to 
adapt to the English society and way of life.
My use of self (by means of disclosure) became very pertinent as my clients knew that I 
was also a foreigner. A Greek mentality was seen as diametrically different from the 
En^ish; as cultural issues and attitudes were at the heart of our encounters, I had to be 
very sensitive and critically aware of my own assumptions and views, as well as my 
‘Greekness’. An explorative and descriptive stance was therefore imperative; it cultivated 
an atmosphere of acceptance and a focus on understanding rather than explaining my 
clients’ difficulties and ways of being.
Psychology and Postmodernism
As mentioned in the introduction, postmodern theories have always been at the centre of 
my interests. However, it has not always been easy to combine postmodern assumptions 
and psychological knowledge. I agree with Kvale’s (1999) assumptions, who argued 
that one of the reasons psychology has been notoriously resistant to following the 
postmodern movement is because it is still fiimly rooted in ideas that were formed 
during the Enlightenment. Moreover, Gergen (1999, 2003) expanded on this argument 
by presenting four overarching presumptions based on which psychology established 
itself as a modem discipline. These are a belief in: i)an objective and knowable world, ii)
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universal properties, in) empirical metkod, and iv) the progressive nature of scientific 
research
Postmodernism casts doubt on all these assumptions; Lyotard (1984) argued that the 
modernists' dream of discovering one unified theory (or grand narrative) which will 
somehow explain the human condition, has not only been abandoned by postmodern 
theorists but has also been judged to be a mere illusion. It is in the above spirit that 
Hollanders (2003) quite rightly questioned whether pure theoretical integration and its 
attempt to come up with one unified theory can ever be possible, or is even *‘in step with 
a post-modem society in which the search for absolutes has been abandoned” 
(2003:35). I believe that unless we try to address this question, psychological knowledge 
and its application in professional/ therapeutic practice will continue to be marginalised 
and isolated from neighbouring disciplines in the social and political arenas.
During my training, I have tried to address the above question through my readings of 
different theoretical perspectives and attempts to challenge the current position of 
psychology within postmodemity. affinity with social constructionism and 
existential philosophy has been particularly helpful and has had a profound effect on my 
way of working with clients. Both disciplines see reality and meaning as a co- 
construction between two people (DeurzemSmith, 1997; Gergen, 1991, 1993; Spinelli,
1989) reality is not found, it is constnicted by individuals. Hence, while with my clients, 
I tend to focus on identifying and exploring their own constructs and views which are 
construcred by their interactions with other people and the pluralistic society in which we 
live.
It is my contention that psychotherapy no longer affords to be a closed system; it needs 
to open up and embrace the constructs of the communities and societies that it serves. 
Hence, the idea of the existence of a unique, objective redity is exchanged by an 
emphasis on multiplicity of perspectives. Pluralism allows room for the co-existence of 
different therapeutic approaches which are perceived to be equally ‘true’ and valuable. It 
follows that a pluralistic stance to psychotherapeutic practice uses concepts and 
techniques from different models without undermining their autonomous character and 
position within the field (Samuels, 1989).
However, 1 should mention that my attempts to combine my knowledge from different 
fields have not always been smooth; there were times when I felt frustrated, almost 
envious of the apparent security of the purists’ belief in the validity and effectiveness of 
one model. While working with clients I often felt like ffiying’ over a land of 
contradictions (i.e. their psychological diversity). Sustaining these contradictions without 
trying to fit them within ‘fixed’ interpretations or label them as pathological was not 
always easy. To date I have not reached any definite way of working with clients, but I
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have learned to live with the dilemmas and paradoxes of human existence and the 
insecurities that are inherent in our profession. Before embarking on a description of my 
therapeutic work with clients, I  would like to summarise my philosophical viewpoint 
which underlies all my integrative attempts and winch lies at the very centre of my ways 
of working with clients.
The Hoar of Gonscionsness
If the Greeks were right in claiming that philosophy is a way of life and not just an 
academic discipline, then philosophy is also an integral part of psychological therapy. In 
my view, both fields are above d l a representation of an attitude which aims at a critical 
reflection and examination of life and meaning as well as of personal existence (as 
reflected in our emotions, thoughts and actions) and ways of being in the world (i.e. our 
subjective positions in the world with others).
My personal stance encompasses an attempt to combine my philosophical knowledge 
with my psychological understanding. It is a difficult process in that it cannot rest on 
any firm basis. In this respect, Deurzen’s (1997, 1998, 2002) emphasis on existential 
philosophy and her conceptualisation of therapy as an exploration and clarification of 
the client’s ways of being in the four world dimensions of human existence, have 
definitely been an immense source of reassurance and inspiration to me.
Sisyphus
The myth of Sisyphus is veiy close to my personal ideology in life. Sisyphus’ task 
encapsulates the absurdity of human existence in a world devoid of intrinsic meaning 
and universal truths and values. Contrary to the corrunon view, the absurd - when viewed 
from postmodern and existential perspectives - ceases to be dreadful. It is not to be met 
with fear and despair, it is rather an invitation to live and experience life as it is, liberated
There is an inherent paradox in the myth and it is in this paradox that the emancipation 
of the absurd position lies. Despite his condemnation, Sisyphus remains conscious of 
his life, of his endless task. This hour of consciousness, “the breathing space” - as 
Camus (2000: 109) put it - constitutes his freedom and victory. It is during these 
reflective moment(s), when he returns to his rock and contemplates his life, that 
Sisyphus realises that his fate belongs to him. The myth therefore teaches us a number 
of lessons; it reminds us tiiat to a large extent we are the authors of our own lives and 
thus responsible for our own existence. It also stresses the importanee o f personal 
meaning in a life which is iiAerently meaningless and at the same time fills us with a 
sense of unease since freedom gives rise to anxieties and insecurities.
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It is my contention that one of the central aims of the therapeutic encounter is to awaken 
and enhance these moments of reflection. In other words, a person can only begin to feel 
empowered and thus able to move forwards if s/he is aware of her predicament and of 
the wider social context within which s/he relates to others. As Deurzen (1968) argued 
“people may evolve in any direction, good or bad ... only reflection on what constitutes 
good and bad makes it possible to exercise one’s choice in the matter” (1^8:56-57). 
When viewed from this perspective therapy becomes dialectic mdfacilitative rather than 
prescriptive and Ærective. A descriptive, clarificatorv and reflective approach, together 
with Rogers’ (1951, 1961) core conditions of empaüiy, congruence and unconditional 
positive regard, are at the very heart of my therapeutic work.
Trainmg Experience;
The Importance o f the Therapeutic Relationship
Despite my fascination with theories, I now feel confident in acknowledging that no 
theory can ever grasp the complexity of human beings. So if I were to summarise the 
outcome of my training experience in a few lines, 1 would say that theories are simply 
metaphors and should be treated as such; they are descriptive tools and not explanations 
of the human predicament. In my eyes, the only ‘concrete’ reality in therapy is the 
therapeutic reWfowAip (C3arkson, 1995); it is only through our authentic engagement 
with clients that theories can become useful.
The idea that the relationship is the most important factor in the therapeutic process is in 
itself integrative as it is a synthesis of different qualities. Relating in therapy is not 
simply an attempt to apply theoretical and technical skills in practice; it is also a being 
with and for the client (Spinelli, 1994: 2%, 317). Specifically, being with implies an 
acknowledgement of the client’s perspective, without any attempt to correct it. Being for 
the client implies an attempt to enter the client’s lived world and experience, to 
understand as closely as possible her subjective.existence. In this sense, the therapeutic 
relationship presupposes both client’s and therapist’s personal engagement and 
disclosure as well as use the therapist’s being qualities (e.g. qualities of acceptance, 
openness, non-judgemental listening, empathy etc.). With these thoughts in mind, I will 
now focus on a personal account of my work with clients from different theoretical 
perspectives as facilitated by different supervision experiences and clinical settings.
Year One; The Lived Immediacy of the Therapeutic Encounter.
I completed my first year placement at the counselling and trauma unit of a major 
transport network. I was fortunate to work in a team whose support promoted my 
development and growth as a therapist. Coming from a psychoanalytic background, I
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found the idea of time-limited therapy (i.e. 6 sessions) shocking! At first it was 
unmanageable; T kept trying different therapeutic styles none of which felt ‘right’* 
Moreover, I found my experience of personal, psychodynamic therapy impossible to use 
as a model. The detached style and the emphasis on interpretation felt completely 
inappropriate to the context 1 was working and in juxtaposition to what 1 was learning in 
my humanistically oriented supervision.
Through working with different clients and presenting issues, I gradually freed myself 
from the constraints of theories and allowed myself to be guided by the * lived 
immediacy\ 1997) of the therapeutic encounter. By that I mean the ‘live’
interaction with clients and the direct exploration of the feelings that are evoked. I soon 
realised that such direct attitude and attention to therapeutic process strengthened my 
relationship with clients by promoting an atmosphere of safety and trust. This stance 
proved to be particularly helpful with one of my clients who after a few sessions began 
to implicitly express a flirtatious attitude towards me. By directly addressing the nature 
of our relationship, we managed to overcome the ‘heavy’ atmosphere between us and 
our feelings of embarrassment and to proceed with an exploration of what he called his 
“usual pattern”.
‘Being^with’ my clients has therefore been both a rewarding and demanding experience. 
It taught me the importance of the therapeutic relationship and ‘lived immediacy’ of my 
interaction with my clients which presupposes an openness to the unknown and a 
genuine interest in the their dialogical statements and their emotional intonations. 
Existential phenomenology and its application to therapeutic practice (Deurzen, 2002) 
provided me with a theoretical and philosophical basis which influenced my development 
as a therapist and broaden my horizons and understanding of human concerns. Together 
with Rogers’ (1951) three core person-centred qualities of empathy, congruence, and 
unconditional positive regard, it set tiie basis upon which I began to balance the 
contradictions, difficulties, and paradoxes of therapeutic encounters.
Specifically, my clinical practice proceeded from the use of humanistic and 
existential/phenomenological theories with a special focus on Heidegger’s notions of 
being-in-the-world and being-with-others. As argued elsewhere in my portfolio^, human 
beings, when viewed from this vantage point of existential phenomenological theories, 
are not isolated entities; they are instead inextricably linked to the world and always in 
relation to other people. It follows that the notions of interrelatedness and 
embeddedness were at the heart of my therapeutic practice. I therefore understood my 
client’s issues as “expressions of conflicts and insecurities that arise from relational 
experience” (Spinelli, 1997:6) and notas pure manifestations of intrapsychic conflicts.
Please refer to the Academic and Research setions of this portfolio
The above stance is illustrated in my work with Freddie who sought professional help in 
overcoming the shock of his friend’s suicide by hanging. Although he had not 
witnessed the incident, he reported experiencing recurrent intrusive thoughts and images 
surrounding the event which evoked deep feelings of “anxiety” and to his surprise 
“rage” towards his friend. 1 think that my integration of a person-centred approach with 
an existential/phenomenological orientation enabled me to create a therapeutic space that 
facilitated expression and exploration of his emotions and thoughts as well as a 
challenging and reflective attitude towards his concerns and difficulties. Based on an 
existential/phenomenological framework (Cohn, 1996; Deurzen, 2002; Strasser, 1999) 
my therapeutic approach aimed at the clarification and elucidation of my client’s world 
views, beliefs, and values and their influence on his interpretation of events and life.
During the course of therapy Freddie explored and reflected on the feelings and ideas 
evoked by his friend’s suicide and came to acknowledge his fear of death and his 
tendency to avoid the harshness of reality. My empathie understanding and emphasis on 
clarifying Freddie’s feelings facilitated his efforts to find a personal meaning in life and 
to accept as well as learn from the traumatic incident. As a result Freddie’s symptoms 
subsided and he was able to return to work.
Year Two: a Psychodynamic Qrientatioii and the Importance of Supervision.
My transition to the second academic year was rather smooth as I felt comfortable with 
psychodynamic theory and familiar (mainly due to my personal therapy and master’s 
degree) with the analytic stance. For my second year of placement I worked in a 
Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) which gave me the opportunity to exchange 
ideas with practitioners coming from different theoretical and philosophical 
backgrounds. In addition I had the opportunity to work with a great range and enduring 
difficulties, such as self hami, eating disorders, intense anxiety, and severe depression.
Looking back I feel grateful to my supervisor, who worked from a Kleinian perspecti ve 
incorporating Freudian and Winnicottian ideas. Our sessions were invaluable as I had to 
learn how to apply my theoretical knowledge to practice without sacrificing my personal 
style. Despite my supervisor’s purist approach, I felt comfortable in voicing my opinion 
and sometimes disagreeing with her views. This was important to me as I had my 
reservations (and still do) regarding the model’s over reliance on interpretation, the 
withiiolding of self disclosure, and the conceptualisation of symptoms as manifestations 
of unconscious, intrapsychic conflicts. Through my encounter with my supervisor and 
other colleagues, I realised that the above views were not dogmatic, but assumptions that 
could be challenged.
47
Working from a psychodynamic perspective proved to be a rewarding experience as I 
learned to further appreciate the different dynamics in the relationship (i.e. transference 
and countertransference) and the infinite creativity of psychoanalytic theories. At the risk 
of sounding too simplistic, it is my contention that it does not really matter what type of 
terminology we use (e.g. humanistic, psychodynamic or cognitive); subjective “truths” 
and fantasies are - despite their nature (i.e. rational or irrational, conscious or 
unconscious) - potent and enduring and so deserve both therapist’s and client’s 
attention and clarification. It was through this realisation that I learned to appreciate the 
influence of cliildhood experiences on the formation of a sense of identity and ways of 
being and behaving. Consequently, the client’s psychic reality became the main focus in 
therapy; Freudian, Kleinian, and Winnicottian ideas (i.e. notions of unconscious fantasy, 
projection, and primary process) informed my efforts to understand, describe and 
interpret my clients' narrative. Indeed reflection on transferential and 
countertransferential issues (both with my clients and in supervision) proved invaluable.
I think that my work with Mary reflects the above ideas. Mary is a divorced, 37 year old 
with Caribbean roots; she sought professional help due to her intense feelings of anxiety 
and persistent delusional thoughts of being persecuted and ridiculed by friends and 
neighbours. At times she could hear a voice criticising her and calling her “ugly” and 
“useless”. Mary’s difficulties could be conceptu^ised by a number of different 
psychodynamic ideas. Her symptoms were compatible with such processes as 
identification, introjection, projection, and projective identification (Freud, 1915; Klein, 
1948). Specifically, it seemed that Maiy bad introjected the fierce criticism and 
derogatory attitude of her mother who continued to d en i^ te  her throughout her life. 
When the internal conflict became unbearable Mary began projecting it outwards (Klein, 
1946). The result was that her environment became the screen onto which she projected 
the painful and hostile elements of her own mind.
Despite the severity of her persecutory symptoms which contributed to a distorted 
interpretation of reality , Mary was aware of her paranoid thinking and was therefore able 
to distinguish the difference between phantasy and reality. Her capacity to engage with 
me and to critically reflect on her emotions led me to view her symptoms as neurotic 
rather than psychotic in nature. According to psychoanalytic theory delusional formation 
is not an illness per se, but the individual’s attempt to recover (Freud, 1911). Therapy 
focused on working through Mary’s unbearable emotions and internal criticisms; she 
gradually came to accept herself and to recognise the voice as internal rather than 
external. What followed was a painful exploration of her self image and an effort to 
accept as well as change aspects of herself.
Finally as I mentioned earlier, supervision during this year was invaluable; it can at best 
be described as a reflective process and secure base that allowed me to talk about both
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my own and my clients’ difficulties as well as to explore the arising counter/ 
transferential issues. Tt proved to be especially helpful with clients who implicitly or 
explicitly positioned me in specific ways (e.g„ as a problem solver, an authoritative 
figure, or a friend) which in turn hindered therapeutic process and contact My 
supervisor’s insight and experience facilitated my understanding and viewing the 
‘positionings’ I was experiencing as products of my clients’ unconscious phantasies 
and their projection onto me. This understanding set the basis upon which I started 
woiking with my clients  ^ psychic reality and its manifestation in transference. As a 
result my clients gradually became aware of their projections and began to distinguish 
bet ween their fantasies and expectations and the reality of the therapeutic encounter. This 
process enhanced their capacity to reflect on themselves and gave them a sense of 
control and power over what was previously felt as “unmanageable”.
Year Three; Integration of Different Cognitive Therapies
During this year I continued working within the same team but with a different 
supervisor who worked from a cognitive behavioural perspective. Reflecting back on my 
first sessions with clients, I remember being very sceptical as I knew that most of the 
cognitive behavioural assumptions regarding the nature of human beings and ways of 
relating were diametrically opposed to my own philosophy. Moreover, having read 
seminal papers on CBT (especially the traditional views of Aaron Beck) I was worried 
that - due to the model’s emphasis on technique - I would end up sacrificing my 
existential/humanistic way of working. 1 soon realised that 1 did not need to be so 
combative! My supervisor kept an open attitude with regard to what “works” in therapy 
and was very much in favour of giving priority to the therapeutic relationship. Through 
my exposure to recent developments in the cognitive paradigm (e.g.. Beck, 1995; 
Greenberger & Padesky, 1995; Safran & Segal, 1990) and Young’s (2003) schema- 
focused I was able to reconcile my initial difficulties.
Although I did employ a number of cognitive/behavioural techniques, such as thought 
records, activity plans and imagery, my interventions weie based on an integration of 
different cognitive models that placed the therapeutic relationship at the heart of 
therapeutic conduct. Indeed as argued by Corrie (2002), the importance of the 
relationship is now being recognised within cognitive models of therapy and perceived to 
be an important “tool” that facilitates clients’ psychological well being and therapeutic 
change.
As will be shown in my work with Laura, my attempts to integrate the cognitive 
assumptions with my general psychological understanding and theoretical knowledge of 
different models were influenced by schema-focused therapy and its efforts to 
synthesise various aspects of cognitive, behavioural, and psychodynamic perspectives. In
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a nutshell, the model’s major emphasis is on the importance of early deficient 
experiences with primary caregivers which in turn lead to the formation of maladaptive 
schemas that serve as templates to process (in a distorted way) later experiences (Young,
1990). These maladaptive schemas, which can relate to the client’s p^ceptions of self, 
world, and others, are perceived to be the source of psychological difficulties as they 
tend to “entrap” the individual within specific ways of thinking and behaving. In other 
words the person ends up repeating a self perpetuating loop that preserves and even 
strengthens her original, distorted, and negative assumptions and beliefs.
Laura, a divorced, 45 year old was referred by her psychiatrist with moderate symptoms 
of depression and complaints of minor panic attacks. As she was initially nervous we 
spent the first couple of sessions discussing her own understanding of her current 
psychological state as well as her views on therapeutic treatment Laura was very agitated 
and reluctant; she was somehow convinced that I would not be interested in her and that 
therapy would be a waste of our time. After all - she kept saying - “no one ever helped 
me before and no one ever will”. It seemed to me important not to challenge any of her 
views but to remain as close as possible to her own experience and understanding. Only 
after we had established a trusting relationsMp which she began to perceive valuable, we 
began exploring her life and challenging her thoughts and behavioural patterns.
Laura gradually disclosed a lifetime of abuse and neglect that began during her 
childhood. She described her mother as “mentally, emotionally, and physically abusive” 
and her father as always “negative and highly critical” of her. By working 
collaboratively, we began to reflect on her developmental history and construct a shared 
psychological formulation. While in therapy Laura read Young’s and KJosko’s (1994) 
Reinventing Your Life, which helped her “get things in perspective. Through completing 
their Maladaptive Schema Questionnaire, she gradually opened up and expressed her 
pain and fears; she began to understand her feelings and behaviour in the light of her 
childhood experiences and came to the realisation that her conviction of “unworthiness” 
and “defectiveness” possibly stemmed from early maladaptive schemas of 
mistrust/abuse, emotional deprivation and defectiveness. This type of understanding 
gave Laura a sense of power as she could now construct a coherent and meaningful 
image of her feelings and ways of being without feeling trapped in it.
In my being with Laura, I found Young’s (1990, 20(B) concepts of limited reparenting 
(i.e. cultivation of a therapeutic attitude that aims at the provision of the very elements 
that the client was deprived of as a child) and empathie confrontation (i.e. empathie 
understanding and challenging of schemas) very helpful. They formed the basis upon 
which Laura felt secure to challenge her own beliefs and schemas and to proceed with 
their successful modification.
FA
Concliidittg Remarks
'Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter, Trv avain. Fail avain. Fail better'- 
Last but not least, a remark on my personal mistakes which I have tried to use in a 
productive and faeilitative way. Through openly acknowledging rny errors to my clients 
and allowing time to discuss their effect on their emotional world, I feel that I have come 
closer to my own weaknesses and blind spots. When I think of the invaluable 
knowledge that I have gained from my mistakes, I especially think of Laura (the client I 
mentioned above).
Following a very productive session (I think it was our 9th) during which she was being 
particularly honest with herself, Laura came back feeling “lost” and ratlier reluctant to 
proceed with her plans regarding her job situation. Instead of staying with her feelings 
and insecurities and trying to explore their source, I acted out on my impatience and mv 
feelings of frustration which derived from my fondness of Laura and my wish to see her 
getting better and moving out of what she often described as “limbo”. It was only after 
she left that I realised how challenging and selfish I had been with her. Laum came back 
and for the first time she made a brief comment about her week and then sat in silence, 
feeling uncomfortable, and staring at the floor. I knew that it was my fault and so I began 
by owning up to my error and disclosing the thoughts i mentioned above, i told Laura 
that I was carried away by my own feelings and wish to see her getting better; I also told 
her that I should have stayed with her emotions and that I should have respected her own 
pace. Laura burst into tears; she explained how “crap” she felt after realising that she 
had disappointed me. During the end of the session she told me that she appreciated my 
disclosure and honesty and that she felt moved by my own wish for her to get better. 
The incident acted like a catalyst for our subsequent interaction; Laura trusted me even 
more and began to open up in an undefended and genuine way.
To conclude, I am most grateful to all of my clients who trusted in our work together and 
who contributed to their getting better and to my development as a therapist by voicing 
their fears, insecurities, and disagreements in relation to the tiierapeutic encounter. It was 
through my mistakes and having faith that I could share them with my clients, that I have 
learned most.
Samuel Beckett (1983). WorstwardHo!
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PART III
Research
Dossier
întrodcEctîôn
As mentioned in the introduction to the portfolio the research dossier is comprised of a 
literature review and two empirical investigations that reflect my academic and 
epistemological interests. Reflective commentary on the ‘use of self during the research 
process highlights my personal ‘journey’ to the choice of research topic, my difficulties, 
and excitement as well as the inevitable influence subjectivity has on the interpretation of 
findings.
My first year’s literature review, entitled ^Mind the Gap': Can we Argue for a Non- 
Duatistic Approach to the Notion o f the Self in Contemporary Existential 
Psychotherapy?, aimed at a critique of Catfesian dualism tlirough a presentation of 
existential thinking regarding the notion of ‘consciousness’. Emphasis was placed on 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as well as on Sartrian and Merleau-Pontian ideas. The 
review also focused on a critique of the notion of 'self as an entity and on existential/ 
phenomenological therapists’ efforts to overcome the gap between human 
consciousness and the external world.
The second year’s qualitative research entitled "One, No One, and One Hundred 
Thousand'; Views o f Existential/Phenomenological Therapists on the Notion o f 
Subjectivity and its Impïicatiom for Therapeutic Practice aimed at an analysis of tiie 
ways in wliicli existential/ phenomenological therapists conceptualise the concept of 
self, its impact on therapeutic practice, and the methodological significance and use of 
the notion of phenomenological reduction (i.e. epoche)
Rnally, my third year’s empirical research entitled Counselling Psychologists' 
Perception o f the Scientist-Practitioner Identity was based on a pluralistic stance to 
research and therefore combined quantitative and qualitative methodologies. It explored 
counselling psychologists’ personal accounts of the Scientist-Practitioner model and 
their views on epistemology. It also investigated the effect of identification with the 
model on the participants’ strength of interest in scientist and practitioner activities and 
on their choice of theomtical orientation in psychology. Finally, a qualitative content 
analysis of two open-ended questions exploring participants’ views of the model and 
notion of science yielded coniplimentary results that added to the clarification of the 
quantitative findings.
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^Mind the Gap’: Can we Argne for a Non-I>oalistic Approach to the 
Notioii of the ^Seir in Modern Existential Psychotherapy?
ABSTRACT
Hie present review aims at a critique o f Cartesian dualism through a 
presentation o f existential thinking regarding the notion o f "consciousness' as 
found in the early writings o f Martin Heidegger and especially in relation to his 
notion o f Dasein as "beingdndhe^world', The influence o f his ideas on modem 
existential thinkers such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is briefly assessed and 
critically discussed from the vantage point o f contemporary European 
existential psychotherapists. Emphasis is placed on the questioning o f the notion 
of "self as an entity and their efforts to overcome the gap between human 
consciousness and the external world.
I. Introduction
There is no reality except in action ... Man is nothing else than his plans; he 
exists only to the extent that he fulfils himself; he is therefore nothing else titan 
the ensemble o f his acts, nothing else than his life” (Jean-Paul Sartre, 
7965:47).
The above statement epitomises the Existential movement (Wamock, 1970) which came 
into being at a time when ontological dualism predominated; a dualism which left 
mankind with a sense of “broken totality, a divided being” (Murdoch, 1953: 55). It is 
this ontological division that Existentialism set out to overcome; this “third wave 
movement” in philosophy (Murdoch, 1953: 54) had a major impact on European 
thought around the 1940s and 19^s and owes its existence to the radical linking of 
two 19th century authors, namely Kierkegaard (1813-55) and Nietzsche (1844-19(X>). 
Among its aims was the deconstruction of the long held tradition of epistemology as 
well as the belief in absolute truths and essences which had dominated philosophical 
thinking rince the Platonic era (i.e. 5lh centuiy BC).
It is not the victory ofscierice that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the 
victory o f scientific method over science ... Epistemofogists say: ""There are 
only facts”. No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations ... To 
speak o f a "thing-in-itself is just as perverse as a "sense-in-itself a "meaning- 
m-itself. There are no "facts-in-themselves', for a sense must always be 
projected into them before there can be facts. (Nietzsche, 1968:261, 267,301).
Nietzsche here recapitulates the Existential stance towards scientific ontology and 
method and its criticism of ‘objectivity’ and ‘intellectualism’ as the main enemies of an 
understanding of the human condition and the world. For Existentialists (Wamock, 
1970) the notion of objective truth is mere escapism; the preservation of a myth which 
views the world as a constellation of identifiable facts and universal tmths and values that
can be grasped by means of detached obsenration and scientific experimentation. \^Tiat 
Nietzsche (1968) argues and indeed what the whole existential movement advocates, is 
that there is no sharp line between ‘describing’ and ‘evaluating’; the very act of thinking 
involves elements of choice and preference as well as what he called "valuations' (i.e. 
subjective opinions). Accordingly ‘meaning’ and ‘truth’ are not the product of 
dieoretical abstractions and scientific formulations, instead they are subjective and 
contextual in nature. In other words, they are to be found in the relationship between a 
person and her social, cultural background of signs and references.
This view is in opposition to the thinking of Rene Descartes who has been described as 
“the founder of modem ontological dualism” (Fell, 1979: 4) and who argued that the 
human mind - through suspension of belief and methodic self-#sçipline - has the 
capacity to serve as an impartial judge of criteria of reality and truth. Descartes’ views on 
self-consciousness begin with the existence of a solipsistic self, whose own existence is 
assumed by him because this is the only thing that cannot be doubted. It is a self, who 
thinks, perceives, and understands in complete isolation from its own body and the 
world. What survived his method of doubt was a thinking being (res cogitans) whose 
existence is co-extensive with his thoughts and who may or may not have a body (res 
extensa). This mind-body dichotomy apart from alienating human beings from their 
environment, also created the still unresolved epistemolo^cal problem of explaining how 
ideas in our minds can be true and valid representations of external reality (Kuhn, 1962).
It could be argued that one of the main differences between Existentialism and 
Enpiricism is that the former stresses knowledge through participation whereas the latter 
emphasises detached observation. The radical antithesis between these two schools is 
recapitulated in Heidegger’s (1927a) demand for a reversal of the Western tradition of 
epistemology over ontology. Thus the Existential wave shifted the emphasis away from 
the quest for knowledge to an ontological quest and specifically to tiie question of 
Being. The focus was now on the experience of what it means to exist, that is, to use 
language, participate, choose, and engage with the world and others (Solomon, 1972). As 
Macquanie (1972) argued this non-empiricist stance of the Existential movement is 
reflected on their rejection of the concept of ‘man’ as an empirical subject and its 
replacement by ontological terms like Dasein (Heidegger) and "For-itself (Sartre). As 
will be seen the use of ontological terms was neither accidental nor mere eccentricism; it 
emphasised human beings’ self-transcendence and avoided the assumptions carried by 
modernist terms (e.g., self, mental process, etc.).
Consequently, the notions of consciousness became central for Existential thinkers, who 
argued that the Western tradition has misinterpreted and mis-deseribed human beings by 
assuming that individuals Jmow and act by discovering and then applying principles and 
rules (Dreyfus, 2001). For Heidegger (l%7a) and Sartre (1943) this assumption totally
disregarded existence in the world; in dieir own idiosyncratic styles, they showed that 
being is primarily acting and not thinking.
Etymologically, tiie terai existence has its roots in the Latin ex-sistere which means ‘to 
stand out’ or ‘to emerge’ out of nothing (Cohn, 1997). As will be shown, in the hands 
of Existential authors the term acquires a unique meaning which is to be differentiated 
from the rather static dictionary explanation of the word as “the fact or state of living or 
having objective” (Oxford Dictionary, 1998: 644). Heidegger (1927a) was the first to 
clarify this qualitative difference; he set out to explore what it means to exist as a human 
being and argued that to be a person, is to be in a position to ask what it is to be a 
person. He claimed that it is only human beings who have the capacitj^ to make “ an 
issue of themselves” (Heidegger, 1962: 32112]) and therefore, ontologically speaking, 
they are the only beings who exist. Hence for the existential thinkers, the term existence 
implies transcendence: it is a ehosen way of being, a moving forwards towards the 
future, it is not some kind of static condition. Based on this definition objects and 
animals in the world do not exist, they simply are.
Consequently, Existentialists claim that human beings do not have a fixed nature, instead 
they are always in a process of becoming, of self-transcendence (Macquanie, 1972: 71). 
Solomon (1972) summarises the Existentialist’s view of human existence and the 
concept of self-consciousness by arguing that an individual does not discover her 
personhood through knowing, but she creates it herself tiuough deciding and acting 
upon her potentials and choices. Sartre (1943) in Ms work Being and Nothingness 
sealed tiiis idea of man’s autonomy, freedom, and responsibihty towards Ms nature in 
his famous pronouncement “existence precedes essence” (1998: 28).
It is out of tMs rich pMlosopMcal tradition that existential psychotherapy arose and 
assumed the critical and sceptical stance of its pMlosophical predecessors. The present 
paper is divided in two parts; the first part is pMlosophical and aims at a methodological 
critique of the Cartesian legacy from the vantage point of early Heideggerian ideas as 
well as those of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Enphasis will be placed on the notion of 
self-consciousness and the authors’ rejection of the mind/body dichotomy. To acMeve 
this aim, frequent reference will be made to Husserl’s phenomenological ideas since 
there is a close tie between Existential and Fhenomenological thinking due to the latter’s 
emphasis on methodology. The second part focuses on a critical discussion of 
Existential-Phenomenological ideas regarding the notion of ‘self’ as presented by 
contemporary European psychotherapists. Emphasis will now be placed on the link 
between pMlosophical tliinking and their conceptualisation of tsubjectivity and 
personhood.
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It will be seen that existential/phenomenological therapists rejected the modernist view of 
the self as a ‘fixed’, ‘inner’ entity, and attempted to re-define the concept in accordance 
with their philosophical heritage. As a result they have replaced the term with a number 
of philosophical concepts (mainly Heideggerian) or with a different terminologiy which 
attemtps to reconstruct the notion. Indeed the authors’ views are often inferred by their 
use of a number of a philosophical concepts which often contradicted each other. As will 
be seen, the literature in this area is limited; apart from few authors who have specifically 
addressed these notions, the majcnity of the literature is based on a  general description of 
human beings and relation to the existential ‘givens’. Rnally, I will argue that 
existential/ phenomenological psychotherapists in their efforts to retain a type of 
methodology and therapeutic approach without betraying the philosophical tradition 
from which they evolved, fall prey to a modem linguistic game and way of thinking 
which undermines their very aim.
II. A Heideggerian Critique of the Cartesian Legacy; 
a Pragmatic Approach
Heidegger's Hermeneutic Phenomenology
In Heideggerian thought the Cartesian ‘cogito ergo sum’ is reversed to "lam therefore I  
think'. The reasons for such a reversal are clarified in the following statement,
""With the "cogito sum' Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on 
a new and firm footing. But what he left undermined when he began in this 
""radical” way was the kind o f beirig which belongs to the res cogitans, or more 
precisely the sense o f the being o f the surh” (1962:46[24]).
In order to investigate the nature of Being, Heidegger (1927a) used as a starting point 
Husserl’s phenomenology which he transformed according to his own thinking. At the 
heart of Heidegger’s approach lies the notion of mindless, everyday coping skills which 
are perceived to be the starting point of all intelligibility (Dreyfus, 2001). This practical 
engagement with the world, led Heidegger to a reject Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomcno/ogy which is based on the primacy of intentionality and takes for granted the 
existence of a self-suffident subject as a consciousness with self-contained meamngs. 
Moreover, he criticised Husserl’s notion of transcendental ego which perceives and 
constructs the world but is notinvolved with it. Echoing Nietzsche’s view, he argued that 
there are no interpretation-iree facts or subjective belief syriems that are independent 
from the world and our involvement with it. It follows that for Heidegger, the study and 
understanding of phenomena can only occur within the contextual background within 
which they are embedded.
On this assumption Heidegger (1927a) claimed that any attempt at describing 
phenomena by means of ‘bracketing’ is futile since all interpretations and meanings are
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contextual. Hence Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is rendered meaningless. 
Heidegger argued that “our investigation itself will show that the meaning of 
phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation” (1962: 61 [37], 
author’s italics). It is this hermeneutic understanding in the shape of interpreting that 
distinguishes Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology from Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.
Existence as Being-in-the-World by Way o f Dasein
From the very ovAset of Being and Time (1927a) Heidegger emphasises that Being is not 
an entity - as the capital ‘B’ in English suggests, but some sort of event or process. To 
this ‘Being’ he gives the name Dasein or "being-in-the-world'; “this being which each 
of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we 
shall denote by the term Dasein” (1962:27[7]). For Heidegger (1927a) Dasein is not a 
self-contained, meaning-giving subject, but a state of being which in order to disclose 
itself needs the world and others. The hyphens in the term are not accidental, they 
indicate that being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon: a full account of one of its 
aspects is therefore an account of all of them. As Heidegger puts it “Self and the world 
belong together... [They] are not two beings, like subject and object” but “the unity of 
Being-in-the-world” (1982: 297).
Dasein literally means ‘Being there’; as noted by Cooper (1996) the emphasis is on 
‘ there’. However, it should not be interpreted as a spatial relationship (i.e. as a location); 
the emphasis stresses Dasein’s engagement and involvement with the world and other 
people. Furthermore Cohn (1997) argues that the ‘there’ of Dasein highlights two basic 
attributes of its existence; thrownness and being-in. The former refers to Dasein’s 
facticity; that it the fact that all human beings are already m  situations that they have not 
necessarily chosen for themselves. The latter, refers to the “primacy of the individuars 
relational context”, which argues that Dasein’s state is that of intersubjectivity 
(1997:25). Finally, Dasein’s definition has major implications for the notions of human 
nature and essence. Dasein is “its possibilities in that no sense can be made of a 
person’s existence, except in terms of the projects ... upon which he is engaged” 
(Cooper, 1996:27). When viewed from a Heideggerian vantage point, human beings do 
not have a preordained essence, they are the products of their choices and inevitable 
engagement with the world and others. As Heidegger puts it ""The essence o f Dasein 
lies in its existence” (1962: 33[13], author’s italics).
A  Critique o f Husserl's Intentionality
Heidegger (1927a), in his attempt to reach an ontological understanding of human 
existence, rejected Husserl’s (1913) use of intentionality as the most basic mental act, 
that is as the starting point of all relationships to the world and others. He argued that 
such a view presupposes a gap between the subject and the world which existence as
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being-in-the-world defies. Humans are in-the-world, they do not need to take a step 
forward in order to bridge the gap between their ‘mental contents’ and the ‘world’. 
Similarly they do not need to make an ‘inference’ - as Husserlian phenomenology 
suggests - from those contents and representations to the things described as external 
objects.
Contrary to Husserl (1913), Heidegger (1982) rejected the term ‘intentionality’ in order 
to avoid its “mentalistic overtones” (Dreyfus, 2001: 51) and used instead the term 
comportment to refer to Dasein’s directed activity towards the world and others. His 
opposition to the Husserlian notions of intentionality and transcendental ego becomes 
clear in the following statement.
The idea o f a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own 
sphere arid is ... encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues 
the basic ontological structure o f the being that we ourselves are. (1982:63- 
64).
As will be shown in the next section, Heidegger (1927a) argues that all mental states 
presuppose a more basic form of being-in-the-world-with-things which does not involve 
mental activity but the acquisition of skills (Dreyfus, 2001).
Everyday Understanding as Being-in-the-world: a practical "know-how' versus an 
intellectual "know-whaf
Heidegger (1927a) rejects the traditional account of ‘knowing subjects’ relating to 
‘objects’, instead, he places our understanding and relation to the world in our everyday 
concemful coping which takes place without intentional content. Contrary to Husserl’s 
view, Heidegger (1927a) argues that intentional mental states emerge only when our 
practical involvement with the world gets disrupted. As Heidegger puts it:
In everyday terms, we understand ourselves, and our existence [in the world] by 
way o f the activities wepursue and the things we take care of. (1982:159}.
Hence, concern [Sorge] in Heideggerian theory is the basic relationship between human 
beings and their environment; it is Dasein’s mode of being and it is the significance 
which being-in-the-world has for them. When he speaks of our relationship to the world, 
he talks about a primordial understanding (1962:182[142-143}) which is not a cognitive 
phenomenon but a know-how, a capacity for handling objects by use of practical skills 
(Dreyfus, 2001). Heidegger (1927a) notea that in our everyday being-in-the-world, we 
do not simply encounter objects, rather we use them and manipulate them in-order-to 
achieve our aims and goals. Thus:
We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern ""equipment”. In 
our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working;
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transportation, measurement... Equipment is essentially something in-order- 
to... Taken strictly, there ""is” no such thing as an equipment. To the being o f 
an equipment there always belongs an equipmental whole (1962: 97[68]).
Hence, contrary to the Cartesian understanding of the relationship of human beings to 
the world, Heidegger (1927a) emphasises that we first encounter things as “ready-to- 
hand” (i.e. as functional and usable objects) and then as mere objects “present-at- 
hand” (i.e. through perceptual cognition), (1962: 99[69]). It follows that an intellectual 
understanding of things presupposes a practical engagement and use of them. Moreover, 
coping with equipment has its own kind of ‘knowledge’, it is an intelligent ‘know-how’, 
which as Heidegger argues “is the condition of possibility for all kinds of comportment 
not only practical but also cognitive” (1982:276). Contrary to Husserl (1913), 
Heidegger (1927a) argues that it is man’s personal use and manipulation of objects that 
gives objects a meaning and not some kind of mental belief system. In other words, it is 
the act of hammering that gives the hammer its meaning as an object and not our ideas 
about it (Dreyfus, 2001). Hence, it follows that our relation to the world is primarily 
practical and not intellectual. For Heidegger ( l%7a) thinking, perceiving and all other 
‘mental processes’ presuppose an involvement with a  shared world as physical beings. 
It is this pragmatism versus intellectualism that distinguishes Heideggerian from 
Cartesian thought.
This pragmatic approach to an understanding of ‘equipment’ and the world extends to 
Heidegger’s conception of the nature of meaning. Heidegger argues that the source of 
meaning does not reside within each particular Dasein (Dreyfus, 2001). Instead all 
meaning is contextual. From the vantage point of Heideggerian theory, the world is a 
totality of significance, it is not composed of meaningless res extensa (as Descartes 
argued). The locus of meaning therefore shifts from the ‘mind’ to the ‘world’, to what 
Heidegger calls ‘referential’ or ‘relational totality’ (1985: 209-210X which can be 
thought of as an “intricate network of pathways, which is oriented towards some 
ultimate goal or goals” (Richardson, 1986: 2 ^ . In other words, the processes of 
inteipretation and understanding are a masteiy of a means to an end, an end that humans 
set for themselves and try to achieve. Consequently, Dasein’s familiarity with the world 
and its primordial (pragmatic) understanding undermines Husserl’s (1913) attempt to 
ground all forms of intentionality as meaning-giving mental activity of a detached 
transcendental ego who perceives and acts in isolation from the world and its objects.
Heidegger’s pragmatic approach, apart from being a critique of Cartesian epistemology, 
is also a rejection of his dissociation of the mind from the body. For Heidegger (1927a) 
humans relate to the world as flesh-and-blood beings who engage with the world
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primarily through their practical concern. In "Zollikoner Seminare' (1987) Heidegger 
introduced the term ‘bodying-forth’ (as translated by Heaton, 2002:318) to describe his 
ideas regarding the mind-body relationship. Not surprisingly the term implies activity 
and engagement; the body for Heidegger is not an object, rather the means to an end, a 
human end. It is the vehicle of communication with the world and others. In other words, 
through the body, Dasein discloses itself and reaches towards its future goals and plans. 
Hence, the body is not a mere possession, a res extensa, or something simply to look at; 
it is the^only way of human expression.
However, it was Sartre (1943) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) who extended his ideas and 
developed an embodied theoiy of consciousness. They argue that humans are both 
minds and bodies, both subjects and objects, who cannot exist in isolation. This is 
primarily because our body is ambiguous, it can be both a subject and an object for us. 
In other words, when I touch my body; I give and receive the touch but not 
simultaneously. Touching is not a unified sensation. As a result Merleau-Ponty states:
The body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment 
to that existence, but because existence realises itself in the body... Neither body 
nor existence can be regarded as the original o f the human being, since they 
presuppose each other. (1962:167).
In line with Heideggerian thought, he argues that our primary understanding and 
relationship to the world is through our bodies; our sense of who we are is not the result 
of a mental acquisition, as modem cognitive theories advocate, but an embodied image 
conveyed through physical contact with others (i.e. gestures, touch, and vision). In other 
words, “it is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through my 
body that I perceive things” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 186)*
In a similar vein Sartre (1943) argues:
The problem of the body and its relation to consciousness is often obscured by 
the fact that one starts by thinking o f the body as a thing \Àîch functions in 
accordance with its own laws and which can be grasped from the outside, while 
one thinks o f consciousness as something given to us in introspection. (1943: 
365).
Based on this criticism of Cartesian dualism, Sartre (1943) argues that humans beings 
are not distinct from their bodies; they are their bodies.
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""One is what One Does”; an Existential Conceptualisation o f Personhood 
The above pragmatic approach toward Dasein’s existence and its understanding and 
relation to its environment has major implications for the existential conception of the 
notion of human consciousness and personhood. As shown, Heidegger never spoke of 
an individual self; his concept of Dasein is an ontological term used to describe a 
person’s way of being in the world. Hence, when speaking from a Heideggerian vantage 
point the notion of self is rendered meaningless and it is in direct opposition to his ideas, 
as self implies the existence of a static, inner entity* In his view, human beings are al ways 
in a process o f becoming, sAwaysXxaosQmdùng their own existence.
This active instead of static quality of a person has major implications for the 
conceptualisation of consciousness. In contrast to Husserl and his belief in the existence 
of a transcendental ego as the seat of consciousness; existential philosophers situate 
self-consciousness in-the-world. The notion of the ^self is therefore freed from its 
modernist connotations (i.e. a fixed, inner entity) and is repositioned from the mental 
sphere to the individual’s engagement and involvement with the world and others. As 
Heidegger (1927a) states:
Dasein always understands itself in terms o f its existence - in terms o f a 
possibility o f itself: to be itself or not itself... One is what one does (1962: 
33/727,283/239;).
What follows from this definition is that a person is always in-relation and is defined by 
her way of being-in-the-world-with-others; by her projects, actions, aims, and future 
goals. Dasein is not an individual self; it is a human being’s way of existing in the world 
and as such it is a historical being, always acting on some future possibility by means of 
its concern. It is therefore ultimately related to temporality: Dasein is always ‘ahead of 
itself and thus it should not be perceived as a static or fixed entity, but always in the 
process o f becoming something different. In one of his later works Heidegger (1982) 
states:
Each one o f us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we 
understand ourselves and our existence by way o f the activities we pursue and 
the things we take care o f (1982:159).
Authentic versus Inauthentic Being
Bearing in mind that Dasein is a way of being and not a private sphere of ownness, 
Dreyfus (2001) argues that it “can own up, disown, or fa il to take a stand an its way o f 
being” and on its understanding of its possibilities and choices (2001:26, italics in the 
original). In other words Dasein in its freedom to choose and decide on its way of being 
has full responsibility for its existence. Ownership is intimately related to Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity. Dasein is initially thrown into the world, where it is expected to
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socialise according to the particular understanding and demands of its culture. In this 
state it has an equal possibility to own itself and thus lead an authentic life or loge itself 
and succumb to an inauthentic mode. According to Heidegger (1927a) what propels us 
to inauthenticity is a state of fallenness with other people, which is an essential feature of 
Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-world’. As Heidegger puts it:
[Fallenness] does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that 
Dasein is proximally andfor the most part alongside the "world' o f its concern 
... Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an 
authentic potentiality for Being its Self and has fallen into the "world' (1962: 
220/776;;
and in terms of the self (i.e. a person’s individual way of being)
The Self o f everyday Dasein is the they-self which we distinguish from the 
authentic Self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold o f in its own way 
(7962; 767/29;;
What awakens Dasein from the state of inauthenticity and enables it to become 
disclosable to the world and its possibilities is a primordial sense of anxiefv As 
Heidegger puts it,
[In a state of] anxiety there lies the possibility o f a disclosure which is quite 
distinctive; for anxiety individualises. This individualisation brings Dasein back 
from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are 
possibilities o f its Being (1962:235[191 ])
It is because Dasein cares for-itself that it is anxious; anxiety is the vehicle by which 
Dasein reaches its potentiality of being. To conclude, Merleau-Ponty (1962) following 
Heidegger’s exposition of a person’s existence as ‘Dasein’ or ‘being-in-the-world’ 
writes:
The world is not an object such that I  have in my position the law o f its making; 
it is the natural setting o f and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit 
perceptions ... there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world 
does he know himself (1962: XI)
The above statement is the epitome of existential thinking; the ‘self’ is no longer 
conceived as an enclosed system but as a relational field within which it interacts with 
others and objects in the world, and defines itself through them. Based on this view, 
Sartre (1965) in his Philosophy o f Existentialism states that “in order to get any truth 
about myself, I must have contact with another person” (1965: 51-52).
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III. The Transition to Existential/Phenomenological Psychotherapy and its Use
of the Notion of ‘SelT
The Self as a "Process*; a "Centre o f Gravity*; an "Impermanent Construct*; and a 
"Mode o f Existence^
The impact of Heideggerian diought and its influence npon British existential 
psychotherapy has been acknowledged by the majority of existential-phenomenological 
psychotherapists (Cohn, 1993, 1996, 1997; Condrau, 1996; Cooper, 1996, 1999; 
Deurzen-Smith, 1990, 1995a,b, 1996, 1997, 2002; Diamond, 1996; Du Flock, 1992; 
Greig, 1997; Helting, 1997; Spinelli, 1989, 1994, 1996a,b, 2001; Strasser & Strasser; 
1997, and Wolf, 1999). Consequently a number of terms - among which ‘Dasein’, 
‘Being-in-the-World’ and ‘authenticity’ - are repeatedly found in their writings and 
used in a variety of idiosyncratic ways.
Existential psychotherapy’s main interest is elucidated in the ways in which a person 
exists and relates to the world and others. It is an engagement which is perceived to take 
place in four different dimensions; the phyacal {Umwelt}, the social (Mitweh), the 
psychological (Eigenwelt), and the spiritual (Uberwelt} (Binswanger, 1963; Deurzen- 
Smith, 1997). It follows that a study of human beings outside this totality contradicts 
both existential thinking and the ontological existence of individuals. However, the 
nature and aim of the present paper restricts its focus to a critical discussion of the 
existential and phenomenological perspectives regarding the concept of self Due to the 
word limit of the present review emphasis will be placed on a critical discussion of the 
four main representatives of contemporary existential thinking (i.e. Cooper, Deurzen, 
Heaton, and Spinelli).
The Self as a Process
Truthful to the existential tradition Deurzen-Smith (1990, 1995, 1999) bases her 
theoretical assumptions on an ontological premise regarding the nature of human 
existence. In one of her earliest writings she makes her thesis explicit by stating that the 
essence of being human “is to not have an essence” (1990:8). In other words, human 
existence is open-ended and in continuous flux; “the person is in a constant process of 
becoming. I create myself as I exist” (1995: 4). The defining feature of this proposition 
is the inherent freedom that describes the human condition; human beings are not 
subjected to the same determinism that rules the behaviour of animals, plants and objects, 
they are the products of their choices and of their inevitable interaction with the world 
and others.
Based on the above assumption Deurzen-Smith (1995) perceived the notion of ‘self to 
be intricately interwoven with that of ‘authenticity’. In an effort to avoid confusion, he
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warned the reader not to fall prey to the general misuse of the term as an individual’s 
efforts to achieve growth and actualisation of his/her ‘true’ and ‘solid self’. Contrary to 
this widely held assumption, she emphasised that the existential view sees the self “as a 
process - not an entity or substance” (1995: 9, italics added). Authenticity is therefore 
perceived to be “a gradual ongoing process of self understanding. It means getting to 
know the self as it is created in one’s relationships to the world on all its different 
levels” (1995: 9).
The concept of ‘self’ appears in most of Deurzen’s (1990, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2002) 
writings, however, it is in two distinct articles that she makes her views explicit. In ‘The 
Survival of the Self’ (1996), she focuses on the formation and maintenance of a ‘self 
and its struggle to ‘survive’ in its constant interaction with the ‘world’ and ‘others’. 
Moreover, three years later in her seminal paper on ‘Heidegger’s Challenge of 
Authenticity’ she argues for the concept’s central position in the understanding of 
‘selfhood’ from an existential perspective.
Deurzen-Smith (1996) in her article ‘The Survival of the Self’ pays tribute to the 
Heideggerian (1927a) concept of and its authentic or inauthentic way of being as 
well as to Sartre’s (1943) view of the self as an artificial project deriving from a 
fundamentally open consciousness. However, she makes it explicit that “these concepts 
of transparent or non-self are hard to take on board” as they can leave us “wondering 
how to conduct our lives in relation to other people and the demands society makes upon 
us” (1996: 59). In this statement she clearly expresses her reluctance to eriibrace a 
‘non-self’ stance towards the conceptualisation of a person’s position in the world and 
her social conduct. Her sceptical stance can therefore be seen as the impetus for an 
attempt to reconstruct the notion of ‘selfhood’ without betraying existential 
philosophic^ roots. Consequently, through a criticism of the essentialist notion of the 
‘self as a fixed and autonomous entity, which is perceived to be distinct from the 
external world, she proposed a different view which focuses on a relational-interactive 
process that is utterly dependent on the existence of the world and others. “Selfhood is 
not a set thing, but rather constituted of what one associates with, commits to, attaches 
oneself to, singles out, absorbs, concentrates on...” (1996: 62).
One cannot fail to notice the influence of Heidegger’s ideas and his conceptualisation of 
‘Dasein’ as its own possibilities and activities. In the same paper Deurzen offers her 
personal conceptualisation of the ‘self’ as a ‘process’, as “a person’s centre of 
gravity” (1996: 59-62) which can be understood as one’s sense of balance; “... as I go 
out in the world I jeopardise my inner balance. My centre of gravity becomes redefined 
by what I reach out towards” (ibid: 62). The idea of the self as a “centre of gravity” 
which is constantly redefined by one’s engagement with the world and others implies a 
sense of plasticity, flexibility and movement. It follows that our sense of self is always
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beings challenged by our interactions with the world and odier people; “I am a source 
and a medium, not a thing, not a substance, not an entity in my own right” (ibid: 60).
In addition, Deurzen’s accurate understanding and incorporation of the Heideggerian 
theory in her conceptualisation of the ‘self’ becomes evident in her seminal papers on 
‘Heidegger and Psychotherapy’ (1995) and ‘Heidegger’s Challenge of Authenticity’ 
(1999), where she states that “to be authentic is to be one’s self” (1999: 115). In this 
statement authenticity and self become paired; the self is crated through a person’s 
authentic existence, her way of life, choices, and engagement with the world and others. 
In both papers she makes it clear that a therapist needs to see the client as a gestalt; that 
is as a ‘flesh and blood’ being interacting with the four dimensions of the world. 
Specifically she states that we can understand a person only when we see the self “as a 
world disclosure” and not as an entity; “selves are basically openness to the world 
around and their role and function is to disclose that world: to make it apparent in a 
certain way.” (1995: 20).
The close link between her views and Heideggerian thought becomes even more 
prominent in her latest paper where she reviews Dasein’s ontological characteristics (i.e. 
time, care, fallenness, thrownness, and conscience) and places them at the centre of her 
understanding of a person’s efforts to be ‘true to herself’. As she puts it:
We are not simply a particular something, but rather a range o f possibilities, a 
potentiality o f being ... the self is always outside, ahead o f itself, and in the 
world with others. It cannot purely be in itself and reflect on itself in isolation 
without doing violence to its essential nature. (1999:119,120).
There is no doubt that Deurzen’s (1990, 1995, 1996, 1999) descriptive mid clear re­
definitions of the ‘self’ have successfully ‘freed’ the concept from the modernist 
assumptions which view the notion as a fixed entity that is isolated from the world and 
others. Nevertheless one could argue that the use of the noun ‘self as a process is in 
itself an oxymoronic schema, since the ‘self’ implies the existence of some kind of 
entity. It is my contention that the oxymoronic schema is not contextual but linguistic. 
Deurzen has accurately used Heideggerian ideas which however when embedded within 
a psychological discourse become contradicting.
Based on the paradox of integration and the linguistic contradiction between terms like 
‘self and ‘process’, Heaton (1991, 1995) portrays his views through a critique of 
Laing’s understanding and conceptualisation of self. In his lengthy articles ‘The 
Divided Self: Kierkegaard or Winnicott?’ (1991) and ‘The Self, the Divided Self, and 
the Other’ (1995) he criticises Laing’s view of the ‘self as that of an essentialist rather 
than a phenomenologist. Heaton (1991,1995) argues that Laing’s efforts to integrate an 
object-relations approach, as conceived by Winnicott, with that of non-dualists like
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Kierkegaard and Heidegger lead to a conceptual impasse. Through a discussion of 
Laing’s (1957, 1961) work, he argues that Laing failed to free himself from the 
constrains of modernist assumptions regarding the notion of subjectivity and continued 
to perceive the ‘self as an entity.
Specifically, Heaton argued that Laing’s account portrays the ‘self’ as an entity which is 
contained within the person and gives him/her a sense of stability and reality. He objects 
to his notions of ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘divided self’ and argues that he did not manage to 
depart from the Cartesian notion of human being. In other words, the self as Laing 
conceived it, is separate from the body and capable of “cutting itself off from direct 
relatedness with others” (1965: 137). In contrast to this view, Heaton (1991) - in line 
with existential-phenomenological thinking - claims that “what we call self- 
consciousness is not consciousness of a self’. With this statement he embarks on a 
thorough explanation of the role of language in our conceptualisation and use of the 
term. Specifically, he argues that “if I say, ‘I will kill myself,’ I am referring to my 
person not to an entity which is a subject of experience ... I do not go around with or 
without a self. In short, it is persons who say, ‘I’, not selves” (1991:32, emphasis 
added). To conclude, Heaton (1991) emphasises the active orientation of consciousness 
towards the world and its use of language in order to express thoughts, emotions, and 
feelings in order to argue that all these emotional and cognitive activities “are not 
happenings occurring in some private theatre of my mind” (1991: 33).
The Self as Impermanent, Relational, and Plastic Construct
It is these linguistic contradictions that Spinelli (1989, 1994, 1996, 2001) attempted to 
overcome. In one of his most influential books he portrays the nature of ‘self on the 
basis of a phenomenological theoretical model. As he writes from the vantage point of 
phenomenological psychology, and understanding of his reconstruction of the notion of 
self requires a prior understanding of basic phenomenological assumptions such as 
intentionality, intersubjectivity, consciousness, and phenomenological reduction. Based 
on this line of thinking, he writes:
On initial consideration, the existential-phenomenological model*s view o f the 
"self may strike many readers as being either odd or absurd. For this model 
argues that the question o f whether or not a "self exists, in the sense that each 
o f us "has* a self that is real (as opposed to "unreal selves*) fixed or (relatively) 
stable, and which seeks to express, or actualise itself, is, at best, open to doubt.
Instead, this model prefers to view the self as a focal point in relation and, as 
such, speaks only o f the "self-in-relation* rather than the "self as a separate, 
fixed, and complete "entity* ... hence ""the "self is more properly speaking a 
"relational construct* (Spinelli, 1994:342-343).
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Central to the above statement is the notion of ‘consciousness’ as a relational process: 
that is as a mode which requires both the object/figure of interest and its background 
(i.e. figure/ground theory). Hence, “our constructions of the self rely on ... the 
perceptual notion of figure/ground, wherein the ‘figure’ focus on this relation is the 
‘self-construct’ and the ‘ground’ focus is ‘that which is not currently perceived to be 
the self’” (1994: 343, italics in the original). The above statement acquires its full 
significance only when viewed from the vantage point of phenomenological reduction, 
since, for Spinelli (1994), no experience can be described as it occurs, but only after it 
has occurred. It follows that a ‘sense of self’ can only emerge only after the process of 
bracketing has been carried out Hence, it is only by means of epoche' that reflective 
experience can take place. Based on this assumption, Spinelli (1996) argues that “at the 
level of immediate experience there exists no innate experiential quality which permits an 
inherent division between ‘self and other’ or ‘self and the world’” (1996:59).
It seems that Spinelli is arguing for a total obliteration of the self which he perceives as 
non-existent prior to conscious activity. Through his rejection of the self as an existing 
entity that lies somewhere within the person, he re-defines the terms as an artificial 
construct, a product of a person’s ‘reflective experience’. The echoes of Heidegger’s 
notion of ‘ being-in-the-world’ are present in Spinelli’s reconstruction; however, the two 
views are based on fundamentally different assumptions. Spinelli’s (1996) account has 
its roots in Husserlian phenomenology and method, which presupposes the existence of 
inner mental processes and takes intentionality as the starting point of all human 
experience. His account therefore retains the Husserlian view that all our activity is 
mediated by mental representations and as such the Cartesian scepticism towards the 
validity of our interpretations and representations is maintained. It follows that Spinelli’s 
notion of ‘self-construct’ is the product of mental processes, of a consciousness which 
detaches itself from the world and others by the process of bracketing.
Bearing this distinction in mind, it can be argued that the essence of Spinelli’s (1994, 
1996, 2001) reconstruction of the notion of ‘self’ lies in his rejection of the term as a 
singular entity which is intrapsychically located and perceived to be the initiator of 
consciousness. Instead, his ‘self-construct’ is the product of relational experience and as 
such it is indefinable, impermanent, and in constant flux. Its apparent stability and 
continuity is according to Spinelli (1994) the result of a process called sedimentation. 
Sedimented beliefs are strongly held fundamental beliefs that are perceived to be correct 
and insist on their primacy over all others; they are ""the foundational "building blocks* 
o f our constructed self* (Spinelli, 1994: 348, author’s italics). In other words, the 
process of sedimentation allows an individual to maintain a perception of ‘self’ with a 
relatively stable essence, fixed in time, and therefore possibly the source of a sense of 
security and belonging.
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It could be argued that Spinelli’s (1996) argument for a conceptualisation of the self as a 
‘construct’ which is always in constant reformation is in line with existential- 
phenomenological assumptions regarding human nature in general. In his article on ‘A 
Sketch of an Existential-Phenomenological Theory of Human Sexuality’, he further 
argues against essentialist assumptions and rejects the notion of sexuality as a biological 
given. Instead, he places sexual activity and the desire to ‘make love’ within an inter- 
relational context. Sexual encounters are for Spinellin the means through which one 
expresses her presence to ‘the other’ and vice versa. Consequently, “how we are, 
sexually, and what we enact sexually, therefore become statements not of reproductive 
drive but of our willingness, hesitation, delight, and anxiety to explore the ‘being-with’ 
of self and other” (1996: 8).
In his paper ‘The Vagaries of the Self through an imaginary conversation and partial 
criticism of Deurzen’s (1996) and Cooper’s (1996) articles, Spinelli (1996) emphasises 
the importance of self-construct and the role of dissociation in the perception of a 
multiplicity of ‘selves’ (i.e. Cooper’s use of the notion of polvpsvchisml. Although he 
expresses his complete agreement with Deurzen’s conceptualisation of the ‘self as an 
interactive process, he criticises her use of language, which in his view suggests an 
inherently essentialist structure. Specifically, he argues that “the word ‘self defies our 
very enterprise by asserting its ‘it-ness’ or ‘thing-ness’, which in turn creates confusing 
and apparently contradictory communications” (1996: 58). It is a rejection which is 
encapsulated in his phrase “I am not a nourC* (2001: 38, my italics). Moreover, he 
concretises the superiority of ‘self-construct’ over ‘self by using a modified version of 
Deurzen’s clinical examples. After replacing her terminology with his own, he argues 
that the end result not only retains her initial ideas, but also clarifies them and places 
them at the centre of existential/phenomenological thinking.
To conclude, Spinelli (1994, 1996, 2001) argues that when individuals are faced with 
ideas or beliefs that do not ‘fit’ the apparent unity of their ‘self-constructs’, they are left 
with two options; to either ‘own/integrate’ them and thereby alter their self-constructs, or 
‘disown/dissociate’ them and thus avoid any reflection or challenges that they impose. 
Not surprisingly the act of dissociation is far more common, since a challenge of one 
part of the ‘self-construct’ inevitable leads to a re-evaluation of the whole of it and 
therefore creates a sense of anxiety and insecurity. In his view, dissociation is ‘a 
mechanism of inauthenticity’ in so far as it expresses a fundamental unwillingness to 
cany through with the challenges of meeting with the world in order to safeguard the 
stability of the sedimented self-construct” (1994: 64). It follows that for Spinelli an 
authentic living entails a fundamental openess to the nothingness of being.
Following this argument, one could reasonably ask about the fate of these dissociations; 
that is whether they are completely discarded or blocked from conscious awareness, or
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whether they remain active and therefore a potential threat for the individual. According 
to Cooper (1996) there can be “a range of discrete, qualitatively distinct self 
constructs” (1996: 52, author’s italics). Spinelli (1996) on the other hand argues for 
one ‘self-construct’ which can ‘own’ even contradictory beliefs. Such co-existence of 
beliefs is for Spinelli (1996) an act of authenticity since it is the product of a person’s 
openness and willingness to embrace inconsistencies and challenges resulting from her 
engagement with the world and others. Hence, different constructs "‘can co-exist at the 
level o f immediate experience but remain experientially dissociated at the level o f 
reflection” (Spinelli, 1996: 66, author’s italics). Consequently, for Spinelli (1996, 2001) 
dissociation does nor refer to a personality division, but to a “splitness in reflective 
being” (2001: 51). With this argument he remained truthful to phenomenological 
theory; the idea of existence of autonomous subpersonalities is discarded and so the gap 
between ‘self consciousness’ and the world is obliterated.
In contrast. Cooper (1996) seems to be trapped in a dualist argument. In his effort to 
provide a phenomenological account of the phenomenon of ‘multiple personality 
disorder’ (M.P.D) - also known as ‘polypsychism’ - he attempts to integrate two 
distinct theoretical ideas; that of autonomous, intrapsychic entities and the notion of 
intersubjectivity. Cooper (1996), in line with existential-phenomenological theory, 
discards the notion of underlying mental entities. However, within the same article, he 
seems to contradict his own argument with the following statement; the existential- 
phenomenological perspective “does not inherently negate the existence of structurally- 
located intrapsychic entities, it does vastly minimise their possible psychotherapeutic 
significance - the ‘how’ encompassing the ‘why’ and the ‘which’” (1996: 51, author’s 
italics). It is my contention that the above statement is a clever compromise which allows 
Cooper to proceed to a deconstruction of a highly complicated issue; that of M.P.D.
What the above perspectives have in common is a rejection of the notion os self as an 
inner, static entity, which is autonomous and self-contained. Indeed, all authors have 
attempted in their own ways to redifine the term in order to overcome its essentialist 
implications and assumptions. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the majority of tiie 
authors by using philosophical and psychological terms interchangeably (e.g. 
‘intersubjectivity’, ‘self,’ and ‘being-in-the-world’, or ‘Dasein’) have created 
unnecessary confusion which leaves the reader feeling perplexed. It is a confusion which 
is further intensified by the use of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and 
Heidegger’s philosophical ideas as two compatible philosophical stances.
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IV. Conclusion
Heidegger’s (1927a) focus on ontology and hermeneutics of everydayness emphasises 
the importance of engagement with the world and others and attempts to show that the 
shared public world is the only world there is. When viewed from the vantage point of 
existential theory, the gap between human consciousness and the world is proven to be 
artificial; human beings are embedded in the world-with-others. Hence, in contrast to 
Cartesian ideas, consciousness and the slef are no longer viewed as some kind of inner 
entities that are detached and isolated from the world and other people.
At first glance, the existential-phenomenological analysis of the notion of ‘self’ seems to 
be in line with the above thinking in that it has retained a person’s engagement and 
situatedness in the world as a starting point. However, it is my contention that the 
majority of authors have used contradictory philosophical ideas interchangeably and 
have also fallen prey in a linguistic trap which defies their veiy aims. Consequently, the 
emphasis on an understanding of subjective experience and the client’s private ‘world­
view’ perpetuates the use of traditional binaries such as self/other, individual/society, and 
inner/outer. Although the ‘self’ is not regarded as a fixed, inner entity, it is perceived by 
certain authors to be the product of detached conscious reflection (i.e. mental processes 
and representations) which in turn implies a gap between self-consciousness and the 
world.
In my view, the above paradox has sprung out of a clash between existential ontology 
and an epistemological need for a method which will validate existential psychotherapy 
in the arena of academic and clinical research. As a result, Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction has - in spite of its fundamental differences with the existential view of 
‘consciousness’ - been retained and used. The result has been that whilst existential- 
phenomenological psychotherapists are mindful of the gap none has yet succeeded in 
achieving its dissolution. Hence the use of Heideggerian notions such as being-in-the- 
world is bound to be confusing.
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Self Reflection
Having being immersed in psychoanalytic theoiy and particularly having explored in 
depth the notion of psychic reality I felt constrained by a system of though which 
despite its infinite creativity is based on a model of the mind as conceived by 19th 
century scientists. As such psychoanalytic theoiy with its emphasis on the Unconscious 
is mainly concerned with an individual’s internal rather than external reality. My study 
of existential thinkers and subsequently postmodern theories provided me with a 
different focus and a new philosophical approach to an understanding of Being. As a 
result a deconstruction of what I had previously taken for granted was inevitable.
A recent study on the notion of identity from a postmodern perspective together with my 
psychotherapeutic work became the impetus for further research on the topic from the 
vantage point of existential thinking. Knowing that existential psychotherapy sprung out 
of a philosophical movement which criticised traditional epistemology and mainstream 
psychology I set out to explore ideas which challenged traditional ontology and 
specifically the constructed gap between ‘self-consciousness’ and the ‘external world’.
The surrendering of long held truths, values and beliefs is disquieting and leads to an 
insatiable quest for an intellectually satisfying position which allows room for a plurality 
of ideas and therefore for a more open attitude towards a multiplicity of views. As 
Charcot once said “Theories are good, but they don’t prevent things from existing”. A 
conceptualisation of consciousness as a mental process detached from the world and the 
belief in the existence of a structured, rational, unified agent, who possesses innate, 
universal and stable essences are not only theoretical restrictions but an imprisonment of 
the mind. By deciding to explore the area of Existentialism and its view of the ‘self’ as a 
process I was hoping to bridge the gap between the internal and external world and thus 
overcome the isolation of human consciousness from its surroundings.
Based on the above ideas and aims I embarked on a a criticism of the Cartesian legacy 
and traditional epistemology through the reading of the contributions made by radical 
and innovative thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger. Moreover, due to my interest 
in psychotherapy an emphasis was placed on contemporary existential psychotherapists 
who developed these ideas and attempted to apply them in their own field of work. 
Nietzsche’s critical thinking and a brief review of existential ontology set the scenery in 
which the Heideggerian reversal of cogito ergo sum took place. Heidegger’s pragmatic 
approach and his emphasis on everyday coping skills as well as on a hermeneutic 
interpretation of phenomena were perceived to be intellectually and historically 
challenging. His views not only questioned centuries of philosophical thinking but also 
laid the foundations of the Postmodern movement. The density of his concepts and his 
intentional manipulation of linguistic terms was at times exasperating. Moreover having
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to summarise his ideas without betraying the content of his arguments was the most 
difficult part of this review and it was obviously difficult to do them justice in such a 
short paper. Indeed having to choose the most representative contributions of Merleau- 
Ponty and Sartre was comparatively refreshing.
Coming to an analysis of the ideas presented by existential psychotherapists was both 
exciting and disappointing. Since I started from a point of ignorance I was anticipating a 
rewarding study of the development of those ideas and the ways in which they would 
incorporate philosophical terms in psychotherapeutic literature. To my surprise I not 
only found a limited contribution to the area but also a weakness in dealing with the 
implications of such radical ideas in the context of psychotherapy. Hence, the use of 
philosophical terms lacked clarity and was often presented in contradictory ways. In 
addition, the conclusions reached by the main authors seemed to be bom out of a 
compromise between existential thinking and the incorporation of phenomenological 
assumptions for the sake of a method and perhaps clarity of expression. Nevertheless, 
while doing my research and consequently presenting my ideas I was aware of the 
limited amount of time that I had left and therefore anxious to produce a piece of work 
which would meet the required standards in relation to structure and clarity of ideas. 
Given more time I would have been able to detach myself from my work and therefore 
allow room for more critical reflection and more research in the area.
However, I think that my inclination to engage with revolutionaiy philosophical thinking 
in contrast to my psychoanalytic background contributed to the cultivation of high 
expectations in relation to how the existential therapists would apply these ideas in their 
own theoretical conceptualisations. As a result my own anticipation for an equally radical 
psychotherapeutic approach influenced my emotional reaction to the findings. To 
conclude, it remains to be seen whether philosophical ideas like those presented can ever 
be incorporated and applied in psychotherapeutic practice without a betrayal of their 
original meaning and aim. Consequently, bridging the gap remains a challenge for the 
future.
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O^ney No One y and One Hundred Thousand^  ^; 
Views of Ëxîstential/Phenomenoiogical Therapists on the Notion of 
Subjectivity and its Implications for 
Therapeutic Practice
ABSTRACT
The present study sets out to explore three interrelated areas; the ways in which 
existential/ phenomenological therapists conceptualise the notion o f the self its 
impact on therapeutic practice and the methodological significance and use o f 
the notion o f "epoche* within the field. Semi-structured interviews with twelve 
therapists working from an existential/phenomenological perspective who were 
also lecturers in the field were analysed by using IP A. Analysis yielded four 
main themes; iflh e  Fluid Permanence o f the Self, ii) Aspects o f the Self, Hi) 
"Self and Therapy and iv) "Existential/ Phenomenological Accounts o f the Notion 
of Phenomenological Reduction. The intricacy and paradoxical nature o f the self 
was highlighted by participants and its implication for therapeutic practice were 
also discussed.
I. Introduction
Existential thinking - which came into being at a time when ontological dualism 
predominated - set out to criticise the notion of scientific ontology and its emphasis on 
objectivity, certainty and truth. Scientific ontology, which is based on a Cartesian 
syllogism, by advocating clarity and certainty (i.e. the belief in a truly known external 
world) denies the world’s transcendence and therefore reduces it to an object for 
consciousness (Dillon, 1997). As a result the knower becomes a spectator, a detached 
observer, who, by means of experimental, controlled research, sets out to discover the 
conditions under which making an error becomes a mere impossibility. It is this 
emphasis on detached observation that existential thinkers set out to deconstruct by 
shifting the focus from epistemology to ontology. Hence, from an existential vantage 
point, the acquisition of knowledge is perceived to be a social process, the product of 
involvement and engagement with the world and its phenomena (Cooper, 2000).
As argued by Deurzen-Smith (1997) a number of contemporary existential philosophers 
- among which Kierkegaard and Nietzche - reacted to the dogmas of their time and set 
themselves against the dominance of rationalism and positivism. One of the most 
influential advocates of the ontological position was Martin Heidegger (1927a) who set 
out to criticise scientism (i.e. scientific investigation) by claiming that the notion of 
objective truth is mere escapism. In his view. Western thinking has imprisoned itself in a 
mental-representation approach to the world and has fallen prey to the erroneous belief 
that ‘reality’ can be ultimately known by means of detached observation and scientific 
experimentation. Heidegger (1982) perceived such absolutism to be a preservation of a
Luigi Pirandello, (1990). New York: Eridanos Press
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myth, which views the world as a constellation of identifiable facts, universal truths and 
values. His rejection of positivist epistemology and subsequent interest in the notions of 
‘Being’ and ‘existence’ led to the development of hermeneutic phenomenology which 
stands in opposition to Husserl’s (1913) transcendental phenomenology. As argued by 
Cohn (2002), Heidegger rejected Husserl’s notion of reduction (i.e. the idea that the 
world can be ‘bracketted’) and focused on the importance of interpretation and 
hermeneutic analysis.
Consequently, the ‘natural attitude’, which is the very thing that pure phenomenologists 
like Husserl tried to ‘suspend’, became the centre of Heideggerian hermeneutic 
phenomenology and was perceived to be the interpretative framework through which the 
world can be understood (Heidegger, 1982). In other words, since things or phenomena 
‘show’ themselves to us, our primary encounter with them can be nothing other than 
interpretative. It follows that human beings can no longer be perceived as detached 
observers; from the vantage point of hermeneutic phenomenology they are seen as 
“traffickers in meaning” (Cooper, 1996: 22). With his notions of ‘Dasein’ and 
‘bodying-forth’^  Heidegger (1927a) successfully managed to dissolve Cartesian 
solipsism and to eradicate Husserl’s (1913) reduction of the ‘I’ to a ‘transcendental 
ego’. For Heidegger (1927a,b, 1982) an ‘I ’, which perceives and constructs the world 
but is not involved with it, presupposes a gap between the subject and the world and 
therefore leads to a different kind of solipsism (i.e. phenomenological solipsism). 
However, as argued in Being and Time (1927a), no sense can be made of consciousness 
except in terms of its engagement with the world and as humans are already in the world, 
they do not need to take a step forward in order to bridge a gap between their ‘mental 
contents’ and the ‘external’ reality.
Despite the diversity of contemporary existential thinking and approaches to therapy, 
philosophical views and ideas continue to influence both theory and practice and are still 
perceived to be the ground upon which the field evolves and develops. Hence, the 
philosophical attitude of exploration and clarification of human existence remains at the 
centre of existential approaches. As argued by Deurzen-Smith (1997), existential 
theorists and therapists - faithful to the field’s philosophical underpinnings - refuse to 
make grandiose statements about a person’s mental state and psychological health and 
instead focus on a description and clarification of human predicament.
The above attitude is to be found in the field’s critique of mainstream psychotherapies 
(such as psychoanalysis and cognitive-behavioural therapy) and their emphasis on 
causality and explanation of human behaviour. It could be argued that existential 
therapeutic approaches attempt to demystify the traditional view of the therapist as an 
‘expert’ and to question the validity of a number of assumptions such as transference.
For a more detailed account of these notions refer to Manafi (2002)
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psychic structures, and rationalism. As a result theoretical and therapeutic concepts are 
being re-defined and explored in a reflective, philosophical, and critical light.
The present study sprung out of my literature review of the existential/ 
phenomenological critiques of the traditional dualist approach to the notion of ‘self’. 
Specifically, it focused on Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian epistemology and on the 
existential view of the ‘self’ as inextricably linked to other people and indelibly 
connected to the world through the body. As a result, emphasis was placed on 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘Dasein’ and on a number of concepts such as ‘temporality’, 
‘embeddedness’, ‘facticity’, and ‘embodiment’. Moreover, the impact of these 
philosophical concepts on existential psychotherapy and its use of the ‘self’ was also 
reviewed. It was concluded that a close look at contemporary existential/ 
phenomenological literature on the notion of the self, shows a discrepancy between the 
contextual and discursive use of existential and phenomenological terms and their 
meaning within the philosophical discourses from which they originated. Specifically, it 
was argued that despite the fundamental philosophical differences between purely 
phenomenological and existential standpoints, terms such as ‘transcendental ego’, 
‘Dasein’, ‘epoche’, and ‘being-in-the-world’ were used interchangeably (Manafi, 
2002).
In the light of the above paradox the present study sets out to explore and hopefully 
clarify the notion of ‘self as conceptualised by existential/ phenomenological therapists. 
Emphasis will be placed on three different areas; i) the ways in which the notion of 
‘self is conceptualised within the field, ii) the significance and use of purely 
phenomenological ideas such as transcendental ego and epoche, and iii) therapeutic 
implications. Finally, in an effort to explore the relece of philosophy in existential 
practice and therapeutic thinking, participants will be asked to discuss a number of 
philosophical terms (see Appendix C) and their possible impact on their 
conceptualisation of the ‘self.
n. Method
From an existential/phenomenological perspective, theoretical understanding is perceived 
to be a relational and experiential phenomenon. This being the case. Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis with its emphasis on the elucidation of individual 
perceptions and experiences was considered to be the most appropriate method for the 
current study.
Participants
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of Surrey Advisory 
Committee on Ethics (see Appendix B). Due to the theoretical and clinical
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undeipinnings of the present study eligibility for participation required both theoretical 
involvement in the existential/phenomenological field and therapeutic practice from an 
equivalent perspective. The above criteria were perceived to be necessary for sufficient 
theoretical and practical exploration to take place. Potential participants were contacted 
via the web sites of School o f Psychotherapy and Counselling at Regent's College 
(SPGRC) and New School o f Psychotherapy and Counselling (NSPC) as well as 
through the ‘Directory of Existentially Oriented Practitioners’ (as published by the 
Society for Existential Analysis). The SPCRC and NSPC were chosen due to their 
recognised status and focus on existential/ phenomenplogical approaches and 
therapeutic training.
Data Collection
Data were collected by using a semi-structured interview schedule which allowed space 
for participants to discuss their views on existing terms (see Appendix C) and to present 
their personal accounts and experiences. Two pilot interviews were conducted to allow 
refinement of the questions. Consequently, four main areas were covered in the interview 
and were addressed by open-ended questions that were occasionally followed by 
requests for clarification and elaboration. Specifically, the; four areas covered included, i) 
reference to the philosophical background in relation to the notion of the self and 
subjectivity, ii) critical evaluation and discussion of the existing terminology surrounding 
the topics of interest, iii) perceived presence or absence of a tension between the 
phenomenological and existential approaches, and iv) therapeutic conduct For a sample 
of the actual questions, (see Appendix E).
Interviews lasted between one and one and half hours and were conducted either in the 
participant’s own home, private consulting room, or academic office. Each participant 
was given an information sheet, which outlined the nature and aims of the study, an 
informed consent form, which provided details of confidentiality, and a background 
information questionnaire (see Appendices A. B. C and D \
Method of Analysis
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, with its emphasis on engagement and 
involvement with participants’ accounts and its attempt to adopt an ‘insider’ perspective 
(Smith, 2003) rather than an objectivist stance, was perceived to be the most appropriate 
method of analysis. It is a method which is strongly influenced by symbolic interaction 
Denzin (1995) with an emphasis on interpretation and on an effort to capture the 
experiential quality of participants’ accounts instead of some sort of objective truth. At 
the same time, the positioning of the researcher as that of an insider and not as a 
detached observer acknowledges and validates the influence of her interpretative 
framework in the analysis of the data (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999; Smith, et al. 
1999; Smith, 2003). Such acknowledgement of an interaction between the participants’
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accounts and the conductor’s own interpretative stance is in line with Heideggerian 
(1927a,b) views on hermeneutic interpretation and notions of understanding and 
meaning, which are perceived to be embedded within the referential totality of a culture 
and history.
For reasons of clarity and understanding, all twelve interviews were audiotaped, 
transcribed and then analysed individually, following the steps proposed by Smith et al. 
(1999). Transcripts were read repeatedly and on individual basis, making notes and 
identifying key phrases and processes. Emphasis was placed on connections between 
different aspects of the transcripts and on initial interpretations. Gradually, notes were 
condensed to produce initial themes and subthemes which reflected participants’ 
accounts and phenomenological understanding. Once this process was completed for 
each transcript, the resulting sets of initial themes were closely compared to each other in 
order to identify recurring themes across the transcripts which in turn led to the final set 
of superordinate and subordinate themes (for a sample of a transcribed interview and 
guidelines on transcription notation, see Appendices F & G).
A final note should be made regarding issues of reliability and the idea of ‘bracketing’. 
As argued by Giorgi (1985) ‘bracketing’, that is, the attempt to suspend any 
preconceived assumptions and attributions is to be found in most forms of IPA. 
However, for reasons of methodological clarity, it needs to be added, that this idea, also 
known as epoche, is in this context used in order to facilitate a reflective awareness 
during the process of interpretation of participants’ accounts. In other words, 
‘bracketing’ in this context by no means implies a disengaged, objectivist stance towards 
analysis; it is rather analogous to “training wheels on a bicycle” which facilitate balance 
(Spinelli, personal communication). Therefore, affiliation with the Heideggerian 
epistemological stance is retained.
Lastly, since IPA is explicitly involved within an interpretative framework, which 
recognises the conductor’s personal influence in the analysis of the data, results are 
inevitably part of a subjective process, which varies from conductor to conductor. 
Reliability within this methodological framework is therefore bound to lose its 
importance and is instead replaced by the notion of reflexivity, meaning, the conductor’s 
awareness and critical reflections upon her own standpoint in relation to the analytic 
process and findings. As argued by Willig (2001), reflexivity is at the very heart of 
qualitative research and aims at the retention of a critical and reflective stance throughout 
the research process.
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III. Analysis of the Data
Background Information
There were 6 female and 6 male participants whose mean age was 45 years ( SD = 5.8, 
range 36-69). They were all therapists working from an existential/phenomenological 
perspective with United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP), British 
Association for Counselling (BAC), or British Psychological Society (BPS) 
accreditation (self-reported). Moreover, all participants were also lecturers in die same 
fields.
The analysis of the present data gave rise to the identification of four major themes. The 
first was labelled, "The Fluid Permanence o f the Self and dealt with the tension and 
paradox of the co-existence of fluidity and permanence. The second theme was labelled 
"Aspects o f the Self and attempted to capture the multiplicity of the notion. The third 
theme attempted to explore the importance of phenomenological reduction and its use; it 
was therefore labelled, "Existential/Phenomenological Accounts o f the Notion o f 
Phenomenological Reduction'. Rnally, the fourth major theme, labelled "Self and 
Therapy', focused on the impact of the absence of a ‘fixed self’ on participants’ ways 
of working with clients.
‘The Fluid Permanence of the Self
In an attempt to elucidate the tension between permanence and fluidity, two sub-themes 
emerged; i) Against the Notion of a Fixed Self and ii) The Paradox of the Self
i) Against the Notion of a Fixed Self
All participants’ accounts highlighted the uniqueness, fluidity and plasticity of the self; 
the rejection of the notion of a ‘fixed self’ as an isolated, unitary entity that is self- 
contained and disembodied was unanimous. The majority of the participants, in order to 
convey their views, extensively referred to philosophical concepts and to existing terms 
relating to the notion of subjectivity and the self. Such reference to the philosophical 
work of key figures in existentialism and phenomenology created a sense of cohesion 
and continuity between the two fields (i.e. philosophy and psychotherapy).
In line with the above ideas, ‘Participant 1’ argues;
the sélf, who we are, is about experience and interaction with the world and 
others, it's an embodied experience, it's mine and it's in the world [ ] it is not 
solipsistic and it's not fixed. (Participant 1 )
Participant 1 by her reference to the notions of ‘solipsism’ and ‘embodiment’ is almost 
explicitly rejecting the Cartesian cogito. Consequently, a person is no longer perceived 
as an autonomous, self-contained being, but is instead conceptualised as an amalgam of 
interactions with other people and engagement with the world. This holistic perspective
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views the self as both interactive and interrelational; in other words the self, while 
retaining its individuality, is indelibly connected to society, culture, and history.
The critique against the perception of the self as a fixed entity becomes even more
explicit in Participant 2’s account, who argues;
the position that one is likely to adopt is one that in some way supposes a notion 
o f self seen in a concrete^ objectifying sense, you know, the self seen as a thing. 
as an object, as some kind of  fixed entity that supposedly resides within and that 
has various characteristics that can be captured, contained and described [ J 
however if  you start with the first phenomenological principle, which is to stay 
with the phenomenon, you come to the realisation that the self is really a 
construct (Participant 2 )
Here, Participant 2 uses the phenomenological standpoint in order to criticise the 
mainstream psychology and its perception of the self as a fixed entity. Although he 
acknowledges the likelihood of seeing the self in a “concrete, objectifying sense”, he 
shifts his emphasis on description (i.e. the first phenomenological principle) in order to 
claim that the ‘self’ is a construct, devoid of any essences and characteristics.
Later in the interview, he provided his own view of the self, which is again embedded 
within phenomenological theoiy. Specifically, he argues;
S elf is the attempt at making something o f the world and in that sense it is 
inseparable from the reflective process o f consciousness [ ]  so from this 
vantage point, the self is always interrelational and grounded in the world, it's 
not a fixed object, it *s more liJæ a process (Participant 2)
Participant 2 argues that this self-construct does not pre-exist, but is the outcome of 
conscious reflection and it is used as a means of making sense of the world. In other 
words, a sense of self cannot be separated from the acts of experiencing, perceiving, and 
understanding. When seen from this vantage point, the self is inseparable from lived 
experience. His emphasis on “interrelational grounding” has a catalytic effect on the 
conceptualisation of the notion; the self gets decentred, it is no longer situated within. It 
is instead revealed through engagement and involvement with the world and others.
In line with Participant 2’s account. Participant 3, by using an imaginary scenario, 
rejects the idea of fixity and argues;
we are what we do [ ] i f  you kill somebody you are a murderer, and nothing can 
take away that fact, but you can become a repentant murderer, or a complacent 
murderer and you can redeem the fact that you are a murderer, by repenting 
and you can go on and become a saint, or you can go on and become a serial 
killer (p) so what you are at any given time does not predict what you are going 
to be at any given moment in the future, in other words, we are never fixed 
(Participant 3).
The above account is closely linked to a Sartrean conceptualisation of the self which is 
focused on the importance of an individual’s actions. Participant 3. by bringing together
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the notions of action, choice, responsibility, and determinism, views the self as a 
personal creation, which mirrors not only one’s own actions, but also their 
consequences. Moreover, by presenting the self as a creative process, he defies the 
notion of determinism. In other words, a person is no longer perceived to be guided by 
inner essences or forces that are outside her awareness. According to Participant 3, any 
restrictions on one’s sense of self have been consciously inflicted upon oneself and are 
thus viewed to be redeemable.
The above views are echoed throughout the data; indeed a combination of relatedness, 
interaction and fluidity was present in all accounts. In line with this view. Participant 4 
argues;
/  am not fixed, the closest Vve come to my definition o f the self is a sense o f a 
forward process, which is embodied and which cannot exist in isolation, it's 
always in relation to the world (Participant 4}
and Participant 5 combined the notions of agency and relatedness by stating that;
we are what we do and so we are never fixed, we are embodied and indelibly 
related to the world and others (Participant 5)
ii) The Paradox of the Self
All participants referred to what turns out to be an existential paradox, which sprang out 
of a belief in a type of constancy and endurance. Specifically, they argued for the 
existence of something permanent in their sense of self, which despite its enduring 
continuity, retains  ^a capacity to be open to experience and therefore is malleable and 
capable of changing. Consequently, the self is viewed as a continuous process, which 
nevertheless entails something which is substantial and has a sense of continuity over 
time.
This paradox is explicit in Participant 6’s account, who very emphatically argues;
there has to be some sort o f permanence underneath all that! In a sense I  am 
still the same person that I  used to be when I  was young, it is permanent, it's mv 
personal history, but, it does not define the totality o f who I  am, I  am still free to 
choose, I  continuously evolve, I  am m l determined by my past (Participant 6)
It seems that for Participant 6 the paradox emerges out of her personal sense of self; out 
of her own experiences and continuity in time. Therefore, it is deeply reflective and 
experiential in nature. Moreover, it could be argued that this sense of permanence 
accounts for her own sense of individuality and uniqueness; later in the interview she 
captured these notions by referring to this permanence as “something which makes me, 
me! [ ] my past experiences define me but do not restrict me”. What Participant 6 seems 
to describe, is a sense of self that can never be lost in a vacuum; its fluid permanence, 
gives it a sort of gravity, which is very personal, and which balances one’s way of being 
in the world with others.
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Other participants expressed their views, by referring to Spinelli’s (1994, 1996) use of 
the notion of sedimentation, Deurzen’s (1998, 2002) view of the self as a process, and 
Jasper’s (1955) concept of relative constancy. Participants 7 and 8 are among those 
who argued for the presence of an experiential sense of a sort of constancy. Both of 
them, in their own idiosyncratic ways, refered to an apparent solidity and continuity 
which is partly perceived to be the result of sedimentation and conscious self-reflection. 
Specifically, Participant 7 argues;
I  agree with the notion o f self as a process, its being in a constant flux, but in my 
view there is also a paradox, because when I  think of myself I  recognise a kind o f 
solidity, o f sedimentation [ ] so in a sense I  am also concrete, but never stuck in 
this concreteness (Participant 7)
Participant 7 seems to point at sedimented ideas or views, which contribute to the 
maintainance of a perception of a sense of self with a relative stability in time. Her 
emphasis on what could be viewed as a ‘malleable reification’ and her refusal to fix the 
self in any way retains a sense of process as well as freedom to choose and change.
On the other hand. Participant 8 uses Jasper’s (1955, 1970) notion of ‘relative
constancy’, as the closest description of what initially could be seen as an oxymoronic
schema (i.e. the co-existence of permanence and fluidity). He argues;
my notion o f the self would be that it is something constantly in flux, but at the 
same time stable (p) I  am also the relative constancy - and here /  am borrowing 
the term from Carl Jaspers - that I  find in myself (Participant 8}
The notion of ‘relative constancy’ is indelibly connected to the notion of temporality; 
therefore Participant 8 ’s account resembles a journey in time and within oneself. In 
other words the stability to which he refers seems to be found within oneself, after a 
process of reflection has taken place. It is a sense of continuity which is partly 
dependent on one’s sense of past; in other words this “reminiscent I” - as Jaspers’ 
(1970:31) calls it - is a person’s reflection on the mirror of time.
In addition. Participant 9 addressed the paradox by proposing a personal term,
yes we are in constant flux, and we are embedded and embodied, but there is also 
something else, something paradoxical, which gives us a sense o f stability and 
continuity in time [ ] Vve called it, a person's own core o f semitivities. this core 
is very loose, it's not fixed and partly it could be described as one's inheritance 
andfacticity. (Participant 9)
Participant 9 with his account provides a holistic view of the notion of the self and its 
paradoxical nature. Together with his conceptualisation of the self as an embodied being, 
which is not detached but embedded in the world, he includes his personal term “core of 
sensitivities” in order to emphasise the uniqueness of each individual. This “core” is in
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other words a collection of personal experiences but also of given aspects, such as 
genetics and environment (i.e. one’s facticity), which affect one’s way of being in the 
world. Furthermore, his insistence on avoiding the idea of fixity, by emphasising the 
loose character of this “core”, seems to emphasise his belief in the existence of the 
paradox.
Finally, a number participants attempted to capture and address the paradox through the
use of naturalistic images. A representative account is that of Participant 10 who argues
the self is our centre o f gravity, which is first and foremost situated in the body 
that we are, but it's not fixed, it's not solid [ ] we are like a river which 
constantly flows, but there is bound to be sedimentation as well, because a river 
needs its bottom, it can't exist without it, so no matter how sedimented we are, 
the flow is still there (Participant 10)
It seems that the use of metaphorical images, apart from enhancing participants’ 
conceptualisation of the self as a process, also introduces an artistic and experiential 
flavour to their narratives that reflects the concept’s lucidity. Moreover, the metaphore 
contributes to a more holistic understanding of a notion that sits at the very heart of the 
social as well as the therapeutic worlds.
‘Aspects of Üie SelT
The attempt to capture the multiplicity of the self gave rise to two sub-themes which were 
considered to be at the heart of the notion. The first sub-theme was labelled An 
Embodied. Temporal, and Spiritual Being, which is Culturallv. Socially, and Historicallv 
Embedded: this sub-theme is a combination of a multiplicity of notions which 
participants perceived as inextricably bound together. The second subtheme was labelled 
Language and it attempts to elucidate participants’ views regarding the linguistic impact 
on the concept of ‘self’.
An Embodied. Temporal, and Spiritual Being, which is Culturallv. Sociallv. and 
Historicallv Embedded
All participants, by emphasising the importance of experience, which they viewed as both 
physical and intellectual in nature, proposed a holistic view of the self, which resulted in 
a rejection of the Cartesian split between the body and the mind. Moreover, the notion of 
embodiment was viewed as inseparable from that of temporality, embeddedness, and 
spirituality.
Participants 10 and 8 expressed the invaluable importance of embodiment, 
embeddedness, and temporality in their conceptualisation of the self;
“ we are a unity in the sense that body, world, history, culture, and time cannot 
be viewed in isolation" (Participant 10)
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and Participant 8:
/  can't view myself outside my skin, our sense o f self starts with bodily 
experience, so in a sense, I  am my body, as I  am my culture, my context, and 
what others ' view o f me (Participant 8)
The emphasis on a holistic view of the self is evident in both accounts. Participant 10 
sees the self as inseparable from the elements she describes and Participant 8 goes on to 
the extent of equating the body, culture, and context with the self. Moreover, in his 
conceptualisation of the notion. Participant 8 also takes into account the reflections of 
others which again reminds us of Sartrean views (i.e. the ^look’ of the other). When 
viewed from this vantage point, a person’s sense of self assumes a plurality; it becomes 
an intricate matrix of personal and public perceptions and images. Moreover, in both 
accounts the body is no longer perceived to be just a physical object, it is a means to an 
end and it involves activity and engagement As a result the self is viewed as an 
embodied, social, and historical being which is indelibly connected to the world and 
other people.
In line with these views Participant 7 argues;
the self cannot be conceptualised out o f the realm o f lived experience and so it 
involves bodily experience in Merleau-Pontian way [ ] it is the totality o f our 
lived experience and as such it is in constant flux (p) what Pm saying is that the 
self cannot be reduced to anything, it is not Just language, as some theories 
advocate, we are much more than a text! (Participant 7}
The above account pleads for an experiential understanding of the self, which both 
emancipates and restricts our conceptualisation of i t  In other words, the self is in a way 
understood to be ineffable, as something that cannot be captured theoretically, but can be 
felt experientially. In this sense, the self is viewed as the totality of our existence. 
Moreover, her rejection of viewing the self simply on intellectual/theoretical terms is 
emphasised by an explicit focus on ‘bodily experience’. For Participant 7 the body 
seems to become a vehicle for communication with the world and others; it is in other 
words a whole realm of experience, which cannot be ignored or even viewed in isolation 
from the totality of our own being. The reference to Merleau-Ponty’s work is not 
accidental; it is used in order to highlight a different level of perception, bodily 
perception, which is not just the togetherness of the five sense, but a direct bodily sense 
which involves activity and engagement. Rnally, it seems to me - although it was not 
made explicit - that her last claim “we are much more than a text!” implies a rejection of 
postmodern ideas (I am thinking of Derrida’s claim “there is nothing outside the text”) 
which obliterate the notion of the self through perceiving it as a linguistic construct.
Finally, Participant 4’s account is representative of the spiritual aspect of the self;
The spiritual dimension, a person's spiritual world, is at the heart o f my 
conceptualisation o f the self(p) by spiritual I  don't necessarily mean religion or 
God, spirituality is a much wider concept and I  think Emmy describes this
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dimension very well [  ] it is really a person's ideological world, her values and 
ideals, (p) we can't possibly begin to understand a person's sense o f self without 
taking into account this dimension. (Participant 4)
Spiritually is here not restricted to a specific religion or the existence of God; through 
the reference to Deurzen’s ‘world dimensions’ (1997, 2002) Participant 4 widens the 
scope of spirituality to include a person’s (religious) beliefs, values, personal 
philosophy, and ideology. It follows that an understanding of a person’s sense of self 
can only proceed through an exploration of her implicit or explicit ideological outlook. 
The self is therefore seen as a relational concept which encompasses a wide variety of 
experiences and different levels (or dimensions).
.Eapgpage
The majority of participants - by emphasing the importance of lived experience - 
criticised the existing terminology regarding the concept of self as being reductive. They 
argued that the very word ‘self’ as a noun is incapable of capturing the notion’s 
multiplicity and totality. The existing terminology was also criticised on a purely 
linguistic basis; they argued that the English terms that attempt to cupture one’s 
subjectivity and personhood are founded on an essentialist and dualist language which 
cannot do justice to the interactive and interrelated aspects of subjectivity.
Based on the above assumptions. Participant 2 argues;
Part o f the dilemma with Western language is that it is dualistic by nature (p) it 
does not lend itself to expressing interrelational concepts, the moment I  try to 
describe the notion, I  fall into using essentialist, dualist language [ ] to avoid 
that. I  talk about a self-structure (Participant 2 )
In the above account. Participant 2 is expressing his concern and frustration regarding 
the inherent dualism and essentialism in the English language and Western cultures. It is 
a critique which led to the exposition of a new term, that of “self-structure” designed to 
show its antithesis to and overcome the two main positions which predominate the 
modernist view of the self. Hence, it seems that with this term Participant 2 tries to free 
the notion of subjectivity both from a dualist position which is based on the primacy of 
binary oppositions such as mind/body, subjectiobject, inner/outer, and from an 
essentialist stance. Through the above criticisms, the term “ self-construct” intends to 
overcome the linguistic barrier and enter the intersubjective field. Moreover, it can no 
longer be seen in terms of a fixed, isolated, inner entity, which is characterised and 
governed by inner attitudes, personality traits and other biological/psychological 
characteristics which in turn pre-determine behaviour and engagement with the world 
and others.
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Finally, a significant number of participants who viewed the self as ineffable and who 
therefore disagreed with any attempt to capture it linguistically, found refuge in 
philosophical notions such as ‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘interrelatedness’; in addition 
they used personal pronouns such as ‘myself’ and ‘you’ in their “ordinary everyday 
sense” (Participant 3). Participants 3 and 12 were among those who expressed their 
concern about the tendency to theorise the self. They argued that theorising inevitably 
leads to the construction of an intricate web of terms which, depending on the way tiiey 
are being used, end up defining if not constructing the object they are supposed to 
represent Consequently, Participant 3 argues;
T  is actually the subject o f a verb, it is just a grammatical construct, it does not 
refer to something that lies hidden within us and which carries some sort o f 
essences and characteristics [ ] I  wouldn't talk about 'the se lf, I  wouldn't try to 
theorise it [  ] for me words like 'yourself and 'myself have an ordinary 
everyday meaning (Participant 3)
The emphasis on the self as a ‘grammatical construct’ is here prominent; Participant 3 
used the noun ‘self’ and other pronouns in a pragmatic, practical way, that is, as means 
of orienting speech. In other words, it is used as a point of reference, through which one 
owns his/her speech actions, experiences, and references. Moreover, his emphasis on the 
‘I’ as the subject of a verb introduces movement and fluidity to his account; 
consequently, through his eyes, the ‘I’ can no longer be seen as an existing, concrete 
object. This everyday sense strips off any theoretical presuppositions from the notion of 
the self and accentuates its use on an ordinary, experiential level.
Finally, Participant 12 by distinguishing between theoretical and experiential 
understanding, makes a similar point. Specifically, he argues;
/  am very cautious with terms that attempt to define the notion o f subjectivity, 
what's important to me is to remain open to experience, to be able to stay with 
the clients' own personal views o f themselves [  ] terms and theories do not 
necessarily facilitate understanding, they can also guide it (Participant 12 )
It seems that receptivity and openness become the central points in the above account 
Participant 12 urges us not to equate theories, concepts, and terms with living people, but 
instead to stay with the actual experience of their personal accounts (i.e. personal views 
of themselves). In other words, for him and indeed for the majority of participants in this 
study, there is a danger of losing the experience for the sake of a theoretical and 
linguistic validation of the phenomenon.
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‘Existential/Phenomenological Accounts of the Notion of Phenomenological 
Reduction’
The above theme explored the possibility of the existence of a tension between the two 
philosophies (i.e. existentialism and phenomenology). Participants in their discussion of 
the list of philosophical terms regarding the notion Of subjectivity and the self were 
tentative and aware of differences and contradictions. The majority of them, in line with 
their conceptualisation of the self as primarilv interrelational and interactive, referred to 
Heideggerian notions such as and not to Husserl’s transcendental
ego which was criticised for its implied sense of detachment and apparent solipsism. 
Nevertheless, this term was used for theoretical purposes (Le. while lecturing). However, 
their references to phenomenological reduction were less coherent and idiosyncratic and 
gave rise to the emergence of the following sub theme.
From Absolute Necessity to Mere Impossibility
Participants’ views on the notion o f‘epoche’ showed interesting fluctuations, oscillating 
between two extremes. Their attitudes ranged from seeing the notion of epoche as an 
absolute necessity, to criticising it as a ‘mere impossibility’. Participant 6 was among 
those who viewed ‘phenomenological reduction’ as ari invaluable concept. Her views on 
epoche ^ e  emphatically expressed;
I  think 'epoche' is very important and when it comes to therapy absolutely 
necessary (p) this doesn't mean that I  am less engaged with my clients, 
'bracketing' helps me twi to impose my views on them, it does not mean 
disengagement (Participant 6)
Participant 6 is here presenting the vitality of the term when working therapeutically. It 
seems that for her ‘epoche’ is a way of guarding her own assumptions, a way of being 
aware of them and therefore in control of them. Consequentiy, for her ‘bracketing’ does 
not imply “disengagement” from the world and others, instead it seems to facilitate a 
‘proper’, unbiased way of being with them.
Participant 7 on the other hand represents the other extreme; she was among those 
participants who completely discarded the idea;
epoche is impossible, you can never detach yourself, even when one tries to 
bracket something, one is stilt involved, he or she is just changing the position o f 
involvement, so I  don't see any value in this term [ ] the problems begin when 
people assume that involvement implies bias, but it doesn't, involvement is at the 
very heart o f alt understanding (Participant 7)
Participant 7 is here assuming a hermeneutic stance; her words are echoing Heidegger’s 
(1927a,b) views on ‘meaning’ and ‘knowledge’. With her emphasis on involvement she 
highlights her existential stance and at the same time discards the ideas of ‘detached 
observation’ and ‘spectatorial knowledge’. In other words, for Participant 7 the act of
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bracketing is illusoiy; it is perceived to be an active involvement, which simply leads to a 
different position, which - to her - is anything but neutral.
Nevertheless, besides these extreme views, most of the participants retained the notion, 
but were less emphatic and always aware of its impossibility. They all used it as a tool 
which helped them be ‘critically aware’ of their clients’ position. In the following 
account Participant 1 argues;
epoche can never be complete, I  mean, my assumptions are still there, I  don't 
completely detach myself from them, I  simply become critically aware o f them 
(Participant 11).
Moreover participants who agreed with the notion claimed that their use of it departs 
from the purely phenomenological, Husserlian assumptions. On this basis. Participant 9 
argues;
It's not that I  am trying to reach some land o f essence, 'bracketing' to me has a 
practical role, it is a  means to critical reflection. In other words in my efforts to 
'bracket' my assumption I  simply try not to impose my personal views on the 
other, views which o f course contidue to colon, to influence the way I  
understand, interpret information (Participant 9}.
Hence, most participants viewed phenomenological reduction as a "reflective tool" 
(Participant 5), "a reminder" (Participant 4) and as "a reflective mirror" (Participant
2), which is there to facilitate the preservation of balance in a person’s engagement with 
the world and consequently in her assumptions and inferences. Hence it could be argued 
that ‘epoche’, having departed from a ‘pure’ phenomenological stance, is used as a 
means to an effective mode of engagement (both on a Aeoretical and expaimtial level).
‘Self and Therapy’
Participants’ accounts regarding the absence of a fixed self and its impact on therapeutic 
practice gave rise to two subthemes; i) Exploring rather than Interpreting and ii) The 
Rise of Contradictions and the Fall of Pathology. Emphasis was placed on their interest 
in exploring the world views of their clients as well as on their personal sense of 
emancipation from theoretical and interpretative frameworks.
Exploring rather than Interpreting
All participmts’ accounts were governed by a sense of liberation, which emerged out of 
their belief in a fluid, malleable sense of self. For all participants, eveiy session was 
perceived to be a unique moment in time, “as the first and the last” (Participant 12). 
Moreover, all participants emphasised the importance of exploration, openness and 
understanding of the client’s way of being in the world with others.
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Based on the above views Participant 9 argues;
for me the focus o f therapy is on exploration (p) if I  have any aim, it is to free my 
clients from the inevitable sedimentation which restricts them, this can only be 
done through exploration and not through svstematised interpretation 
(Participant 9)
In this account, Participant 9 explicitly states that exploration should not be confused 
with interpretation. His awareness that all perception is inevitably ihterpretational, is 
shown from his emphatic criticism of svstematised interpretation. In otiier words he 
implicitly makes a distinction between a ‘reductive/systematised’ interpretation and a 
hermeneutic interpretation, which is compatible with the notion of exploration. 
Consequently, for Participant 9, emancipation can only be achieved through a 
deconstruction of sedimentation by means of exploring the client’s views. His 
juxtaposition of the two terms leads to viewing systematised interpretation in a rather 
derogatory way; since he views it as a restricting and therefore inadequate tool which 
fails to capture the clients’ experience and to do justice to their concerns and difficulties.
The above view was also present in Participant 1 ’s words, who states;
exploration! (p) this is how the absence o f a fixed self influences my therapeutic 
conduct. The freedom to explore and not interpret based on constructed 
explanatory systems (Participant 1 )
Once again the emphasis on exploration in her way of working seems to devalue 
systematic interpretation and explanatory systems which rest on an assumption that fhey 
can provide a valid explanation of the fundamentals of human existence. Participant 1, is 
thereby arguing for a liberation from theoretical frameworks and particular sets of 
techniques.
Participant 6 in the following statement, actively discredits technique and analytic theory 
as “fairy talés” which restrict and direct therapeutic conduct;
it's all about exploration o f the client's world views, it's nol about specific 
theories (p) I  don't do fairy tales. I  don't do Freudian fairy tales, I  don't do 
Jungian fairy tales, I  am quite happy to live my life without these blinkers 
(Participant 6)
Hence, it seems that the point of view of the client takes precedence over the therapist’s 
imposition of interpretations.
Finally, Participant 8 was among those, who explicitly referred to the sense of liberation 
emanating from their way of working;
the non-fixity o f the self, is liberating; each session is form e a new invitation to 
see clients in different ways [  ] people are different, the same person can
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behave in different ways, which are often contradictory, so exploration is my
means o f therapy
(Participants)
Participant 8 emancipation emanates out of his belief in multiplicity, tiiat is, the co­
existence of different ways of being in the world, which in turn influence and enhance 
different self-images. Consequently, this recognition and acceptance of contradiction 
defies die view of the self as a coherent, rational agent and gives rise to the following 
aspect of this theme.
The Rise of Contradiction and the Fall of Pathology
The notion of ‘pathology’ was abdicated by all participants and therapy was viewed as a 
means of broadening clients’ perspectives. Emphasis was placed on clients’ individual 
accounts, ways of experiencing the world and personal views of themselves. By 
concentrating on the self’s non-fixity, participants condemned the notion of rationality 
as the ‘normal’ way of being and instead focused on the importance of a multiplicity of 
viewpoints. As a result, the notion of contradiction gained primacy and was seen as part 
of a person’s way of being in the world with others.
Based on the above assumptions Participant 7 argues;
I  don't agree with medical assumptions, it's all about labelling (p) determinism 
should be questioned, I  mean psychological disturbance is not necessarily 
situated within the individual, it is not just the outcome o f a chemical imbalance [
] difficulties occur at the point o f engagement with the world and others they are 
not simply internal dysfunctions (Participant 7)
Participant 7’s critique is on many levels; she not only discards the medical model and 
its assumptions regarding pathology and positioning ‘patients’ as powerless, but also 
criticises the notion of psychic determinism. In other words, she seems to displace the 
origins of disturbance from the internal (as most therapeutic models assume) to the 
external and specifically to one’s meeting point with the world and others. Hence, she 
implicitly refers to the primacy of the individual’s relational context: disturbance is 
always to do with a person’s relation to the world, it is not the outcome of intrapsychic 
conflicts.
The emphasis on relatedness was also evident in Participant 4’s account,
I  don't refer to diagnostic criteria, they are constructions based on a specific view 
of the mind, they leave no room for contradictions, they are just a convenience [
] in my view, there is no such thing as 'pathology', just ways o f being and 
relating to the world and others, that's why exploration is at the very heart o f my 
practice (Participant 4)
The sense of liberation is evident in the above account; Participant 4 assumes a critical 
stance toward the totality of the notion of patholo^ and mental illness. Consequently,
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his emphasis on the self’s relatedness and embeddedness challenges mainstream 
medical and psychological ideas which view pathology as something which resides 
within the individual and which can be measured, identified, and categorised. Exploration 
of individual experience is privileged as opposed to its ‘problematisation’; all positions 
in life are validated and a holistic perspective of human experience is assumed.
Moreover, contradiction and ambiguity were favoured in the accounts of all participants; 
the notions of ‘absolute truth’ and belief in ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways of behaving were 
challenged. They spoke of a co-existence of conflicting ways of being, which were 
perceived to be humans’ natural state of being; “contradictions are at the heart of human 
existence” (Participant 5).
The above assumptions are reflected in Participant 11’s account,
There is no such thing as 'pathology', that's why I  feel so comfortable practising 
from an existential perspective (p) life and people are full o f contradictions, it is 
our relation to the existential givens that leads to difficulties [ ] it is important to 
recognise that we are all vulnerable, we are all exposed to the limitations o f our 
existence, to meaninglessness and death, anxiety is an authentic state o f being 
(Participant 11)
It seems that for the above participant the aim of therapy is to encourage clients to face 
human existence with all its passions and adversities. Disturbance is viewed as the 
outcome of an evasion, of a refusal to face life and existentials (i.e. death, 
meaninglessness, contradictions, etc.). It is the unaccepted aspects of existence itself that 
lead to difficulties; a tendency that all humans share. In other words, we are all equally 
subject to life’s vicissitudes and the inevitability of death; with this statement ‘Participant 
i r  apparently supersedes any issues of power relations between clients and therapists 
since both are equal and bound by their humanity.
Rnally, some participants referred to clients’ own responsibility for their condition; as a 
result, an active stance towards one’s own state of being was advocated. Emphasis was 
again placed on exploration and possibility for change. Hence, the use of the term 
‘patient’, as used in the medical model was challenged. Participant 12 recapitulates this 
stance with the following statement;
pathology positions clients as powerless victims, who are at the mercy o f 
something that cannot be understood, I  disagree with that, there is always an 
element o f personal responsibility to one's own condition (Participant 12)
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IV. Overview
The present study explored the ways in which existential/phenomenological 
psychotherapists conceptualised the notions of subjectivity and self. In line with the 
views of a number of existential philosophers, such as Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau- 
Ponty participants conceived and constructed the existential subject as an interrelated, 
interactive being, which is embodied and embedded within history, culture and time. In 
their definitions participants placed particular emphasis on lived experience: the 
Cartesian doubt was overcome by arguing that the “I am” -in the existential sense, 
comes into being through involvement, actions and responsible choices. One could 
therefore talk about an existential stance, which not only criticises modem epistemology, 
but also rejects the idea of a self-contained being, which exists independently from its 
body, the world and others.
This view of the self is in contrast to that of a fixed entity which resides within the 
individual and which somehow is characterised by inner attributes and essences. In line 
with contemporary existential/ phenomenological authors (Deurzen, 1996,1998; Cooper, 
1996; Spinelli, 2001) participants of the present study viewed the self as a process, as a 
malleable concept which is always in flux and in constant interaction with the world and 
others. In other words, this sense of “me” or “mineness”, as some participants argued, 
is not a thing but a personal creation, it can therefore be viewed as the totality of lived 
experiences.
In line with Frier (2003) participants’ emphasis on the selfs fundamental 
embeddedness by no means obliterated a sense of agency and individuality. On the 
contrary the majority of them argued that it is the paradoxical sense of permanence, 
which is neither fixed, nor concrete, and which is derived from an experiential sense of 
“relative constancy” in time (Jaspers, 1970:33) that makes an individual a unique and 
responsible agent. Therefore, the self is never completely lost in the “they” (Heidegger, 
1927a: 168). In addition, participants’ emphasis on the multidimensional aspects of the 
self (i.e. embodiment, embeddedness, temporality and language) and on its non- 
essentialist character created an alternative conceptualisation of subjectivity, which is 
independent from modernist and postmodernist assumptions. By addressing the above 
aspects, participants emphasised the element of experience, which is always grounded in 
the body. This focus on embodied experience and the emphasis on a ‘normalisation’ of 
contradictions, emancipates the existential position from being equated to the Cartesian 
subject and to the modem notion of the self as constructed by the image of homo 
rationalis (Henriques, et al.,1984; Kvale, 1999).
Moreover, the criticism of language as reductive and incapable of grasping the 
experiential aspects of the self, together with a focus on agency, responsibility, choice
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and embodiment, contributes to the creation of a unique stance, which is in complete 
antithesis to postmodern ideas, that view the self as a mere linguistic construction (Samp, 
1993; Shorter & Gergen, 1989). This holistic account, which emerges out of an 
emphasis on experience, successfully decentres the existential subject without 
obliterating it. The self is always ‘in-the-world’ but it never loses its uniqueness and 
individuality. This view becomes explicit in participants’ accounts regarding therapeutic 
conduct. Indeed, the existential position maintains a focus on the individual agent 
without defining it as a reified, omnipotent subject, which creates its own experience and 
is therefore detached from the world. In line with Cohn’s ideas (1997, 2001) 
participants, through a criticism of the medical model and its emphasis on 
psychopathology, placed psychological disturbance in the in-between area, which 
demarcates the person’s interactions with the world and others. Consequently, therapy 
was broadly perceived to be an exploration of the client’s world and personal views.
With regard to the co-existence of purely phenomenological and existential ideas, it was 
shown that participants use of terms did not contradict their philosophical and 
therapeutic practices. Consequently, on the basis of a distinction between transcendental 
and existential phenomenology they criticised Husserl’s transcendental ego, but 
retained the concept as a valuable philosophical and theoretical point of reference. 
Moreover, the majority of the participants, who referred to and used epoche, viewed the 
concept as a tool, which facilitates “authentic seeing” and the quest for openness to 
experience. What was common in all participants account was the emphasis on 
engagement and critical reflection of one’s own personal stance. Consequently, in this 
context the notion of reduction is not understood from a purely phenomenological 
standpoint.
To conclude, although the current study has contributed to a clarification of the 
existential/ phenomenological position within the academic and psychotherapeutic fields, 
it is by no means a complete account of the notion of subjectivity and self. There 
certainly are omissions of a range of perspectives. Specifically, the present study, due to 
its philosophical underpinnings has placed an emphasis on the philosophical 
background of the subject matter. However, there is still a lot of ground to be covered in 
order to provide a more encompassing account of the conceptualisation of subjectivity 
and self, which will include a broader analysis of the multidimensional aspects of the self 
and their effect on therapeutic practice.
It would be hoped that future studies, by placing more emphasis on an exploration of 
those aspects and their impact on clinical practice would shed more light on the 
psychotherapeutic underpinnings of the subject matter and on the position of existential 
therapy within the vast clinical field.
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Self Reflection
The present study felt like the central station of a long journey to unknown-known 
territories. As with all journeys there were moments of excitement and disappointment; 
my incessant quest for clarity and possibly for a final conclusion kept falling into 
uncertainty as my ideas and ways of seeing were constantly challenged. Moreover, my 
own beliefs in comparison to those of others were at times disquieting. It took me a 
while to realise that I had landed in the land of paradoxes and that I was the only black 
and white creature!
The notion of subjectivity and the plethora of different ideas surrounding the existence 
or absence of a self have -for a long time- been at the centre of my interests. One does 
not need to be in a psychotherapeutic profession to ask questions such as ‘who am I?’ 
and ‘why am I here?’. However, these questions when addressed from this perspective, 
become pertinent and inescapable. Having felt the disappointment and oppression of 
theoretical perspectives which come up with clear and schematic ideas regarding the 
origins, formation and development of a self, I turned to postmodern theories. 
Consequently, entering the world of deconstruction and that of perpetual criticism and 
questioning filled me with a sense of emancipation and with intellectual rigour. However, 
possibly, due to my own cultural background and personal choices, postmodern ideas 
remained at an intellectual level, which somehow lacked the type of passion I was 
looking for. Nietzsche came as a relief; he was the first to write from a post-scientific, 
postmodern perspective without losing the passionate voice of his authorship. His work 
on the Birth o f Tragedy with its references to a culture which was bound to feel familiar 
to me as well as his reconstruction of Dionysiac and Apollonian powers sat veiy well 
with my own understanding and views. As a result, with Nietzsche as a starting point, 
existentialism became another chosen destination.
The present study is a natural outcome of my last year’s quest, in which I reviewed the 
ways in which existentialists, such as Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, criticised the 
Cartesian project and the conceptualisation of human beings as ‘divided beings’ living 
in the midst of an autonomous, solipsistic world. However, while studying the 
philosophical background of the ontological aspects of human existence and their 
influence on the construction of the existential subject, I became aware of my ignorance 
concerning the present state of affairs within the existential/ phenomenological fields. As 
a result, I embarked on a review of the work of contemporary European 
existential/phenomenological psychotherapists on the notion of self.
Reading the work of these authors was indeed stimulating, however, interviewing them 
was fascinating! As a person who loves abstract thinking and who certainly has no 
understanding of concepts such as ‘organisation’ and ‘planning’, the idea of conducting
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a study -even on a subject, which is at the very heart of my interests- was terrifying. It 
was therefore a pleasant surprise to find out how involved and excited I became, while I 
was actually doing i t  There is no doubt, that the level of my excitement and theoretical 
involvement with the topic had an effect on the formulation of questions, possible 
inferences that I have made and consequently on the actual analysis of the data. As a 
result, choosing a methodology was a daunting experience. I therefore consider myself 
extremely lucky to have been given the chance to speak at the Annual Conference of the 
Society for Existential Analysis on "The Im/Possibility o f Research in Psychotherapy", 
a topic so relevant to my thinking at that time. The timing was impeccable and the 
interaction/discussion with existential analysts who have struggled with the same issue 
freed me from the misconceptions I had been stuck with. It was an experience that totally 
re-formed my approach to the present study. After this conference, I felt that the ‘black 
and white creature’, who had launched this study had started to become a bit grey and 
therefore more open to ambiguities, paradoxes and uncertainties...
Consequently, the interview process was the most enjoyable part of this study; there 
were moments when I was feeling combative and passionate and so I had to keep 
reminding myself that I wasn’t there to argue; most of the time, however, I was wishing 
for time to freeze, so I could continue listening to my participant’s wisdom. Analysing 
and writing up the study’s results and conclusions was a completely different experience 
but not less enjoyable. However, meeting deadlines has never been my strong point and 
even now that I am writing these words it is the night before submission. I therefore feel 
my usual irritation, which emerges out of the fact that I have to disengage from a piece of 
work which I’ve come to consider as part of myself, which has been part of my lived 
experiences this year and which most probably does not do full justice to these 
experiences. Hence my latest feeling is a bit split; part of me wishes I could stay a bit 
longer with it, to refine it, to “live” it a bit more and another part reminds me that there 
is no such thing as perfection and that perhaps my participants were right when they 
claimed that language can never capture the totality of our experience.
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APPENDIX A 
CONSENT FORM
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the discoursive analysis of how 
existential psychotherapists conceptualise the notion of subjectivity and its applications 
for practice. I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided and been given a 
full explanation by the conductors of the nature, purpose, location, and likely duration of 
the analysis, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been given the opportunity to 
ask questions on all its aspects and have understood the advice and information given as 
a result.
I understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the 
strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree that I 
will not seek to restrict the use of the results of the analytic discourse on the 
understanding that my anonymity is preserved. I understand that I am free to withdraw 
from it at any time without needing to justify my decision and without prejudice. I 
confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participate in 
this analysis. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to 
comply with its instructions and restrictions.
Name of Participant (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
Name of the Conductor (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
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APPENDIX B 
INFORMATION SHEET 
How do Contemporary Existential/Phenomenological Psychotherapists 
Conceptualise the Notion of Subjectivity and its Implications for Therapeutic 
Practice
I am a trainee Counselling Psychologist at the University of Surrey, conducting a 
research study, which looks at the ways in which existential psychotherapists 
conceptualise and use the notion of subjectivity within their theoretical field and 
therapeutic practice.
My last year’s literature review, which was part of the academic requirements of the 
course and which aimed at a critique of Cartesian dualism through a presentation of 
existential thinking regarding the notion of ‘consciousness’, led me to my present 
inquiry about the notion of subjectivity within contemporary existential 
psychotherapeutic literature. The main focus of the review was on the presentation of the 
early ideas of Martin Heidegger and especially in relation to his notion of Dasein as 
'being-in-the-world'. Moreover, the influence of his ideas on modem existential 
thinkers such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty was briefly assessed and critically discussed 
from the vantage point of contemporary European existential psychotherapists. 
Emphasis was placed on the questioning of the notion of ‘self as a fixed, entity and 
their efforts to overcome the gap between human consciousness and the external world.
It is argued that at first glance existential/phenomenological analysis of the notion of 
‘self has retained intersubjectivity as its starting point and thus has remained within the 
lines of Heideggerian thinking who argued that “man is not 2l detachable consciousness 
who can abstract from the world around him”, but a ‘ being-in-the-world-with-others ’. 
(Solomon, 1987:179). Nevertheless, it was shown that it never managed to overcome the 
individualistic heritage handed down by Empiricism with its inherent gap between the 
‘self’ and the ‘world’. Consequently, its emphasis on an understanding of subjective 
experience and the client’s private ‘world-view’ perpetuates the use of traditional 
binaries such as self/other, individual/society and inner/outer. Although the ‘self’ is not 
regarded as an inner, fixed entity, it is still perceived to be the product of detached 
conscious reflection (i.e. mental processes and representations). As a result, Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction has - in spite of its fundamental differences with the 
existential view of ‘consciousness’ - been retained and used.
The result has been that whilst existential/phenomenological psychotherapists are 
mindful of the gap between the subject and the external world none has yet succeeded in 
achieving its dissolution. Hence, the notion of subjectivity within the existential/
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phenomenological literature - although of great interest - it is also a source of ambiguity 
and confusion. Consequently, the use of Heideggerian notions such as being-in-the- 
world is bound to be confusing and misleading.
Hopefully, the present study will shed light on the nature of subjectivity within the 
existential/phenomenological psychotherapeutic literature and will also lead to a 
clarification of the ways it is used in psychotherapeutic practice.
If you would like to participate in this study or have any further inquiries, please ring me 
on (07932 013761) or contact me through the Psychology Department of the University 
of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 5XH
Thank you in advance,
Elena Manafi
Counselling Psychologist in Training
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
How Do Contemporary Existential Psychotherapists Conceptualise the Notion 
of Subjectivity and its Implications for Therapeutic Practice?
(I introduce myself and provide a basic outline o f the current study and complete the 
informed written consent together with the participant)
As stated in the letter that 1 ‘ve sent you, my current study emerged out of my last year’s 
literature review. During each first part, the notion of Cartesian dualism was criticised 
mainly through the work of Martin Heidegger, but also through other existential thinkers 
such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The second part consisted of an 
overview of how contemporary existential and phenomenological psychotherapists view 
the notion of the self. I consider this study as an opportunity to explore your 
experiences and ideas regarding the notion of subjectivity and their influence on your 
therapeutic practice.
If you have any questions at any time during the interview please don’t hesitate to ask 
me
(and I  begin taping)
Philosophical Background of the notion of Subjectivity
* The following quotes -in their own idiosyncratic ways- illustrate aspects of the 
existential view of subjectivity and human existence; how would vou comment (if at all) 
on these philosophical ideas in relation to your own theoretical stance?
'Man is nothing else than his plans; nothing else than the ensemble o f his acts, nothing 
else than his life ’. Jean-Paul Sartre
'An individual does not discover her personhood through knowing; she creates it 
herself through deciding and acting upon her potentials and choices*. Robert^  C., 
Solomon.
'Self and the world belong together...[they] are not two beings, like subject and object, 
but the unity o f being-in-the-world*.
Martin Heidegger
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Existing Existential/Phenomenological Terms in Relation to the Notion of
Subjectivity and the Self
* This is a list of a number of terms that I came up with last year; they all relate to the 
notion of subjectivity and the self. Would you refer to them or perhaps to other terms 
which I haven’t included?
- Embodied Consciousness
- Open Consciousness
- Intersubjectivity
- Heidegger’s hodying-forth
- Heidegger’s Dasein
- Heidegger ’s Mitsein
- Heidegger’s bemg-in-the-worid
- Sartre’s/or-ifeeÿ*
- Husserl’s transcendental ego
- Husserl’s phenomenological reduction
- The ‘self as a relational field
- The ‘self as an impermanent construct
- The ‘seir as a centre of gravity
- The ‘self as a process
- The ‘self as a mode of existence
- The ‘self* as a world disclosure
- The ‘selT as an illusion
- Plural Self 
Polypsychism
Other terms (please state)
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Pure Phenomenology and Existential Phenomenology
* I ‘ve notice that you crossed out Husserl’s notions of ‘transcendental ego’ and 
‘phenomenological reduction’, would you like to elaborate on that?
QK
* I ‘ve noticed that you ticked both Husserlian and Heideggerian ideas, would you like 
to elaborate on that?
Therapeutic Practice
* How does the absence of the notion of a ‘fixed self’ impacts (if at all) on your ways 
of working with clients?
Additional Questions
Occasionally I asked participants to elaborate on what they had already stated, an 
example of such addition is present at the interview transcript included in the Appendix 
F. However, such questions were strictly used for the purpose of clarification, under no 
circumstances a different question from those above occurred.
1 1 6
APPENDIX D 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The following information will be used for qualitative purposes (i.e. to indicate the 
quality and level of this study). All information will be treated confidentially. 
Nevertheless, if you don’t want to answer some of these questions, please feel free not 
to.
1. Are you (please tick the appropriate answer)
Male  Female_
2. How old are you? [ ] years
3. How would you describe your ethnic origins? (Please tick the appropriate category)
(a) White
* B r i t i s h __
* Irish __
* Any other White background________________________________________
(b) Mixed
* White and Black Caribbean _
* White and Black African__
* White and Asian __
* Any other mixed background, please write in below
(c) Asian or Asian British
* Indian __
* P ak istan i__
* Bangladeshi __
* Any other Asian background_________________
(d) Black or Black British
* Caribbean __
* A fric a n __
* Any other Black background
(e)Chinese or Other Ethnic Group
* Chinese _
* Other Ethnic Group____________
4. What is your status within the Society of Existential Analysis?
5. Academic Achievements (please tick)
-  Publications_________
-  Books _________
-  Other ___________________
6. How many years have you been practising as a psychotherapist?
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APPENDIX E 
TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION
For the transcription of the present data a basic form developed by Jefferson (1985) and
which can be found in Atkinson and Heritage (1984) was followed. The features that
were used are outlined below.
1 Empty square brackets [ } indicate that some of the original
transcript has been omitted.
2. A small p in brackets (p) indicates a brief pause in participants’ 
utterance
3. A capital P in brackets (?) a longer pause.
4. Underlined material indicates that those words were said with 
particular emphasis by participants
5. Indented and italicised material are used to indicate participants’ 
accounts.
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APPENDIX F 
Interview Transcript IX (Participant 31
I: Interviewer 
P: Participant
I: The following quotes  ^ -in their own idiosyncratic ways- illustrate 
aspects of the existential view of human existence.
How would you comment on these ideas in relation to your own 
theoretical stance?
P: I would refer to all three of them um, they represent a philosophy that has 
guided me for the last 40 years as suppose!
I: [uh-huh]
P: and Athough I recognise differences between them, such as Heidegger’s 
emphasis on relatedness and Sartre’s on agency, I still perceive them as part of 
the vast literature in the field, um, so I woidd refer to all of them at different 
instances 
I; [I see}
P: so yes I think tiiat all have valid things to say and I think that it is important 
not to discard the philosophical background of what we now call existential 
therapy, philosophical ideas are always relevant.
I: I see
P: shall I go through the terms?
I: please do
P: first of all I don’t use the term ‘intersubjectivity’ because that seems to imply 
a relationship between two subjects 
I: [I see]
P: and lot’s of people think that Heidegger talked about ‘intersubjectivity’ but I 
don’t remember anywhere, where he uses the term and if he did it would be to 
criticise it 
I: [uh-huh]
P: he talks about ‘Mitsein’ or ‘being-with’ or ‘Thou-Thou’ relationships, that’s 
how he refers to them 
I; [uh-huh]
P: so ‘intersubjectivity’ seems to me a sort of half way house a bit, in the sense 
that it doesn’t really get there 
I: [uh-huh]
P: now, ‘bodying-forth’, ‘Dasein’, ‘Mitsein’, ‘being-in-the-world’ and Sartre’s 
‘for-itself’ yes I refer to d l those terms, as I said it is a philosophical background 
which informs my theoretical understanding and my practice and I think that in 
their own ways these terms do capture human existence, ontologicallv speaking I 
mean, the way we are in the world, the way we relate with others, participate and 
engage with the world 
I: [uh-huh]
P: well Husseil’s ‘transcendental ego’, I use it, but only when I teach in order to 
refer or explain other things, you know, things like pure phenomenology and its 
history
I: [uh-huh]
P; the rest of the terms though, I don’t use. I don’t like any of the terms that talk 
about ‘the self’, I don’t talk about ‘the self’ and actually I don’t talk about a 
‘self’ at all
I: [uh-huh]
Check Interview Schedule - Appendix D
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P: so r u  cross all these out, but I will retain the notion of ‘embodied 
consciousness’ because we are embodied, I don’t agree with any dichotomies, 
and now that I think about it, I will cross out the ‘transcendental ego ’ and so we 
are left with Heideggerian and Sartrean terms 
I: would you like to elaborate on why you don’t refer to them?
P; well I only use the term self in the ordinary evervdav sense, so in therapy for 
example, I might say to a client “is that your idea, or somebody else’s idea of 
who you are ?” and then I explore that 
I: [I see]
P: I mean I wiU use it in context but otherwise I wouldn’t talk about ‘the self’ I 
wouldn’t try to theorise it 
I: I see
P: for me words like ‘yourself’ or ‘myself’ have an ordinary everyday meaning 
but I don’t think that there is any such thing as ‘the self, you know, some kind 
of entity that resides somewhere within and is comprised of essences etc., etc., 
so my position is similar to Heidegger’s or Sartre’s or an number of Eastern 
philosophies, who argue that there is no such thing as a ‘substantial self’
I: [uh-huh]
P: so at some point in the list you had ‘ the self as an illusion’ and in a way I 
agree with that 
I: [uh-huh]
P: and to go back to the quotes (p) I agree with Heidegger and his emphasis on 
embeddedness and with Sartre as well, in the sense that we are what w e ^  we 
create who we are through what we do, so action does define you up to a certain 
point
I: [uh-huh]
P: I mean if you kill somebody you are a murderer, and nothing can take away 
that fact, but you can become a repentant murderer or a complacent murderer and 
you can redeem the fact that you are a murderer by repenting and you can go on 
and become a saint, or you can go on and become a serial killer so what you are 
at any given time does not predict what you are going to be at any given moment 
in the future in other words we are never fixed 
I: [I see]
P: and yet part of who you are now will always be there in the future because 
you can’t get rid of the fact, or eliminate the things that you have done in your life 
1: [uh-huh]
P: so any sense of self is to some extent defined by what one does, but of course 
different people may have different views regarding who they are, or how their 
selves were created and so they may refer to themselves, as selves, for example 
Sartre referred to an ego, it’s like a point of reference, you know?
I: [uh-huh]
P: also when I say you are what you do, different people will have different 
perspectives on that and so they will also have different views of who you are 
I: [uh-huh]
P: so I mean when I am talking about who you are in an absolute sort of sense 
(p) I suppose to be accurate I need to talk about whose view it is of who I am, 
tiiere is my own view of who I am, other people’s view and so on 
I: [uh-huh]
P: there may be a generally accepted sort of fantasy or idea of who I am, a sort 
of public image, um, but I suppose I do believe that in some sense there is a sort 
of absolute image of who I am which is the sum total of what I ‘ ve done and 
different people can have a more or less accurate views on it, but there is always a 
distinction beween who I am for myself and who I am for others, 
how I experience myself and how others are experiencing me
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I: right
P: and as I said, I don’t believe in the idea of a fixed self, one is constantly 
creating who one is, but then again I recognise a paradoxical element because 
while you are creating who you are, which constantly changes, one can have, is 
possible to have a feeling of constancy, experientially I mean 
I; [uh-huh]
P: so (p) the way I see it, what you are creating is in sort of a relationship with 
sometlung, with some kind of eternal, which is given, an idea described very well 
by Kierkegaard, who talks about the person who is in despair, because they don’t 
know they are in despair, because in turn they don’t know that the self which 
relates itself to itself should be transparently grounded in the power that formed 
it
I: [uh-huh] [uh-huh]
P: so in other words one sort of creates who one is but not in a kind of total 
vacuum
I: [uh-huh]
P: there is some sort of transcendental power as Kierkeggard argues in which it 
can find a sort of grounding, it has a religious or spiritual sense 
I: [uh-huh]
P; so there is something eternal and in a way fixed, but also it is something that it 
is transcendent and contingent which is what one makes, of what one is made of 
I: [uh-huh]
P: so who you are is what you make of what you are made of, or what you are
given
I: right
P: and you are given a lot of contingent things, like (p) you might be bom with 
some sort of distortion or disability and so who you become is what you make 
of these contingent things
I: earlier on you decided to cross out transcendental ego’ and also you 
haven’t mentioned Husserl’s notion of ^ phenomenological reduction’, 
however you referred to all Heideggerian terms, would you like to 
discuss that a bit more?
P: well strictly speaking Heideggerian and Husserlian terms are not 
interchangeable, I mean Heidegger was absolutely clear that his ideas contradicted 
those of Husserl and I am with Heidegger on that, I mean I told you that I don’t 
really agree with the idea of a ‘transcendental ego’, but I think with 
‘phenomenological reduction’ its different (p)
I: in what sense?
P; well, Heidegger talks about inauthentic ways of experiencing and defective 
modes of relating and all these existential authors have their own terminology, a 
different language to convey their ideas 
I: [uh-huh]
P: for example Sartre talks about ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ reflection and what they 
all have in common is the belief that it is possible to experience the world in a 
sort of defective way in which you reifv and you objectify things and 
consequently see them in a sort of fixed way and they all argue that when this 
happens, one is not open to the flux of things 
I: [uh-huh]
P: so I mean that’s what all three of them have more or less in common (p) so 
what Husserl calls a ‘reduction’ I think Sartre would probably call ‘pure 
reflection’ and Heidegger ‘authentic seeing’
I: I see
P: and to give you an idea in practice I think that (?) well to give you an example 
I am now working with a client, the practical result which I suppose I can explain 
is that when a client tells me a dream something like “I dreamt I was going to
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my hairdresser and he is a mail hairdresser, so I suppose that perhaps that means 
my father or perhaps it means you”
I; [uh-huh]
P: well in practice I would simply say to her you didn’t dream about your father, 
you didn’t dream about me, you dreamt about a hairdresser so lets stay with what 
you actually did dream, um, well now that I think about it perhaps it would be 
pompous to call that a phenomenological bracketing 
I: [uh-huh]
P: what I am trying to say is, that what bracketting is all about is a 
kind of brushing aside any quick assumptions and simply stay with the 
phenomenon as it is experienced, I mean in fact that way of \ 
understanding dreams which I learned from Medard Boss really revolutionised 
the way I approach dreams and phenomena because when I started out it was all 
too easy to rush in with brilliant interpretations which seduced people and even 
made them to accept them 
I: [uh-huh]
P: over the years I dropped all that and I would simply stay as close as possible 
to the dream and ask the person to describe it with as much detail as possible and 
then stay as close to that without any interpretations (p) now you can call that a 
phenomenological bracketing or horizontdisation as Spinelli would say but I 
don’t use these terms 
I: [uh-huh]
P: I mean as I said I use the word phenomenological or even ‘Daseinanalytic’, 
but in terms of these terms co-existing, strictly they can’t because they mean 
different things, I mean they emerged out of a different philosophical perspectives 
I: [uh-huh]
P: I mean Heidegger dropped that Husserlian language and also disagreed with 
the idea of reduction but personally what I am tiying to say is that I don’t 
actually use these terms, how I use the ideas more or less is in the way I just 
described
I: I see. My last question relates to your therapeutic practice 
P: [uh-huh]
I: how does the absence of a ‘fixed selP impact on your 
therapeutic practice?
P: well to the very heart of it, because clients’ difficulties, most of the times lie 
on the idea that they can’t change and that’s because they think they are who 
they are and that there is no room for different ways of being 
I: [uh-huh]
P: and usually they also think that the whole world is as it is and that there is no 
other way of looking at it, so they get into repeated patterns which cause a lot of 
agony and distress because they can’t see how to get out of them 
I: [uh-huh]
P: and the way I see it, the reason why they fall into these repeated patterns is 
because they see themselves as fixed, they ‘ve got a fixed idea of themselves
and of other people and sometimes paradoxically their fixed idea of who 
other people are is often a fixed idea that the other person will change even 
when they have no intention to do so, so they fail to see how the other person is 
‘fixed’ in their own world, you see (?)
I: [uh-huh]
P: and so my client’s fixed ideas of themselves and of other persons can create 
tremendous difficulties and a sense of immobility and suffocation (p) so most 
people come to therapy because of interpersonal difficulties and I think that most 
of them found themselves in that situation because they are tiying to get 
somebody else to change and they haven’t really take any count of how much
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they can change themselves or havent’s conidered other people’s investment not 
to change!
I: [uh-huh]
P: and so yes I work a lot with their ideas about themselves and where they thing 
they stand in life, most of the times you meet clients who have unrealistic and 
often contradictory ideas regarding how much they can change 
I: [uh-huh]
P; so for example, on the one hand, they don’t see ways in which they 
themselves could behave differently and so they assume a kind of fixity, you 
know, that certain things about themselves are fixed and cannot be changed and 
so they end up limiting and restricting their potentials and it is astonishing to see 
how convinced they are in their fixity and to me it’s not at all like that 
I: [uh-huh]
P: on the other hand, they have some sort of magical expectations of how they 
themselves could change, which to me seem unrealistic, so I suppose on 
reflection a great many clients have a rather confused idea about who they are in 
general and so on one hand they see themselves as fixed in ways that to me they 
shouldn’t
I: [uh-huh]
P: and on the other hand they have expectations to change in a sort of magical 
ways which also seem to be unrealistic (p) so therapy is to me often working out 
and testing what are realistic ways in wMch they can change who they are and 
reflect on who they want to be and what they can do about it and as I said before, 
who they are is essentially what they can do 
I: right
P: so therapy is the sort of place, where they can step back and reflect on their 
sense of sefr and on what they can realistically do and it exists in a sort of 
interplay, because at the same time they are in the world engaging and interacting 
with others and so on their coming back, they can reflect on Æese ways and 
explore them with me 
I: I see
P: so personally and I think for my clients to, when they begin exploring who 
they have been so far, their actions in the past, their plans for the future etc.,
I think that when working from a perspective which does not assume 
the existence of a fixed self there is a sense of liberation, which opens up and 
enhances our willingness to explore where we are and so to return to the terms, 
as I said, they don’t have any meaning for me, so I stay with my client’s 
personal view of themselves and I explore that with them 
I: uh-huh, so if the emphasis is not on these terms, what is it in your 
view that should be emphasised when talking about the notion of the 
self?
P: well if you were my client it would be on vou. not on abstractions like 
personhood, or the rest of the terms and vour vou. even that is an abstraction (p) 
and that’s why I wouldn’t be using the word ‘you’ or ‘I’ except in certain 
sentences for reasons of orientation, you know, where vou would be the subject 
or the object or possibly some other grammatical form of it, so I find it a bit 
strange to be talking about ‘you’ or the ‘self’ as some sort of entity 
I: [uh-huh]
P: I mean, virtually none of what is said between my clients and me is about 
‘personhood’ or ‘the person’ as an entity, it is much more, I am now thinking of 
someone who came in this morning, he came in and said “I can’t think of 
whether to start with a profound experience I had or a banal experience I had”
I: [uh-huh]
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P: and so he is talking about his experience and yes he has used the word T’ 
three times but this is a sort of way of orienting of what he is talking about, in 
other words he is not talking about the T’ as a sort of thing 
I: [uh-huh]
P: and so he talked about what he feltthought. and judged about them and in 
none of that was he talking about an T’ as a thing!
I: [uh-huh]
P: sometimes, people will say things, still not exactly talking about the T’ as a 
thing, they will say (p) I am tiying to think of an example (?) well, yeah, they will 
say, “I couldn’t do that because I am not that sort of person”
I; [uh-huh]
P: and when I hear that, I usually say “are you sure you are not that sort of 
person?” or “how can you be so sure that you couldn’t be that sort of person?”, 
yeah, so that’s how I use what you are trying to tackle 
I: right
P: and when I am asking these questions, I am not thinking specifically one of 
the authors we mentioned 
I: [uh-huh]
P: I am thinking in a sort of general existential way that we shouldn’t be too 
quick and categorise a person prematurely as being a particular sort of person,
I ‘ve learned that through my own experience and through studying Sartre, who 
for me is so insistent on the idea that until one’s dying day, a person is 
responsible for who she is and has possibility of transcending who she has been 
up to that point and I agree with that, that’s why I insist on the importance 
of interaction, so I suppose that view lies behind all things I ‘ve said so far 
I: right
P: so the people who I am closest to are probably Sartre, Thomas Szasz and in a 
funny sort of way Freud, although Freud to me is confused, Freud at his best is 
talking about the same thing 
I: [uh-huh]
P: although he explains it in a completely self-contradictory way and so he talks 
about psychic determinism,whereas to me it’s not the case, to me Freud extended 
the redm of phenomena for which people are actually responsible, so when we 
demystify what he has written for me Ins ideas are very close to what Sartre is 
saying
I: [uh-huh]
P: I like Heidegger and Boss for their way of talking about dreams, but in a way 
I am also suspicious of them, because when it comes to the point of personal 
responsibility things get blurred 
I: [uh-huh]
P: so Boss for example becomes sort of fuzzy and talks about illness, whereas 
Sartre, Szasz and Esterson will talk about someone who has been diagnosed with 
some sort of disease and those three people for me have retained some sort of 
responsibility that these people with the diagnosis still carry 
I: [I see]
P: Boss and probably Heidegger under his influence would say that the person 
is not responsible and so he would call that person ill 
I: [I see]
P: whereas Esterson and Szasz and I think Sartre would got, although Sartre has 
used the term ‘mentally ill’ but always in quotation marks, so these three authors 
would not renounce or abdicate the idea that the person still holds some sort of 
responsibility for his condition and so in that sense I feel closer to the three of 
them
I: earlier ago you rejected the mind/body dichotomy, would you like to 
elaborate on that?
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P: well I think that there is no such thing as ‘the mind’, there is a book by Szasz 
called The Meaning o f Mind (1996), where he points out that ‘mind’ in English 
language used to be a verb so until the 16th century it wasn’t a noun at all 
I; [uh-huh]
P: it became reified as a thing later on, I mean in Latin there is a verb and in 
Greek I think, can’t remember now, how is it?
I: well we use the words ‘nous’ which comes from the verb ‘no-o’
P: yes, yes, ‘nous’ and also ‘noema’
I; yes, tW ’s right
P: it seems to me understandable, I mean people have called Szasz a dualist but 
this is complete ignorance, I mean I ‘ve written... [material is here omitted to 
secure the anonymity o f the participant]
I: [uh-huh]
P: so his position is and certainly mine too that ‘the mind’ is an illusion, I mean 
the mind is the reification of minding and of attending to things and similarly 
with words like ‘I’, because ‘F is actually the subject of a verb!
I: [uh-huh]
P: it is just a grammatical construct it does not refer to something that lies hidden 
within us and which carries some sort of essences and characteristics 
I: I see
P: so nearly all these sort of paradoxes come from the use of language and so to 
me splitting off parts of speech don’t really make sense apart from the sentence 
they are part of, that’s what I meant when I said before I use terms like ‘I ’ and 
‘ self’ in their everyday and not in a theoretical sense 
I: [uh-huh]
P: so the so called debate of the mind and body, well ‘the body’ is a sort of 
abstraction from my embodied experience if you like, but my body as a sort of 
natural scientifically studiable (sic) thing, really does exist 
I; [uh-huh]
P: I mean when I die there is my corpse and to my corpse can be done an 
autopsy, you know, to see what I died of and this is an objective fact 
I: [uh-huh]
P: and from that perspective physical illness is pretty objective, but 
there is no such things as ‘a mind’ to have an illness so you can talk 
about people behaving in fixed rigid ways and that seem not take into account 
situations in reality and things like that 
I: [uh-huh]
P: but to try to argue that in sort of medical analogies like those used for the 
body is really dangerous and in my opinion illusory 
I: [uh-huh]
P: but it’s not dualistic to say that, it is only dualistic from a standpoint that has 
already split people into ‘a mind’ and ‘a body’ and as I said, it is an artificial 
dichotomy
I: I see, well thank you veiy much for your time 
P: my pleasure
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Counselling Psychologists’ Perceptions of the 
Scientist-Practitioner Identity
ABSTRACT
The current legislative emphasis on * evidence-based' practice has focused 
attention on the scientist-practitioner (S-P) paradigm ami given it a dominant 
position in clinical and counselling psychology settings. At the same time, the 
growing discontent with the model's explicit division between science and 
practice and its traditional definition o f * science' has posed a challenge to the 
counselling psychologist's identity. This study, by combining quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies, addresses a number o f issues. It explores 
counselling psychologists' personal accounts o f the S-P model and their views 
on epistemology. Moreover, it investigates the effect o f identification with the 
model on the participants' strength o f interest in scientist and practitioner 
activities as well as on their choice o f theoretical orientation in psychology. The 
findings showed significant differences between participants who demonstrated 
either strong or weak identification with the model. Specifically, the high 
identification group produced significantly higher scores than the low 
identification group on both scales making up scientist and practitioner 
profiles. For the low identification groups a significant difference was also 
observed between scores on the scientist and practitioner scales. These results 
challenge the dominant belief in an existing dichotomy between the two poles 
(i.e. science and practice). Moreover a qualitative content analysis o f the open- 
ended questions yielded complementary results which added to the clarification 
of the quantitative findings. Specifically, the high identification group perceived 
the model as an * integrative tool' that pays equal tribute to both research and 
practice. This group also stressed the importance o f research and 
'methodological pluralism'. The low identification group viewed the model as 
an expression o f 'hard science'; participants stressed the important o f 
humanistic tradition and highlighted a humanistic view o f science. Finally, 
based on the present results, it is argued that the traditional relationship 
between science and practice requires a revised conception o f the notion o f 
'science', in which there is a productive interplay among a variety o f 
methodological perspectives and sources o f knowledge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Counselling psychology’s establishment as a distinct profession of applied psychology 
was officially recognised by the British Psychological Society in 1994. The field was 
conceived of as an attempt to bridge the gap between the branch of psychology which is 
informed by evidence-based practice and the psychotherapeutic traditions that are based 
on the value of the therapeutic relationship, interpretation and subjective experience. 
Hence, in Britain the field is firmly rooted in the counselling tradition and has emerged 
out of a humanistic/existential heritage that highlights a holistic understanding of human 
beings and promotes a psychological as well as ontological view of human existence 
(Woolfe et al., 2003). Given the integrative spirit within which counselling psychology
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emerged a number of scholars and researchers proposed the S-P paradigm as a leading 
model of training and as the field’s defining philosophy {Division o f Counselling 
Psychology, 2004).
As discussed by Raimy (1950) the S-P model of training - also known as the Boulder 
model after a conference held in Boulder, Colorado - developed in the US in the late 
1940s and was given strong support by the American Psychological Association. It was 
at a time when psychologists had started feeling uncomfortable about the growing rift 
between academic and applied psychology. In an attempt to bridge the gap between the 
two poles, they urged for the promotion of a systematic training which would integrate 
scientific knowledge with therapeutic practice and at the same time establish psychology 
as a distinct profession independent from psychiatry. As a result practitioners were 
urged to become both consumers and generators of new research findings and to be able 
to evaluate and promote their own practice as well as to communicate their findings to 
the broader scientific community (Rennie, 1994; Long & Hollin, 1997; Milne & Paxton, 
1998).
Here in Britain the S-P model was introduced in the early 1950s when Eysenck was one 
of the most influential figures in professional psychology. As an eminent researcher he 
was veiy much in favour of empiricism and rather suspicious of the value of therapeutic 
practice and its contribution to psychological understanding. Conie and Callahan 
(2000), in their historical summaiy of the model, argue that as a result the model’s 
earliest conceptualisation promoted the “experimental method in the pursuit of 
empirically driven knowledge” (2000:415). Over the years however the scientist- 
practitioner paradigm underwent considerable transformation and has come to 
emphasise an integrated approach to both research and practice which encompasses 
theoretical and empirical assumptions as well as knowledge derived from therapeutic 
practice. As a result, at the heart of recent definitions of the scientist-practitioner model 
(S-P model) lies an integrative spirit and a commitment to bridge the gap between 
“scientific foundations and professional practice” (Belar & Perry, 1992:72-73).
However, this atmosphere of integration and merging of therapeutic practice and 
research seem to become hazy once counselling psychologists are required to position 
themselves in recent legislative changes within NHS settings. Indeed the current trends, 
which are embedded in wider historical, political and economic contexts, emphasise the 
need to develop therapeutic practices that are derived from empirical research and are 
cost effective as well as efficient within a limited period of time (Shapiro, 1996; Bor and 
du Plessis, 1997). Hence, the focus on controlled research and ‘evidence-based’ practice 
comes with an empiricist stance based on methodological premises that aim at 
discovering objective truths and causal laws which can potentially predict human 
behaviour and therefore therapeutic outcomes. There is no doubt that such an emphasis
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on prediction, efficacy and cost-effectiveness has major implications for all therapeutic 
professions in NHS settings. Given this climate, counselling psychology is striving to 
retain its position in the field without compromising its distinct identity and 
philosophical stance.
Williams and Irving (1996) highlight this tension and argue that counselling psychology 
in its attempt to bridge the gap between experimental and psychotherapeutic stances has 
fallen prey to a methodological mismatch which blurs its identity and position within the 
academic and therapeutic worlds. In their view, the scientist-practitioner model 
constitutes a “conceptual impasse” that is perpetuated by the attempt to combine 
opposing methodologies deriving from the natural and human sciences (1996:5). In a 
similar vein Rennie (1994) speaks of an ‘eclipse’ of human science by natural science, 
arguing that the S-P model with its narrow conceptualisation of science accentuates the 
existing gap between science and practice. He concludes that unless science in 
psychology is revised to include the experience of actual therapeutic practice, with all its 
complexities and ambiguities, the gap is destined to remain unbridged.
With regard to the definition of science debate. Barker et al. (1994) argue that, despite 
the development and popularity of qualitative methodologies within psychotherapeutic 
research, the term scientist-practitioner has retained its positivist “flavour” and has thus 
contributed to the intensification of the existing tension and dichotomy between science 
and therapeutic practice. In the same spirit. Carter (2002) argued that scientific research, 
with its emphasis on objectivity, tends to ignore the “messiness of human lives”; by 
promoting manualised treatments that are specifically designed for discretely diagnosed 
patients, scientific research fails to recognise and address individual differences as well 
as the complexity of human lives (2002: 1287). The same critical stance is held by 
Wakefield and Kirk (1996) who argue that the S-P model, with its emphasis on 
evidence-based practice, implicitly rejects the importance of the therapeutic relationship 
as a “tool” for therapeutic change. By regarding it as secondary to technical skills, it 
contradicts counselling psychology’s therapeutic values and principles. Finally, 
Hoshmand (1991) argues that “the lack of shared definition of psychological science” 
has strengthened the confusion between the two fields and has widened the gap between 
researchers and practitioners (1991:432). In his view the S-P model is rendered useless 
unless both scientists and practitioners find a common language of communication.
Indeed a lack of communication between scientists and practitioners is to be found in the 
majority of the studies mentioned. Specifically, it has been shown that scientists tend to 
adhere to a positivistic epistemology deriving from the natural sciences, whereas 
practitioners emphasise the importance of interpretation and description (i.e. a 
humanistic view of science). In his seminal book Psychologists: Personal and 
Theoretical Pathways, Coan (1979) argues that the notion of theoretical orientation in
128
psychology encompasses different kinds of variables that include philosophical and 
epistemological assumptions as well as more basic suppositions regarding human 
nature, motivation, emotion, behaviour, and environmental and/or hereditary influences. 
His extensive research on the topic has shown significant differences between scientists' 
and practitioners' theoretical orientations and epistemological stances; in line with 
previous studies scientists assume an objectivist, naturalistic stance whereas practitioners 
a subjectivist, humanistic stance.
The growing rift between science and practice has led a number of authors to argue for 
the abandonment of the S-P model as the leading method of training of counselling 
psychologists (Spinelli, 2001). Others emphasise the pressing need for a re-examination 
of the scientist-practitioner model and especially for a clarification of what counselling 
psychologists mean by ‘science’. By challenging positivists’ assumptions they propose 
a model which will acknowledge the effect of the practitioners’ cultural and social 
background as well as their belief system (Woolfe, 1990; Hoshmand & Polkinghome, 
1992; Lokare, 1992; Benishek, 1998; Cowie, 1999). For example, Conie and Callahan 
(2000) by drawing on post-structural and postmodern theories, stress the importance of 
multiplicity and advocate the use of a range of methodologies that include both 
dialectical and phenomenological approaches as well as quantitative ones. In their view, 
different methodologies should be understood “as means of exploring alternative modes 
of reality [...] rather than aiming for universal statements” (2000:423). Their study of 
therapists’ beliefs about research and the S-P model revealed a mosaic of highly 
idiosyncratic definitions that were based on personal values as well as political and 
organisational issues (Conie & Callahan, 2001).
As shown, the literature on the topic mainly consists of academic essays and book 
reviews which present and evaluate the model and its aims from the standpoint of 
academic expertise (Wakefield, et. al., 1996, 1997; Epstein, 1997). A number of studies 
(Kimble, 1984; Krebs et al., 1991; Leon and Zachar, 1992; Aspenson et al., 1993; 
Kenney et al., 1997) have shown an ambivalent stance regarding the model’s efficacy, 
validity and appropriateness as a training method for counselling and clinical 
psychologists. Moreover these studies have consistently shown a dichotomy between 
scientists and practitioners as highlighted in significant differences between their 
personality types, vocational and theoretical orientations as well as interests in research 
and therapeutic fields. Given the fact that the majority of these studies have focused on 
the beliefs of undergraduate and graduate psychology students in the United States, it is 
important to test whether the same results will be found for professionals in the field 
who are currently working in private and/or public sectors within the UK. Such findings 
will hopefully clarify the scientist-practitioner debate and its position in Britain.
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The current research intends to investigate counselling psychologists’ perceptions of the 
S-P model and their views on science and therapeutic practice. Specifically, the research 
intends to measure participants’ strength of identification with the model and explore 
whether this determines any differences in their interests (in what) and theoretical 
orientations. In general terms it is expected that the current findings will confirm the 
existing dichotomy between science and practice and therefore replicate results found by 
similar studies conducted in the US (Barlow, 1981; Leong & Zachar, 1991, Zachar & 
Leong, 1992; Aspenson, 1993; Kenney et al., 1997). In particular it is hypothesised that:
1) participants who will identify strongly with the S-P model will also show a 
significantly stronger interest in activities that make up a scientist’s rather than 
a practitioner’s profile. {Hypothesis 1)
2) Participants who will show low identification with the model will also show 
a significantly higher interest in activities that make up a practitioner’s rather 
than scientist’s profile {Hypothesis 2)
3) Participants who will show high identification with the model will show a 
preference for 3a) a factual rather than theoretical orientation 3b) an objectivist 
rather than subjectivist stance and 3c) a biological rather than environmental 
determinism. {Hypotheses 3a, b,& c)
4) Participants who will show low identification with the model will show a 
preference for 4a) a theoretical rather than factual orientation, 4b) a 
subjectivist rather than objectivist stance and 4c) an environmental rather than 
biological determinism. {Hypothesis 4a, b,&c)
In addition, two open ended questions explore participants’ phenomenological 
understanding of the scientist-practitioner model as well as their views on science and its 
position within the scientist-practitioner identity. Hopefully this exploratory dimension 
will add in the study’s efforts to clarify counselling psychologists’ position in the 
ongoing debate between the natural and human sciences.
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n . METHOD
Design
In line with Howard’s (1983) call for increased ‘methodological pluralism’ the current 
paper is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. These derive 
from different methodological paradigms and philosophies (i.e. naturalistic and 
humanistic science), which are here seen as ‘tools’ for the exploration of different 
aspects of reality which in turn lead to the production of diverse types of knowledge 
(e.g., theoretical versus experiential) (Hoshmand and Polkinghome, 1992). Such stance 
makes no assumptions regarding the notion of ‘truth’; instead all methodologies and 
their subsequent results are viewed as equally valid representations of different facets of 
reality.
The hypotheses were tested through the use of an independent groups design with one 
independent and five dependent variables. The independent variable was the participants’ 
strength of identification with the S-P model (as measured by an adaptation of 
Cinnirella’s Strength of Identification Scale) whereas the dependent variables were 
participants’ strength of interest in 1) scientist and 2) practitioner activities (as measured 
by Leong and Zachar’s Scientist Practitioner Inventory), and 3) factual vs theoretical 
orientation, 4) objectivist vs subjectivist orientation and 5) biological vs environmental 
orientation (as measured by Coan’s Theoretical Orientation Survey).
For the purpose of calculating the effect of the independent variable (i.e. strength of 
identification with the S-P model) participants were separated into two groups. The 
distinction was based on the median score of the scale which - given its 5 point rating - 
was 21 (with 35 as the highest possible score and 7 as the lowest). Hence, Group 1 
comprised participants who scored higher than 21 and thus showing strong 
identification with the model, whereas Group 2 of those who scored lower than 21 and 
thus showing a low identification. There were no participants scoring exactly 21.
Finally, participants were asked to answer two open-ended questions that attempted to 
explore their personal understanding of the S-P model and their views on science. Given 
the mixed methodology of the present study. Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) was 
chosen as the most appropriate type of qualitative approach. As discussed by Mayring 
(2000) content analysis lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative studies without 
violating each position’s epistemological assumptions. As argued by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), QCA assumes a transcendental realist epistemological position 
which places the subjective experience at the centre of the meaning-making process. By 
paying close attention to the texts, the researcher is trying to convert raw material into 
meaningful data. The ultimate aim of organising, structuring and synthesising the data is 
to identify recurring themes or concepts that will set the basis for the construction of 
‘conceptual categories’ and arrive at some sort of ‘solution’ in terms of what the text is
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tiying to convey. In other words, as is the case with all qualitative methodologies, 
content analysis involves inferences and interpretations, the main ‘roads’ to an 
understanding of the manifest and latent meanings of the text (Mostyn, 1985). 
Understanding in the present sense entails both phenomenological and scientific aspects; 
the researcher pays close attention on how the participant experiences the phenomenon 
under investigation (i.e. phenomenological aspect) and at the same time looks for 
meaningful relationships in the data (i.e. scientific aspect).
Stages o f Analysis
The coding scheme constructed for this analysis was based on the two open-ended 
questions of the study which sought to describe participants’ personal understanding of 
the scientist-practitioner model (Question 1) and their views on the (in)compatibility of 
a positivist epistemology with their identity as scientist-practitioners (Question 2). Due 
to the extent of the open-ended material (i.e. 127 participants who answered 2 questions) 
the coding process of the results compromised attention to detail and focused on 
recurring concepts that were relevant to the overall aims of the study. Hence, part of the 
analysis focused on identifying similarities and differences between the answers 
obtained by groups land 2. The end product of coding is represented in Tables 8, 9, 10 
and 11. Given the substantial differences between the two groups, data were analysed 
separately; hence each table focuses on one group at a time. Finally, due to the study’s 
word limitations a small number of quotations from participants’ accounts have been 
included; however, those presented have been carefully selected and are perceived to be 
the closest representations of participants’ views.
Participants
Based on a calculation of power using G*Power (Erdfelder, Paul & Buchner, 1996) 
whereby medium effect size /  = 0,15, and power p  = 0,95, the researcher aimed at 
recruiting 119 participants. 400 questionnaires were sent to counselling psychologists in 
the UK as found in the British Psychological Society’s Register of Chartered 
Psychologists. The current sample consists of a total of 127 counselling psychologists 
(response rate 32%). 84 of them were female (66% of the current sample) and 43 were 
male making up the 34% of the sample. Their age ranged from 27 to 79 years (mean of 
45 yrs; SD of 13)
The demographics information form included participants’ gender, age, type of training, 
preferred model of working therapeutically, years of practising as counselling 
psychologists, total years of practising therapeutically and other qualifications besides 
being counselling psychologists.
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Measures and Qualitative Questions
I) Strength of Identification Scale (Appendix O
This is an adaptation of Cinnirella’s (1997) scale which consists of 7 separate 
statements rated on a scale ranging from not at all (1), to completely (5). The scale’s 
alpha coefficient was found to be .93.
II) Scientist-Practitioner Inventory (SPI) (Appendix D)
This is a 42 item inventoiy designed to measure participants’ interests in activities that 
relate either to a scientist's profile (e.g., ‘designing an experiment to study a 
psychological process’ ) or to a practitioner's profile (e.g., ‘helping a client get in touch 
with his feelings’). Ratings are on a 5-point Likert scale with anchor points ranging 
from very low interest (1) to very high interest (5). Leong and Zachar (1991) have 
presented evidence for internal consistency, test-retest reliability, concurrent validity and 
freedom from response bias. Permission to use the inventoiy was given by Peter Zachar 
(personal communication) who also suggested to drop two questions due to their low 
reliability and validity (question numbers 9 and 24). Consequently the inventory used in 
this study consists of 40 questions, 20 for the scientist scale and 20 for the practitioner 
scale (see Appendix D for the 42 items version). The overall alpha coefficient was .90.
iii) Theoretical Orientation Survey (TOS) (Appendix El
TOS is a 32-item inventory which is to be found in Coan’s (1979) seminal book on 
Psychologists: Personal and Theoretical Pathways. It was used to measure 
participants’ scores on the last three dependent variables of this study (i.e. TOS I, II, and
III). The theoretical dimensions statements are based on the following eight factors: i) 
factual vs theoretical orientation, ii) impersonal causality vs personal will, iii) 
behavioural vs experiential content emphasis, iv) elementarism vs holism, v) biological 
determinism, vi) environmental determinism, vii) physicalism and viii) quantitative vs 
qualitative orientation. By combining scores on these scales, one can obtain scores for 
two second-order factors; hence, the scales used for this study were: TOS I {factual V5 
theoretical orientation), TOS II (objectivism vs subjectivism) and TOS III (endogenism 
V5 exogenism). Coan’s (1979) extensive research showed that a person with an objective 
orientation endorses impersonal causality, behavioural content, reductionism, and an 
interest in quantitative analysis. In contrast, a person with a subjective orientation 
endorses personal will, experiential content, holism, and an interest in qualitative 
analysis. Finally, endogenism measures acceptance of biological determinism and 
exogenism acceptance of environmental determinism. Coan (1979) indicated that test- 
retest reliability on the three relevant scales ranged from .61 to .88. Alpha coefficients 
for the present study were .54 for TOS I; .77 for TOS II; and .81 for TOS HI.
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Qualitative Questions
1) What is your personal understanding of the scientist-practitioner model and how relet 
is it in your own way of working therapeutically?
2) In your opinion is a positivist view of science and its emphasis on experimental 
research compatible to your own identity as a counselling psychologist? If not what kind 
of alternative do you propose?
Procedure
Each participant received a questionnaire packet through the post together with a 
stamped, addressed envelope in which to return the forms. The packet consisted of an 
information sheet explaining the purpose and nature of the study (Appendix A), a 
consent form (Appendix B), and the questionnaire battery (Appendices C, D and E and a 
demographics form (Appendix G); two open-ended questions were also included 
(Appendix F).
Finally, as is the case with all forms of research, ethical issues are of great importance 
and need to be considered for those involved in the project. The current study received 
approval from the ethics committee of Surrey University and attended to the central 
principles (McLeod, 1996) of research ethics such as informed consent, confidentiality 
and avoidance of harm. The consent form was separated from each returned 
questionnaire to preserve the anonymity of the participant and the information obtained 
from both questionnaire battery and demographics form were entered into the database. 
Moreover for the purpose of the qualitative analysis, each returned questionnaire was 
also numbered; numbers where then used as an identification symbol.
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ra .  RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the information obtained by the demographics forms and 
present frequencies and percentages of the above categories.
Table 1. Demographics Information and Participants’ Years of Practicing
Therapeutically
MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
FREQUENCY
f
PERCENTAGE
%
SEX
Female
— —
84 66
SEX
Male
—
43 34
AGE 45
Range
27-79
12.2 — —
Years of 
Practising as 
C. P
7.08
Range
3-14
3.30 — —
Total Years of 
Practising 
Therapeutically
14,2
Range
3-25
5.38 — —
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Table 2. Frequencies and Percentages of Participants’ Type of Training and Preferred
Model of Working Therapeutically
Integrati­
ve
Humanistic Psycho-
dynamic
CBT Eclectic Total
Number
Type of 
Training
99
(79.2 %)
11
(8.7 %)
9
(7.1 %)
5
(3.9%)
2
(1 %)
127
No Mis­
sing 
Values
Model of 
Preferen­
ce
44
(34.6 %)
16
(17.6 %)
24
(18.8 %)
25
(18.9 %)
12 
(4.7 %)
121
6
Missing
Values
The following table shows the outcome of the participants’ division into two groups 
which was based on their scoring on the Strength of Identification Scale. Mean scores 
and standard deviations are also included.
Table 3. Participants’ Strength of Identification with the Scientist-Practidoner Model
Groups Frequency Percentage
%
Mean
Scores
Standard
Deviation
1:Hlgh
Identification
79 62.2 25.93 1.38
2: Low 
Identification
48 37.8 14.91 2.12
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Effects of strength of identification with S-P model and factors obtained from the 
demographics form on participants’ scoring on the scientist and practitioner variables of 
the SPI
After analysing histograms for the dependent variables of the present study and 
checking for skewness and kurtosis (all Z<3.29) it was concluded that they were all 
normally distributed and so there was no need for outlier analysis or for data screening. 
Hence, MANOVA tests were run to analyse possible effects on participants’ scoring on 
the two scales of SPI.
A series of MANOVAS was carried in order to check for significant effects on 
practitioners’ ways of scoring on the scientist and practitioner scales of the SPI using 
variables from the demographics form as independent factors: i) type of training and 
identification groups, ii) model of preference and identification groups, iii) years of 
practice as a counselling psychologist and identification groups, iv) total years of 
practising therapeutically and identification groups, and v) other qualifications and 
identification groups. As shown in Table 4 the only significant main effects were found 
for the identification groups. The rest of the factors showed no significant effects or 
interaction between them.
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Table 4. Results of MANOVA with groups of identification and variables from the
demographics form as factors.
*p<.001
F acto rs df f
Identification Groups (ID.G) 1 39.70*
Type of Training (T.T) 3 1.750
Interaction of ID.G & T.T 2 2.162
Identification Groups (ID.G) 1 38.60*
Preferred Model (P.M) 6 1.802
Interaction of ID.G & P.M 3 1.525
Identification Groups (ID.G) 1 117.04*
Years of Practising as a 
Counselling Psy (Y.C.P)
16 1.973
Interaction of ID.G & Y.C.P 27 1.842
Identification Groups (ID.G) 1 98.67*
Total Years of Practising 
Therapeutically (T.Y.P)
11 1.138
Interaction of ID.G & T.Y.P 13 2.271
Identification Groups (ID.G) 1 102.31*
Other Qualifications (O.Q) 6 1.881
Interaction of ID.G & O.Q 5 2.113
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Tests for significant differences between the means obtained bv the two groups on the 
five dependent variables of the study. (Hypotheses 1.2.3. and 41
Table 5 shows participants’ mean scores and standard deviations on the next two 
measurements of this study. Moreover, a series of t-tests was run to check for 
differences between the means obtained by the two groups on the five variables (i.e. 
Scientist and Practitioner scales, TOS I, II, and III). The results of t-tests are also 
included.
Table 5. T-Tests for Differences between the two Groups on the Five Dependent
Variables in this Study 
* p<001 and **p<.05
Dependent
Variables
GROUP 1 
Mean 
N = 79
Standard
Deviation
GROUP 2 
Mean 
N= 48
Standard
Deviation
t - values
Scientist
Variable
(SPI)
65.72 10.06 40.10 9.43 14.244*
Prac­
titioner
Variable
(SPI)
79.67 7.03 68.23 8.30 8.302*
TOSI 7.23 1.42 7.52 2.01 -.941
TOS II 39.71 5.23 34.98 5.46 4.862*
TOS III 51.29 3.77 50.02 2.31 2.106**
Hypotheses 1 &. 2,
As shown in Table 7, t-tests yielded significant differences between the means obtained 
by the two groups on both scales of the SPL Specifically, Group 1 scored significantly 
higher than Group 2 on both scientist [ti25=14.244, p<.001] and practitioner scales 
[tl25= 8302, p<001]* However, the results obtained by Group 1 on the two scales
show a positive relationship between them; hence, Hypothesis 1 has not been confirmed 
as it expected a negative relationship between the scores.
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The results obtained by Group 2 do confirm Hypothesis 2 which foreshadowed a 
negative relationship between participants’ scores. Specifically, it was predicted that 
participants who show a low identification with the model will show significantly higher 
interest for activities making up the practitioner’s rather than the scientist’s profile. A 
graphic illustration of these results is shown on Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1. Mean Scores Obtained by the Two Groups on the Scientist Variable of the
SPI
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Figure 2. Mean Scores Obtained by the Two Groups on the Practitioner Variable of the
SPI
High Id Low Id
Hypotheses 3a, b ,c & 4a, b, c
With regards to TOS, Table 7 shows that t-tests for TOS II & III yielded significant 
differences between the means obtained by the two groups. Given the direction of the 
scores, hypotheses 3b and c and Ab and c have been confirmed. Indeed the high 
identification groups assumed an objectivist stance [t125=4.862, p<.001] (Hypothesis
3b) and showed an acceptance for biological determinism [ti25=2.106, p<.05]
(Hypothesis 3c). The low identification group showed the opposite results; that is 
participants assumed a subjectivist stance (Hypothesis 4b) and a preference for 
environmental determinism (Hypothesis 4c)
No significant differences are observed between the means obtained by the two groups 
on TOS I which opposes a factual vs theoretical orientation [ti25= -.941, p>.05].
Moreover, the negative value of the t-test outcome shows that both groups scored highly 
on the theoretical rather than factual questions of the TOS I dimension. Such results 
might suggest that both groups assumed a theoretical orientation. A graphic 
representation of the significant results is shown on Figures 3 and 4.
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Figure 3. Mean Scores Obtained by the Two Groups on the 
Objectivism vs Subjectivism Dimension of TOS
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Figure 4. Mean Scores Obtained by the Two Groups on the 
Endogenism vs Exogenism Dimension of TOS
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Finally, separate correlations were run between the two scales of SPI and the three 
dimensions of TOS. Tables 6 & 7 present the resulsts.
Table 6. Correlations between the two Variables of the 
Scientist-Practitioner Inventory (SPI)
Scientist-
Practitioner
Inventory
Scientist
Variable
Practitioner
Variable
Scientist
Variable
1.00 .72*
Practitioner
Variable
.72* 1.00
As shown on Table 6 a significant positive correlation (r= .72) was found between the 
scientist and practitioner scales which might suggest that the scales were not entirely 
independent of each other (i.e. there is a significant amount of overlap between them).
Table 7. Correlations between the Variables of the
Theoretical TOS TOS TOS
Orientation Survey I n m
TOS I 1.00 .312 -.015
T o s n 312 1.00 .112
T o s m .-015 .112 1.00
Table 7 shows that there was no significant relationship between the variables of the 
Theoretical Orientation Survey, indicating that the theoretical dimensions are 
independent of each other, or that they share an insignificant amount of overlap.
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Qualitative Content Analysis of the Two Open-Ended Questions
Each of the questions answered by 127 participants of the current study was analysed in 
detail, noting down ideas and recurring themes and then trying to come up with thematic 
categories. As argued by Mostyn (1985) the selected categories need to be relevant to 
the data (i.e. reflect the purpose of the study) but also mutually exclusive to each other in 
order to enhance reliability.
Key Findings
The analysis yielded one thematic category for each groups’ answers on the two 
questions; which emerged out of a phenomenological understanding of participants’ 
accounts. They were found to be mutually exclusive both in terms of the questions and 
in terms of the groups where participants belonged. However, due to content similarities 
between the two questions the reader might notice an amount of overlap between the 
emerging themes and subthemes. The S-P Model as an Integrative Tool (Group 1) and 
The S-P Model as ‘Hard-Science’ (Group 2) are the first two categories emerging from 
participants’ accounts on the first question; they elucidate the personal meaning ascribed 
by participants to the model. The last two categories. Science as an Investigative Activitv 
(Group 1) and Science: in Need of a Definition (Group 2) reveal participants’ views on 
the notion of science and its place within the scientist-practitioner identity (i.e. Question 
2).
Each of the Tables is followed by two quotations from participants’ personal accounts. 
Their anonymity is preserved by ascribing to each participant the number of his/her 
questionnaire. Finally, empty brackets ( ) indicate the omission of material from the text.
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Question No. 1; What is your personal understanding o f the S-P model and how 
relevant is it in your own way o f working therapeutically?
Table 8. Group 1: Category 1 and its Themes and Subthemes as they Emerged from 
the First Question
Category The S-P Model as an Integrative Tool
Theme I Reversal o f the Term (i.e., Practitioner-Scientist)
Subthemes Emphasis on Therapeutic Practice
Emphasis on Client’s Subjective Experience
Theme I I Awareness o f Research Literature
Subthemes Evidence-Based Practice
Practice-Informed Research
The scientist-practitioner is someone who pays as much attention to scientific 
literature and research as to therapeutic practice. It implies active involvement 
with both. Most importantly, as a scientist-practitioner in the counselling field, I  
also want to stress the importance o f explorative work which emphasises the 
client's subjective experience and phenomenological understanding o f their 
issues. Hence I  prefer to call myself a practitioner-scientist ( ). Theory building 
and empirical research are essential but tome a scientist-practitioner's primary 
aim is practice. (Participant 75)
The term is to me inextricably linked to both scientific research and therapeutic 
practice. As a psychologist working in the NHS, evidence-based practice is very 
relevant to me. It informs my therapeutic and academic work. I  see the scientist- 
practitioner as a^ conscious attempt to integrate empirical and humanistic 
research, this is very important as both approaches have a lot to offer. Moreover, 
the field's phenomenological and humanistic roots are invaluable to my personal 
identity as a practitioner and ways o f working therapeutically () . I  therefore see 
myself as a practitioner-scientist who values a humanistic way o f working with 
clients (Participant 84)
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The notion of integration was a recurrent theme throughout all participants’ accounts. 
The S-P model was understood as a “conscious attempt” to reconcile two different 
poles; scientific research and therapeutic practice. By emphasising the validity and 
importance of both, participants defined themselves as informed users and producers of 
research findings upon which they base their practice. The emphasis on therapeutic 
practice was achieved by positioning the scientist-practitioner model within counselling 
psychology’s humanistic heritage. Such positioning inevitably attaches the values and 
ideology of the field to the perception and use of the model itself. In other words, it 
seems that participants’ personal definition of the model is viewed from the vantage 
point of a position which values a holistic view of human beings. It follows that the 
conceptualisation of practice (one of the model’s polarities) embraces a focus which is 
broader than an emphasis on manualised treatment, problem-solving and therapeutic 
outcomes; instead it espouses a humanistic/phenomenological understanding of 
‘pathology’ and therapeutic conduct. This inclusion is viewed in participants’ emphasis 
on an understanding of the client’s subjective experience and exploration of his/her 
world views.
Moreover, ‘Participants 75 & 84’ were two of the many in Group 1, who explicitly 
demanded a reversal of the term. Such prioritisation of practice achieves a number of 
goals. On one level it highlights the field’s link to the psychotherapeutic traditions and 
their emphasis on therapeutic relationship and process, and on another it gives practice a 
central role in practitioners’ efforts to extend and develop existing knowledge in the 
field. In other words, in the eyes of the study’s scientist-practitioners, practice ceases to 
be a mere application of scientific knowledge. It is an emphasis which also has political 
and power implications, as it actively positions the field of counselling psychology in 
both scientific and psychotherapeutic worlds.
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Question No. 2: In your opinion is a positivist view o f science and its emphasis on 
experimental research compatible to your identity as a counselling psychologist? I f  not 
what alternatives do you propose?
Table 9. Group 1: Category 1 and its Themes and Subthemes as they Emerged from 
the Second Question
Category S cience  a s  an ‘Investigative Activity’
Theme I Compatible
Subthemes Evidence-Based Practice
Empirical Evidence as Justification of Therapeutic Practice
Theme I I Methodological Pluralism
Subhemes Coexistence of Different Epistemologies
Emphasis on Different Aspects of Reality
I  think that counselling psychology should free itself from methodological 
constraints and prescriptions and embrace both positivistic and humanistic views 
o f science; there is a lot to learn from both ( ). So yes a positivist epistemology is 
compatible to my identity as a scientist-practitioner insofar it co-exists with 
phenomenological, social constructionist views. To me the notion o f plurality is 
very important, no approach is better than another, it's iust different and different 
approaches reflect different aspects o f reality, we shouldn't ignore that ( ). 
Science is an instrument, a means to explore and describe reality. (Participant 
28)
Evidence-based practice and practice-informed research should co-exist, my way 
o f working is informed by both. I  feel the same about the notion o f science; reality 
can be viewed through a variety o f lenses, they are all equally valuable as they 
focus on different aspects o f the same phenomenon. I  therefore think that both 
positivism and humanism are important... It's time for psychology to move on 
and embrace a pluralistic stance on both theoretical and methodological levels( ). 
Practitioners and scientists should stop * fighting' each other, all views are equal 
and there is a lot to be learned from them. (Participant 64)
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The conceptualisation of science as a means to an end (i.e. “exploring and describing” 
reality) was evident in all participants’ accounts. Scientific research was viewed as 
invaluable, an infinite source of knowledge which informs one’s therapeutic 
interventions and choices of treatments. As a result evidence-based practice was 
favoured by the majority of participants; by many it was viewed as a form of 
justification of their ways of working with clients. Interestingly however, participants 
also stressed the importance of experiential knowledge; at the centre of their accounts 
lay an effort not to compromise a speculative and interpretative stance which was 
perceived to be invaluable in their efforts to understand their clients’ worlds.
Moreover, participants viewed a positivistic approach to science as compatible with their 
own identities as scientist-practitioners. However, it was not seen as the only possible 
source for psychological knowledge. Instead, science was viewed as an activity which is 
both speculative and pragmatic in nature and which should therefore profit from a 
number of methodological and epistemological stances. This notion of multiplicity was 
evident in all participants’ accounts. In other words, it could be argued that Group 1 
favoured a postmodern rather than a traditional attitude towards science and scientific 
research. Indeed the majority of participants discarded the the idea of one unique and 
objective reality in favour of a variety of perspectives and methodologies which were 
perceived to be “different” but not inferior or superior to each other. It follows that the 
conflict between different epistemic values and world views is rendered meaningless. 
For these participants, a holistic understanding of human beings can only be achieved by 
a type of investigation or exploration which adheres to a number of ontological 
perspectives that in turn focus on different aspects of human nature and reality.
Participants in Group 2, that is those who showed a low identification with the S-P 
model, often held diametrically different views to those cherished by Group 1. That was 
especially evident in their perceptions of the S-P model. Moreover, their plea for a re­
definition of science raised a number of issues regarding the position of counselling 
psychology within the wider scientific and therapeutic communities. As will be seen, the 
explicit emphasis on phenomenological approaches contributed to the preservation of 
the existing dichotomy between natural and human sciences. With the exception of a 
few accounts, participants’ ways of answering the questions were experientially very 
similar to each other. They were all a ferocious attack on the traditional view of science 
and its presuppositions. Hence, participants tended to define themselves through a 
juxtaposition of science and practice. Given the substantial amount of overlap between 
their answers, discussion of the two questions will be combined.
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Table 10. Group 2: Category 1 and its Themes and Subthemes as they Emerged from 
the First Question
Category The S-P Model as an Expression of ‘Hard Science’
Theme I Reflective-Practitioner
Subthemes Speculation and Intuitive Understanding
Reflexivity
Theme H Phenomenological Psychology
Subthemes The Importance of Meaning
Emphasis on Therapeutic Relationship and Process
I  don't feel any ties with the scientist-practitioner model; I  see it as an expression 
o f 'reductionism' and an emphasis on detached observation o f the world's 
phenomena. I  strongly disagree with these views, human experience can never be 
reduced to numbers, moreover, our ways o f being are inherently linked to the 
world and people around us, we are not spectators o f reality, we intimately linked 
with it ( ) . I  therefore avoid to include the dimension o f science, I  prefer to view 
myself as a ^reflective practitioner'. ( ) My identity is very much linked to my 
therapeutic practice. As a theoretician and practitioner I  am constantly sceptical, 
questioning and challenging belieft, it is in this way I  believe I  am scientific. An 
explorative, descriptive stance as advocated by phenomenological approaches is 
still science! (Participant, 12)
No! I  don't see myself as a scientist-practitioner. As a counselling psychologist 
who works therapeutically I  value an intuitive understanding o f human nature. 
Counselling psychology cherishes a humanistic Weltanschauung, a scientist- 
practitioner does not reflect this heritage ( ).Unless we redefine science by 
promoting phenomenological approaches, the two poles do not belong together. 
Therapeutic practice, the way I  see it, is all about being with the client, exploring 
his/her world phenomenologically not predicting it! The scientist-practitioner 
model does not value the things I  described; it is too absorbed with scientific 
research and prediction, it pays no attention to the therapeutic relationship and 
process. (Participant, 56)
149
Participants’ views of the model as an expression of ‘hard science’ had a major 
influence on their personal identities as counselling psychologists. Specifically, the 
majority of participants’ accounts criticised the model. Almost all of them saw it as an 
offspring of a positivist view of science. Hence, the assumptions of the natural sciences 
were heavily criticised. Participants were emphatically against any epistemologies and 
methodologies that attempt to generate law-like predictions which are based on causality. 
Overall, the idea that human beings can be studied scientifically under controlled 
experimental conditions was found unacceptable. In contrast all participants advocated a 
hermeneutic/ phenomenological view of science. They stressed the importance of 
meaning and favoured qualitative analysis which takes into account the researchers’ 
personal stance (i.e. reflexivity) as well as the context within which the phenomenon is 
studied (i.e. its referential totality). The process of reflection and the primacy of 
experience were particularly stressed. Hence, at the heart of participants’ accounts was a 
reflection on the discrepancy between the natural scientific framework adopted by 
mainstream psychology and the interpretative framework which takes into account 
phenomena like responsibility, agency, intentionality, creativity etc. In contrast to the 
views held by participants who strongly identified with the S-P model the above 
positions (i.e. a naturalistic and interpretative/humanistic framework) were viewed as 
irreconcilable.
As a result alternative identities were constructed which were inextricably linked to 
participants’ therapeutic practice. Hence, the majority of answers concentrated on a 
description of their personal ways of working therapeutically; in detail, participants paid 
tribute to the importance of the client’s phenomenology and perceptions about the 
world and herself. An exploratory and interpretative stance was therefore favoured. The 
uniqueness and complexity of human nature were also stressed; hence, human beings 
were viewed as active agents with intentions and expectations that are rooted in their 
capacity to relate and engage in meaningful ways. Moreover, all participants’ accounts 
stressed the importance of the relationship between therapist and client and the quality of 
their engagement (i.e. process); both were viewed as the most important therapeutic 
‘tools’.
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Table 11. Group 2: Category 1 and its Themes and Subthemes as they Emerged from 
the Second Question
Category Science; in Need of a Definition
Theme I Incompatible
Subthemes Emphasis on Dialogical rather than Reductionist Approaches
Emphasis on Human Sciences
Theme H Individual Uniqueness
Subthemes Intentionality
Choice
Table 11 shows the category and its themes and subthemes emerging from participants’ 
accounts. Moreover, the following quotations are a close representation of the views 
discussed above.
No! A positivist view o f science has no place in counselling psychology. Science 
needs to be redefined, a humanistic/ phenomenological view is much more 
appropriate. Personally, I  prefer a dialectical approach to research which is 
reflexive and does not try to place human experience within pre-defined concepts. 
Scientific research should be able to value human uniqueness, intentionality and 
choice, positivist science as manifested in its positivist/quantitative form is too 
simplifying and restrictive. (Participant, 33)
No! as positivism is ultimately a form o f reductionism and oversimplification. A 
humanistic view o f science is far more appropriate. I  am a strong advocate o f 
qualitative research and particularly o f * grounded theory'. Qualitative 
methodologies aim at describing human experience and phenomena through 
inferences and interpretations. To me an objective account o f reality is a mere 
illusion( ). The researcher is bound to influence the content o f his research hence, 
this is not a disadtage, it's what makes research interesting and Hive' ( ). The 
researcher's reflective awareness is very important as it sheds light on the 
interpretative process. (Participant, 22)
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IV. DISCUSSION
Before embarking on a discussion of the present findings it is essential to first address 
the study’s limitations. To begin with it is important to bear in mind the limitations of all 
pre-constructed scales which use bipolar scoring and intend to measure binary 
oppositions (e.g., subjective vs objective, theoretical vs factual); such scales, due to their 
inherent dichotomy, are limited in addressing human multidimensionality and in 
detecting subtle differences and idiosyncrasies in participants’ answers. Also it should 
be mentioned that the alpha coefficient (.54) for TOS I was particularly low showing 
that the reliability of this scale was not statistically strong. Therefore one should be 
careful while interpreting the results of the current findings.
Moreover, although the study did reach power calculations and the data were found to be 
normally distributed, given the unequal size of the two groups comprising the sample its 
representativeness is still debatable. In addition, the positive correlation between the two 
scales of the SPI might indicate that they do not measure different things. Nevertheless, 
Leong and Zachar (1991) after a number of studies on the scales’ reliability and validity, 
claimed that they are sensitive in detecting different characteristics between samples. 
Hence, it could be argued that the present positive correlation between the scales is an 
indication of Group I ’s integrated stance.
In agreement with previous research in the field, participants who strongly identified with 
the S-P model (i.e. Group 1) showed significantly higher scores rather than the low 
identification group on the scientist scale of the SPI. These results are in line with the 
study’s initial hypothesis which predicted a positive relationship between strong 
identification with the model and an interest in scientists’ activities such as publishing 
research papers, designing experimental studies and analysing statistical findings. This 
aspect of the present findings seems to strengthen the assumptions upon which the 
inventory was constructed, that is the S-P model’s emphasis on rigorous scientific 
research and its adherence to a naturalistic rather than humanistic epistemological stance 
(Leong & Zachar, 1991). Not surprisingly, the same participants showed an objectivist 
theoretical orientation on Coan’ s (1979) survey (TOS).
Group 1 answers on TOS seem to support a traditional view of science (i.e. positivistic) 
which has also been the dominant perspective upon which the S-P model rests 
(Hoschmand & Polkinghome, 1992; Rennie, 1994). Specifically, as was expected, 
participants who showed high identification with the model also showed a preference for 
an objective theoretical orientation and an acceptance of biological determinism (i.e. 
endogenism). Based on the constructs upon which the three dimensions rest, this pattern 
of results seems to suggest that participants who belonged to Group 1 were inclined to 
espouse an empirical stance which supports hypothesis testing and theory building and
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to stress the use of a quantitative methodology that favours quantitative description, 
measurement and the use of mathematical formulae. According to Coan the objectivist 
scale also accentuates a preference for observable behaviour that is perceived to be 
characterised by lawful regularity and determinism; therefore such a stance tends to de- 
emphasise individual choice and agency. In addition the participants’ emphasis on 
endogenism implies a belief in the importance of genetic factors as the main 
determinants of human behaviour. In other words variation in human temperament is 
perceived to be governed by the person’s inborn constitution (i.e. biological 
determinism).
The above findings verify those found by Zachar and Leong’s (1992) similar study 
which showed that the theoretical orientation which embraced an objectivist world view 
was most predictive of participants who showed strong interest in scientific activities. 
Moreover, the present results are also in line with Gelso’s (1979) assumptions regarding 
the nature of science and scientific questions. Gelso argued that a scientific attitude aims 
at the reduction of ambiguity and the promotion of formulae aiming at a systematic 
gathering of information. Moreover, he claimed that science as a whole favours logical 
rather than abstract thinking which is based on a belief in theory and hypotheses testing.
Given the above findings one would expect to observe the much discussed dichotomy 
between science and practice. However, a closer look at the overall results of the present 
findings on the scientist-practitioner inventory (SPI) reveals an interesting and 
perplexing pattern. Contrary to the dominant assumptions about the model and the 
study’s initial expectations, participants who strongly identified with the S-P model also 
showed a high preference for activities that constitute a practitioner’s profile. Indeed, 
their preference in activities that emphasised therapeutic relationship and process, as well 
as the clients’ subjective experience was significantly higher than the one found for 
participants belonging to Group 2 (i.e. low identification). These results are a novelty as 
they contradict the general assumptions regarding the nature of the relationship between 
science and practice and the findings by previous research that have consistently shown 
a clear dichotomy between the two poles which is epitomised by a negative correlation 
between them (Barlow, 1981; Leong & Zachar, 1991; Zachar & Leong, 1992; Aspenson, 
1993; Kenney et al., 1997). The absence of the dichotomy in the present results seems to 
indicate a much more coherent picture, where science and practice are integrated 
together. Before attempting to clarify the puzzlement of such findings, a discussion of 
the results obtained by the low identification group on both SPI and TOS might 
contribute to a more coherent description of the relationship between strength of identity 
with the S-P model and participants’ interests, activities and theoretical orientations.
In line with the study’s initial hypothetical predictions, the participants who comprised 
the low identification group scored significantly higher on the practitioner rather than the
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scientist scale of the SPI. In other words they showed a high interest in activities that are 
strongly related to psychotherapeutic practice (e.g., conducting a psychotherapy session 
with a client, attending conferences on psychotherapeutic techniques and interpreting a 
test batteiy for a client). These findings support the existing literature regarding 
practitioners’ low interest in engaging with scientific research (Gelso, 1979; Prochaska 
& Norcross, 1983; Zachar & Leong, 1992). In relation to participants’ theoretical 
orientation, participants assumed a theoretical position which embraced a subjectivist 
Weltanschauung and an acceptance of environmental determinism. Based on Coan’s 
theoretical constructions such results imply that - in many respects - participants’ 
theoretical attitude was diametrically opposed to the one held by the high identification 
group. A subjectivist orientation embraces a holistic perspective which values the 
individual’s personal will, intentionality and uniqueness. In addition it emphasises 
conscious and unconscious experience, and favours a speculative, intuitive understanding 
of human nature. In contrast to an objectivist stance subjectivism favours a preference 
for dealing with both theory and experiential understanding and is therefore inclined to 
go beyond the limits of observation.
Several hypotheses arise from the present findings. As mentioned above, the analysis of 
the results obtained by the high identification group has produced a paradox which does 
not support the dominant view regarding the nature of the relationship between science 
and practice. Indeed, the observed dichotomy, verified by a great number of previous 
studies, seems to have been ‘relocated’; it is to be observed only within the group which 
was comprised of participants who showed a low preference for the model as observed 
by their weak identification with it. In contrast, the majority of the participants who 
comprised the high identification group seem to have successfully managed to integrate 
both roles (i.e. scientist and practitioner) despite the fact that they assumed an objectivist 
stance and accepted biological determinism. Hence, the present state of affairs does not 
support the popular image of the scientist as an isolated, solitary thinker who does not 
get involved with therapeutic practice. Such fusion of perspectives (i.e. science vs 
practice) which so far have been perceived as irreconcilable, poses interesting questions 
regarding the phenomenon’s plausible explanations.
Despite the researcher’s initial thoughts, the information gathered by demographic 
forms did not shed any light on the intricacy of the present findings since none of the 
factors investigated showed any significant effect on participants’ ways of scoring on 
the SPI. Attention is therefore shifted to the analysis of qualitative findings. Although no 
causal inferences can be made, it is argued that the ‘pictures’ emerging from the 
different methodologies are complementary to each other and could therefore clarify the 
points raised in this discussion.
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A close look at the analysis of the first two questions as answered by Group 1 situates 
counselling psychology within postmodern discourse. Notions such as ‘integration’ and 
‘pluralism’ are much in evidence; these would have been considered anathema a few 
decades ago by scholars whose identity was based on academic specialism and “hard 
science” (to use one participant’s phrase). These participants’ understanding of the 
scientist-practitioner paradigm was based on integrative and pluralistic stances which 
might explain their capacity to engage in different activities and to hold contradictory 
conceptual frameworks. Moreover, their emphasis on both evidence-based practice and 
practice informed research contributes to a revival of the dialogue between science and 
practice. Hence it could be argued that the current findings have reframed the scientist- 
practitioner model by actively uniting its two poles for the purpose of scientific as well 
as humanistic inquiry and practice.
Moreover, it seems that the differences between the two groups depended primarily on 
their conceptualisation of the notion of science. As shown by Group 2’s accounts, 
participants’ low identification with the model was possibly derived from their 
perception of the science polarity as relating to a natural epistemological stance. Hence, 
given counselling psychology’s humanistic heritage, participants felt that the S-P model 
constitutes a conceptual impasse. Consequently, these participants discarded the notion 
of science altogether from their identity which was viewed instead as ' rejiective- 
practitioner*.
To conclude, the current findings suggest that the conceptualisation of the scientist- 
practitioner model is inextricably linked to participants’ world views and epistemological 
positions. Possibly due to Group I ’s flexible definition of science - as perceived from 
the vantage point of pluralism - the scientist-practitioner model was understood as an 
“integrative tool” which emphasised a mutually beneficial relationship between science 
and practice. Moreover, it is possible that the participants’ adherence to pluralism also 
allowed them to retain and recognise the value of diametrically different world views and 
epistemological positions (as shown by the differences between their scores on TOS and 
their personal accounts). The importance of the notion of science and its decisive role in 
participants’ understanding of the model was most evident in Group 2. Participants not 
only showed a low identification with it, but also expressed contradictory views between 
the notions of science and practice. In line with previous studies, the dichotomy bewteen 
the two polarities, seems to be based on one’s view of science as a reflection of a 
positivist stance. Participants belonging to Group 2, argued that counselling psychology 
values a humanistic heritage and therefore rejects natural epistemologies.
Finally, based on the present findings, it should be noted that the perception of the 
scientist-practioner model - as viewed from the vantage point of participants who showed 
a high identification with it - is considerably different from the views held by
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undergraduate and postgraduate psychology students and by practitioners and scientists 
in the US. Future research could explore possible factors (such as participants active 
involvement with research) that might have led to these differences. Such exploration will 
add to the clarification of the scientist-practitioner debate.
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Self Reflection
My personal interest in this study evolved during my three years of integrative training 
on this course. The intensive involvement with theory, research and clinical training 
contributed to a persistent search for a personal identity within academic and clinical 
settings. As I was confronted with diametrically opposed theoretical ideas and 
methodological paradigms which derived from equally diverse philosophical stances, I 
began to question the notion of ‘truth’ and to challenge the theoretical and therapeutic 
positions which claimed it. I consider my choice of theoretical multiplicity to be both a 
curse and a blessing. On one level, it has broadened my horizons and contributed to the 
development of an attitude of respect and tolerance of diverse views and on another level 
it has deprived me of a sense of security since it has rendered any quests for certainty 
meaningless.
It was this exposure to difference, which was both disquieting and intriguing, that 
sparked my search for an identity within the pre-set boundaries and definitions of 
counselling psychology. Hence, while reviewing the field’s history (both in the US and 
UK), I came across the scientist-practitioner paradigm which is still perceived to be the 
favourite model of training for both clinical and counselling trainees. However, I also 
discovered, that despite the model’s domination and official endorsement, the scientist- 
practitioner model has often been attacked and criticised as representing a mere utopia. 
The majority of criticisms have focused on its traditional conceptualisation of science 
and its questionable success in bridging the gap between research and therapeutic 
practice. I found the amount of uncertainty emanating from the scientist-practitioner 
identity and the contradicting views regarding the model’s value and efficacy appealing 
as they stimulated my interest in ontological and epistemological issues.
With these thoughts in mind I embarked on an exploration of counselling 
psychologists’ perceptions of the scientist-practitioner identity and their epistemological 
positions. For this purpose, I chose a mixed methodology that combined quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. The promotion of methodological pluralism or relativistic 
epistemology (Fielding and Schreire, 2001) is congruent with my own theoretical 
position which has its roots in postmodern assumptions regarding the nature and source 
of knowledge. When viewed from this vantage point, different methodologies are 
perceived as ‘tools’ for the exploration of different aspects of reality which in turn lead 
to the production of diverse types of knowledge (e.g., theoretical versus experiential). 
Such a stance makes no assumptions regarding the notion of ‘truth’; instead all 
methodologies and their subsequent results are viewed as equally valid representations 
of different facets of reality.
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The above stage of conceptualisation and preparation for my study was followed by a 
two month period of pure frustration and agony during which I was counting the 
received questionnaires to see whether they were complete and indeed filled! I soon 
realised how different my experience was to tiie one felt last year when I was 
interviewing existential therapists. Instead of excitement and fascination, I was feeling a 
growing sense of dissatisfaction and irritation; the sight of numbers started to 
overwhelm me, the creation of a data base felt extremely mechanistic, and the prospect of 
statistical tests and procedures daunting. In a sense I couldn’t really engage with what I 
was doing. Moreover, the slowness of participants’ replies was excruciating, it almost 
felt like a personal rejection and it put me in a relentless stand by mode.
My mood changed for the better once I had gathered the right amount of questionnaires 
and started engaging with the analysis of the data; numbers began to make sense and the 
first sketches of the overall picture of the findings were interesting. Nevertheless, despite 
the intricacies of the findings, reporting and analysing the data was less creative than I 
had anticipated and I kept failing to engage with the meanings of the numbers; I was 
struggling not to make any valuations and to stay with a description of facts. It was only 
when I immersed myself in participants’ phenomenological accounts that I felt I was 
‘doing’ research. There is no doubt, that my interest in epistemology and scepticism 
regarding the model’s efficacy and value had an effect on the formulation of questions 
as well as on possible inferences that I ‘ve made and consequently on the actual analysis 
of the data.
Retrospectively I feel that a mixed methodology is a good idea as long as the researcher 
(in this case me) feels comfortable with the epistemological positions involved. As I said 
at the beginning I don’t believe in the existence of one objective reality and so I do think 
that different methodologies contribute to the clarification of different aspects of reality. 
However, I do have a preference, and my preference is for a hermeneutic stance in 
research. Hence, conducting a mixed-methods research was very challenging, as my lack 
of in depth knowledge in quantitative methodologies and statistics kept me at distance 
from my project. Nevertheless, retrospectively I have appreciated the opportunity to do 
quantitive a quantitative analysis of results and feel that there is some satisfaction to be 
gained from it, not least in terms of the insight it has provided me with regarding 
scientific methodology and its reasons for valuing numbers as well as qualities when 
assessing results.
158
REFERENCES
Aspenson D. (1993). Graduate psychology students’ perceptions of the 
scientist-practitioner model of training. Counselling Psychology 
Quorterly, 6(3): 201-216.
Barker, C., Rstrang, N. and Elliott, R. (1994) Research Methods in
Clinical and Counselling Psychology. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Barlow, D. H. (1981). On the relation of clinical research to clinical
practice: Current issues, new directions. Journal o f Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 49: 147-155.
Bloom, M., Fischer, J., and Orme, J. G. (1995). Evaluating Practice:
Guidelines for the Accountable Professional. Needham Heights 
MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Bor, R. and du Plessis, P. (1997). Counselling psychology reseaarch in health settings. 
Counselling Psychology Review, 12: 19-22.
British Psychological Society, Division of Counselling Psychology (2001)
Professional Practice Guidelines. Leicester: British Psychological Society.
Carter, J., A. (2002) Integrating science and practice: Reclaiming the science in practice. 
Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 58(10): 1285-1290.
Coan, R. W. (1979). Psychologists: Personal and Theoretical Pathways.
New York: Irvington.
Cinnirella, M. (1997). Towards a European identity? Interactions between the National 
and European social identities manifested by univeristy students in Britain and 
Italy. British Journal o f Social Psychology, 36(1): 19-31.
Conie, S. & Callahan, M. M. (2000). ‘A Review of the scientist-practitioner model: 
reflections of its potential contribution to counselling psychology within the 
context of current health trends’. British Journal o f Medical Psychology, 73(3): 
413-427.
Cowie, H. (1999) ‘Counselling psychology in the UK: the interface between practice
and research’ The European Journal for Psychotherapy, Counselling & Health, 
2(1): 69-80.
159
Epstein, I. (1997) 'And the beat goes on' Social Work Research, 21(3): 207-209.
Relding, N. & Screier, M. (2001, Februaiy). Introduction: On the Compatibility
between Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods. Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research, 2(1). (see http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/2-00/2- 
OOfielding-e.htm).
Gelso, C. J. (1979) Research in counseling: Methodological and professional issues. 
Counselling Psychologist, 8:7-35.
Gergen, K. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modem psychology. 
American Psychologist, 40: 266-275.
Hoshmand, L. L. T. (1991) Clinical inquiry as scientific training. The Counselling 
Psychologist, 19:431-453.
Howard, G. S. (1983). Toward methodological pluralim. Journal o f Counselling 
Psychology, 30: 19-21.
Kenney, J. D. and Rohrbaugh, C. C. (1997). The scientist-practitioner role 
preferences: the undergraduate dilemma. Counselling Psychology 
Quarterly, 10(4): 439-449.
Lampropoulos, G., and Spengler, P. M. (2002). Introduction: Reprioritizing the role of 
science in a realistic version of the scientist-practitioner model. Journal o f 
Clinical Psychology, 58(10): 1195-1197.
Leong, F. T. L. & Zachar, P. (1991) Development and validation of the scientist- 
practitioner inventory for psychology. Journal o f Counselling Psychology, 
38(3): 331-341.
Lokare, V. G (1992). Respect for cultures, beliefs and attitudes: a way to better 
relationships and understanding. Counselling Psychology Quarterly,
5(3): 227-230.
Long, C. G. & Hollin, C. R. (1997). The scientist-practitioner model in clinical
psychology: a critique. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 4(2): 75-83.
Mayring, P. (2000, June). Qualitative Content Analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research, 1(2). (see http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/2-00/2- 
OOmayring-e.htm).
160
McLeod, J. (2001) Qualitative Research in Counselling and Psychotherapy.
London: Sage.
Milne, D. and Paxton, R. (1998). A psychological re-analysis of the scientist-practitioner 
model. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 5: 216-230.
Mostyn, B. (1998). ‘The content analysis of qualitative research data: a dynamic
approach. In M. Brenner, J. Brown & D. Canter (Eds), The research interview: 
uses and approaches. London: Academic Press.
Rennie, D. L. (1994). Human science and counselling psychology: closing the gap 
between research and practice. Counselling Psychology Quarterly,
7(3): 235-251.
Shapiro, D. A. (1996). Validated treatments and evidence-based services.
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 3(3): 256-259.
Soldz, S., McCullough, L, (Eds). (2000). Reconciling Empirical Knowledge and Clinical 
Experience: The Art and Science o f Psychotherapy. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association.
Spinelli, E. (2001) ‘Counselling psychology: a hesitant hybrid or a tantalising 
innovation?’ Counselling Psychology Review, 16(3): 3-12.
Talley, P.P., Strupp, H.H., Butler, S.F, (Eds). (1994). Psychotherapy Research and 
Practice: Bridging the Gap. New York: Basic Books,
Wakefield, J. C. and Kirk, S. A. (1996). Unscientific thinking about scientific practice: 
Evaluating the scientist-practitioner model. Social Work Research, 20(2): 83-96.
Wakefield, J. C. and Kirk, S. A. (1997) Science, dogma and the scientist-practitioner 
model. Social Work Research, 21(3): 201-206.
Watkins, C. W., Lopez, F. G., Campell, V. L., & Himmel, C. D. (1986). Contemporaiy 
counselling psychology: Results of a national survey. Journal o f Counselling 
Psychology, 33:301-309.
Williams, D.I. and Irving, J. A. (1996) ‘Counselling Psychology: a conflation of 
paradigms’. Counselling Psychology Review, 11(2): 4-6.
161
Woolfe, R. (1990) ‘Counselling psychology in Britain: an idea whose time has come’, 
Psychologist, 3(12): 531-5.
Woolfe, R. (1996) ‘Counselling Psychology in Britain: Past, Present and Future’ 
Counselling Psychology Review, 11(4): 7-18.
Woolfe, R., Dryden, D., & Strawbridge, S. (2003) Handbook o f Counselling 
Psychology. 2nd Edition. London: Sage.
162
A P P E N D I X  A 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Counselling Psychologists' Perceptions of the SdeîOist-Pracmonertàenûty
I am a trainee Counselling Psychologist at the University of Surrey about to complete a 
Doctorate in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology. As part of the final year’s 
requirements, I am conducting a research study which looks at the ways in which 
counselling psychologists' perceive the scientist-practitioner ïàenûty- The questionnaires 
used for the purpose of this study are designed to explore the psychologists’ strength of 
identification with the model as well as tiieir interests, activities, preferences and 
theoretical orientations. These areas are perceived to be at the centre of the study's aims 
and attempt to understand the factors which describe the scientist-practitioner identity as 
well as possible differences between the two polarities (i.e. scientist and practitioner).
It is hoped that the current study will contribute to the clarification of the existing 
scientist/practitioner dichotomy as well as the paradigm’s validity and accuracy as a term 
that expresses the values, aims and academic/professional stance of counselling 
psychologists. Overall die completion of the questionnaires should take approximately 
half an hour to 40 minutes. Finally it should be mentioned that participation in the study 
is anonymous and voluntary; the blank questionnaires have no identifying features and 
so anonymity is guaranteed. Should you decide to participate, please fill out the 
following questionneras and consent form and return them to the address provided on 
the envelop.
If you have any questions or concerns please do not hesitate to contact me on 
07932 013761 or by e-mml: emanafi @vahoo.com.
Thank you in adce for your participation in this study.
Elena Manafi
Counselling Psychologist in Training
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A P P E N D I X  B 
CONSENT FORM
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on the ways in which 
counselling psychologists' perceive dae scientist-practitioner identity. I have read and 
understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a full explanation by the 
investigator of the nature and purpose of the study and have been given the opportunity 
to ask questions on all its aspects.
I also understand that all personal data relating to volunteers is held and processed in the 
strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree that I 
will not seek to restrict the use of the results of the study on the understanding that my 
anonymity is preserved. I therefore confirm that I have read and understood the above 
and freely consent to participate in this study.
Name of Volunteer 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
On the behalf of those involved with this research project, I undertake that, in respect of 
the questionnaires, professional confidentiality will be ensured and that the use of the 
data will be for the purposes of research only. The anonymity of the above participant 
will be protected.
Name of the Investigator: Elena Manafi
Signed:_________________________
Date:______________________
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A P P E N D I X  C
The following questions measure the strength of identification with the scientist- 
practitioner identity. Please indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number 
using the following scale:
1= not at all 
2= very little 
3= to a certain extent 
4= to a large extent 
5= completely
1. To what extent do you feel a scientist-practitioner ?
1 2 3 4 5
2. To what extent do you feel strong ties with a scientist-practitioner ?
1 2 3 4 5
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be a scientist-practitioner ?
1 2 3 4 5
4. How similar do you think you are to the average scientist-practitioner ?
1 2 3 4 5
5. How important to you is being a scientist-practitioner ?
1 2 3 4 5
6. How much are your views about scientist-practitioner shared by other 
scientist-practitioners ?
1 2 3 4 5
7. When you hear someone who is not a scientist-practitioner criticise 
scientist- practitioners, to what extent do you feel personally criticised ?
1 2 3 4 5
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A P P E N D I X  D
The following questions ask about interests in activities often performed by 
psychologists. Please indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number using the 
following scale:
1= very low interest 
2= low interest 
3= medium interest 
4= high interest 
5= veiy high interest
1. Writing an article commenting on research findings.
1 2 3 4 5
2. Conducting a psychotherapy session with an individual client.
1 2 3 4 5
3. Analysing data from an experiment you have conducted.
1 2 3 4  5
4. Conducting a diagnostic interview with a client.
1 2 3 4 5
5. Presenting research findings at a conference.
1 2 3 4 5
6. Planning a behaviour modification program for a client.
1 2 3 4 5
7. Formulating a theory of a psychological process.
1 2 3 4 5
8. Designing a new treatment method for a mental health agency.
1 2 3 4 5
9. Designing an experiment to study a psychological process 
1 2 3 4 5
10. Administering a psychological test to a client.
1 2 3 4 5
11. Writing a scientific book for psychologists.
1 2 3 4 5
12. Conducting couples and family therapy.
1 2 3 4 5
13. Supervising students’ research projects.
1 2 3 4 5
14. Consulting with school personnel about a new prevention program.
1 2 3 4 5
15. Collecting data on a research project you designed.
1 2 3 4 5
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16. Organising a treatment program in a mental hospital.
1 2 3 4 5
17. Reviewing journal articles.
1 2 3 4 5
18. Presenting a report during a case conference.
1 2 3 4 5
19. Applying for research grants.
1 2 3 4 5
20. Supervising practicum students in clinical and counselling psychology. 
1 2 3 4 5
21. Writing research papers for publication.
1 2 3 4 5
22. Reading about new approaches to psychotherapy.
1 2 3 4 5
23. Reviewing the literature on an issue in psychology.
1 2 3 4 5
24. Giving advice about psychological problems on a radio talk show 
1 2 3 4 5
25. Working for a funded research institute.
1 2 3 4 5
26. Interpreting a test batteiy for a client 
1 2 3 4 5
27. Serving as an editor for a scientific journal.
1 2 3 4 5
28. Helping a client get in touch with feelings.
1 2 3 4 5
29. Learning new strategies for dealing with psychological problems.
1 2 3 4 5
30. Writing a statistical program.
1 2 3 4 5
31. Reading a book on innovative research designs.
1 2 3 4 5
32. Going through therapy to make yourself a better person.
1 2 3 4 5
33. Learning about a new statistical procedure.
1 2 3 4 5
34. Attending a conference on psychotherapeutic techniques.
1 2 3 4 5
35. Brainstorming about possible research with colleagues.
1 2 3 4 5
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36. Consulting with other psychologists about a particular client's concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5
37. Helping a colleague understand confusing statistical findings.
1 2 3 4 5
38. Reviewing an agency's intake form for a new client.
1 2 3 4 5
39. Developing new explanations of well accepted empirical studies.
1 2 3 4 5
40. Reading a book written by a famous psychotherapist.
1 2 3 4 5
41. Conducting group psychotherapy sessions.
1 2 3 4 5
42. Serving on a thesis or dissertation committee.
1 2 3 4 5
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A P P E N D I X  E
The statements below represent a wide range of issues pertaining to theory and methods 
in psychology. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each 
one by circling the appropriate number using the following scale.
1= strongly disagree 
2= disagree 
3= cannot say 
4= agree
5= strongly agree
1. A science is likely to progress most rapidly if researchers devote themselves primarily 
to the systematic gathering of factual information and engage in little elaborate 
speculation or theory building.
1 2 3 4 5
2. Human behaviour is characterised in all aspects by lawful regularity and thus, in 
principle, it is completely predictable.
1 2 3 4 5
3. All behaviour, except for a few simple reflexes, is learned.
1 2 3 4 5
4. Psychologists should be as concerned with explaining private conscious experience as 
they are with explaining overt behaviour.
1 2 3 4 5
5. For many research purposes, it is best to permit many relevant variable to interact in a 
natural fashion and then analyse the results, rather than try to effect strict control.
1 2 3 4 5
6. Individual differences in personality are governed to a high degree by heredity.
1 2 3 4 5
7. All the concepts used in psychological theory should be explicitly definable in terms 
of observed physical events.
1 2 3 4 5
8. The use of mathematical models and equations in theory often serves to create a false 
impression of scientific respectability, instead of furthering our understanding.
1 2 3 4 5
9. It is just as important for psychological researchers to formulate theoretical 
interpretations as it is to accumulate specific facts about behaviour.
1 2 3 4 5
10. In principle, human behaviour cannot be completely predicted, because people can 
choose to act in ways that we have no basis for expecting.
1 2 3 4 5
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11. Except for a few elementary drives like hunger and thirst, all human motives are 
learned.
1 2 3 4 5
12. The individual subject’s personal account of his private conscious experience is one 
of the most valuable sources of psychological data.
1 2 3 4 5
13. Highly controlled experiments often give a misleading picture of the complex 
interactions that actually occur under natural circumstances.
1 2 3 4 5
14. The direction of human behaviour is governed to a considerable extent by inborn 
predispositions.
1 2 3 4 5
15. It is best to define perception in terms of stimulus-response relationships, rather 
than in terms of internal events that cannot be publicly observed.
1 2 3 4 5
16. Elaborate forms of statistical analysis tend to be overemphasised in psychology.
1 2 3 4 5
17. A theory should consist mainly of inductive generalisations based on observations, 
with little in the way of constructions or hypothetical formulations contributed by the 
theorist.
1 2 3 4 5
18. Human actions are just as strictly determined by whatever causes are operating as all 
other physical events are.
1 2 3 4 5
19. Nearly all individual differences in human behaviour can be accounted for in terms 
of past reinforcements.
1 2 3 4 5
20. Psychologists can gain many valuable insights through meditation and other 
procedures designed to expand or illuminate private experience.
1 2 3 4 5
21. In the long run researchers can achieve most if they devote each individual study to a 
veiy specific, circumscribed problem.
1 2 3 4 5
22. Much of the variation in human temperament is governed by inborn constitution.
1 2 3 4 5
23. Any meaningful statement about mental events can be translated into a statement 
about behaviour with no serious loss of meaning.
1 2 3 4 5
24. Psychological theory could benefit greatly from more extensive use of mathematical 
and geometric models.
1 2 3 4 5
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25. The most valuable theories are ones involving speculation that goes well beyond 
established facts and points the way to future discoveries.
1 2 3 4 5
26. In principle, an individual’s choice or decision can never be fully predicted from 
antecedent conditions or events.
1 2 3 4 5
27. Nearly all the behavioural tendencies that have been called instinctive in people are 
actually products of learning.
1 2 3 4 5
28. The primary goal of psychologists should be the explanation of observable 
behaviour, rather than the explanation of conscious events.
1 2 3 4 5
29. We could gain more valuable information if researchers spent more time studying 
total action patterns in relation to the total influencing environment and less time relating 
single responses to a few specific stimuli.
1 2 3 4 5
30. An individual’s pattern of relative strengths and weaknesses in verbal, mathematical, 
and perceptual abilities is governed to a great extent by genetic factors.
1 2 3 4 5
31. As far as possible, the stimulus and response variable used in psychological theory 
should be defined in strictly physical terms.
1 2 3 4 5
32. Mathematical equations are not a very appropriate device for expressing the most 
fundamental relationships and principles in psychological theory.
1 2 3 4 5
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A P P E N D I X  F 
OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS
1. What is your personal understanding of the scientist-practitoner model and how 
relevant is it in your own way of working therapeutically?
2. In your opinion is a positivist view of science and its emphasis on experimental 
research compatible to your own identity as a counselling psychologist? If not what kind 
of alternative do you propose?
172
A P P E N D I X  G 
DEMOGRAPHICS INFORMATION
Your answers to the following questions are strictly confidential and will only be used 
for research purposes. Nevertheless, if you don’t want to answer some of these 
questions, please feel free not to.
1. Are yoo (please tick the appropriate answer)
Male  Female_
2. How old are you? [ ] years
3. What is the main model(s) that you have been trained in?
4. Do you have any other qualifications besides being a counselling 
psychologist? (e.g., psychotherapist, clinical, forensic and/or health 
psychologist etc.)
5. Which is your theoretical model of preference? (e.g., humanistic, 
psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, integrative, eclectic etc.)
8. How many years have you been practising therapeutically in total
Specifically how many years as a:
Counselling psychologist:______________  Psychotherapist:______
Clinical psychologist:_____________________  Other (Please State):
Health Psychologists______________________  ________________________________
Forensic Psychologists _________
Counsellor:
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PART IV
Concluding
Chapter
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Existential/Phenomenological Contributions to the Practice of
Counselling Psychology
I. Introduction
In this essay, I intend to show how philosophy, and specifically existential/ 
phenomenological philosophy informs the field and practice of counselling psychology 
and strengthens its place alongside the other applied divisions of the British 
Psychological Society. I will focus on the field’s major headings (i.e. Research, 
Training, Professionalism, and Therapeutic Practice), which construct its identity and 
define its role within the wider community. Moreover, through my portrayal of a 
personal reflection of existential philosophy and its relation to counselling psychology 
and practice, the reader will gain a clearer view of my portfolio as a whole and of my 
choices of research and academic topics.
I would also like to draw attention to the limited length of the present paper, which 
inevitably will limit the depth and level of analysis of these themes. The reader should 
also bear in mind that as is the case with research projects, an essay reflects the author’s 
personal and philosophical stances, as well as beliefs, values, and ideas, which are bound 
to influence the discussion. This essay is therefore not an objective account of existential 
philosophy and counselling psychology, but a personal, idiosyncratic exploration and 
understanding of the links between the two fields.
II. Counselling Psychology; a Balancing Act
As I have pointed out elsewhere® in my portfolio, one of the reasons I trained as a 
counselling rather than clinical psychologist was my disillusionment with the spirit of 
scientific psychology and its roots in the logico-empiricist philosophy. Influenced by 
my academic background and interests in art, poetry, and literature, I always felt that 
psychology is a great deal more than a search for objective knowledge, facts, and truth. 
Indeed, the etymology of the term, which has its roots in the Greek language, places the 
human psyche at its very centre. In other words, psychology is first and foremost 
concerned with human beings and their lives. As Deurzen-Smith argues, “in the realm 
of living exact answers and facts do not have a place: there needs to be room for paradox 
and contradiction, there needs to be room for integration of opposites and co-existence 
of multiple versions of a truth” (1990: 11).
® For a detailed account of my journey to counselling psychology refer to the introduction of this 
portfolio and to my clinical paper.
175
It is my contention that counselling psychology’s integrative and pluralistic stances, 
which are grounded in a holistic conceptualisation of human beings, embraces the 
position Deurzen outlines and seeks to achieve a balance between the two opposite 
polarities of science and art. Strawbridge and Woolfe (2003) have emphasised 
counselling psychology’s commitment to recognising diversity of experience and the 
impact of contextual factors in work with clients. I believe that this balancing act can be 
further facilitated by the reading of existential/phenomenological philosophers, who -  by 
focusing on ontological and methodological issues -  have provided us with 
philosophical and epistemological frameworks that are firmly rooted in human 
experience and relation to the world.
During my first year of training, I became interested in theories of epistemology and the 
conceptualisation of human consciousness. Hence, in my literature review, I discussed 
how the existential movement, through its critique of positivist epistemology and 
Cartesian ontology, managed to bridge the gap between knowledge of the world and 
experience of the world. By situating the human consciousness in the world, existential 
philosophers viewed the acquisition of knowledge not as a product of disengaged 
research, but as the outcome of an active participation with the world and others.
Such a position is not alien to the field of counselling psychology, which is firmly 
rooted in the humanistic tradition and view of science. In the ‘Professional Practice 
Guidelines’ of the BPS (2001), counselling psychology is defined as a marriage, which 
seeks to unite “the scientific demand for rigorous empirical inquiry with a firm value 
base grounded in the primacy of the counselling/psychotherapeutic relationship 
(2001:4). Implicit in this definition is counselling psychologists’ unique position within 
the wider field of psychology; they hold both academic and clinical (i.e. therapeutic) 
positions and can therefore draw upon theoretical m d experiential knowledge. In my 
view, an existential/phenomenological stance with its rigorous method (i.e. the 
phenomenological method) and its devotion to the notions of intentionality and 
subjective meaning can promote an epistemological stance which can strengthen the 
field’s position in the current debate between the natural and human sciences. Indeed, 
the phenomenological method with its emphasis on description and focus on the 
exploration of phenomena as they disclose themselves to us, remains faithful to tiie 
principles of empirical research without losing track of the human concerns of everyday 
life.
Spinelli (1989, 2001a,b), an eminent existential psychotherapist and counselling 
psychologist, has written extensively on the pros and cons of scientific discourse as seen 
from the vantage point of an existential/phenomenological perspective. As a strong 
advocate of the phenomenological method, he argues that unless we redefine the notion 
of science to include a phenomenological stance, we - counselling psychologists - are
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running the risk of falling back on a positivist/empiricist position and of losing our 
distinct identity as academics/researchers and practitioners (2001b). In his view, such a 
position could have dire consequences for the profession. A naturalist paradigm with its 
mechanistic view of human beings and its notion of prediction and control goes against 
the field’s principles and values and compromises therapeutic practice, which is 
essentially an “enabling and empowering process” (2001b: 4). Although I am very 
sympathetic to Spinelli’s argument, in my view, which is very much informed by 
pluralistic and postmodern ideas, we should allow contradictory discourses to co-exist, 
as their tension - if used creatively - can lead to fruitful discussions and developments in 
the field. By that I mean that different methodologies and epistemological discourses are 
in a sense windows to alternative modes of reality. They should therefore be treated as 
‘tools’ that facilitate our exploration of these modes and not as explicit, universal 
statements about reality. Such combinations of methodological paradigms, also known 
as ‘methodological pluralism’ (Howard, 1983), can be seen in my third year research 
which focused on counselling psychologists’ perceptions of the scientist-practitioner 
paradigm. The combination of both quantitative (i.e. statistical analysis) and qualitative 
(qualitative content analysis) approaches yielded complementary findings that 
highlighted participants’ views.
Interestingly, this pluralistic stance was shared by a number of counselling 
psychologists who participated in my third year’s research, where I focused on the 
notions of science and the scientist-practitioner identity. Although the majority of 
participants plead for a re-definition of science that will acknowledge the researcher’s 
contribution and position, they also argued for a pluralistic stance, which will allow 
different discourses to co-exist. It was concluded that pluralism -  through its rejection of 
the notion of absolute truth and reality - allows us to accept, recognise, and use the value 
and products of diametrically opposed views of reality.
Having sketched the contributions of existential/phenomenological philosophy to the 
areas of epistemology and research, I will now turn to counselling psychology training, 
supervision, and therapeutic practice.
Counselling Psychology; a Holistic Approach
As this portfolio demonstrates, I was fortunate to be part of a training course which 
emphasised both experiential and theoretical knowledge and which allowed room for 
plurality and diversity of ideas. I therefore had the opportunity to explore different 
theoretical and philosophical standpoints and to develop a personal stance in all three 
areas of my training (i.e. professional, academic/research, and clinical). Retrospectively, I 
believe that the existential/phenomenological philosophy can inform all 
psychotherapeutic trainings which value an experiential approach that emphasises 
personal development, the therapeutic relationship, the client’s and therapist’s subjective
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experience, and an explorative rather than pathologising attitude towards the client’s 
presenting difficulties and problems.
Indeed as mentioned in the Competency Statement of the Counselling Psychology 
Division of the BPS (2004), an approved training involves all of the above elements plus 
knowledge of the discipline of psychology as a whole. Psychological knowledge is 
therefore achieved through a required undergraduate degree in psychology and through 
advanced knowledge of psychological theories and practice, which are gained during the 
training. Hence, therapeutic training involves knowledge of “more than two models of 
psychological therapy; an emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and on ethical and 
professional considerations; a training in research methods and skills; supervised 
placements in at least two different settings and personal psychological therapy” (BPS, 
Division of Counselling Psychology, ‘Competency Statement’, 2004:1).
The above passage defines the ethos and training guidelines of the field; it is along these 
lines that existentialism and phenomenology, as two philosophical disciplines, can prove 
an invaluable source of information for counselling psychology. As Wittgenstein (1980) 
claimed, “philosophy is not a theory but an activity” (1980:77), an engagement with the 
world and other people that aims at a clarification and understanding of the human 
predicament. When viewed from this vantage point, we are all amateur philosophers as 
we all -  at some point in our lives -  wonder about issues relating to identity, 
relationships, meaning, and life itself. Like many counselling psychologists, I believe that 
these issues form the core of counselling psychology as it is a field which is not just 
concerned with the notion of knowledge (Bor and Legg, 2003; Cowie, 1999; Laungani, 
2004; Milton, M., Charles, L., Judd, D., O’Brien, M., Tipney, A. and Turner, A., 2003; 
Spinelli, 2001a,b; Strawbridge and Woolfe, 2003).
Counselling psychology grapples with the nature of human beings, questions about life 
and death, and the difficulties clients bring into the consulting room (Hawton and Kirk, 
1989; Lees and Stimpson, 2002; Palmer, 2002; Worral, 1997). It has therefore an ethical 
and professional responsibility to assist trainees engage with more than just theoretical 
and experiential knowledge. Existential philosophy may not be the answer to all our 
difficulties as practitioners, but, as noted in the Handbook o f Counselling Psychology, it 
can certainly enrich our attempts to understand our clients, their subjective worlds and 
problems, and to reflect on our own assumptions, biases and therapeutic use of self 
(Woolfe, Diyden, and Strawbridge, 2003) These parameters can be seen in the 
contributions that the different sections of this portfolio offer.
Deurzen (2002) has argued that the existential/phenomenological approach to 
counselling psychology offers above all a philosophical method dealing with problems 
in living; as such it can provide a trans-theoretical and non-sectarian approach that aims
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at an investigation of human beings and life concerns. In other words, an 
existential/phenomenological attitude does not preclude other theories and vantage 
points, on the contraiy, it approaches life with a sense of wonder and openness that 
makes no assumptions regarding truth and knowledge, or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways of 
being. It therefore allows room for plurality of ideas and enhances a combination of 
psychological and philosophical knowledge on both theoretical and practical levels. Such 
a stance is evident in my clinical paper where I outline the ways in which I used different 
theoretical standpoints (e.g., psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural theories) in 
complementaiy ways.
Two quotes from RoUo May’s (1958) classic book Existence will provide the basis 
upon which further discussion will take place.
‘Can we be sure ... that we are seeing the patient as he really is, knowing him 
in his own reality; or are we seeing merely a projection of our own theories 
about him? (May, 1958:3, italics in the original)
and he continues by saying
“How can we know whether we are seeing the patient in his real world, the 
world in which he lives and moves and has his being, and which is for him 
unique, concrete and different from our general theories of culture” (May,
1958: 4).
Such disquieting questions are I think central to the psychotherapeutic world and 
especially to counselling psychology practice and research, which emphasises the 
importance and value of a person’s subjective experience. They are here to remind us of 
the limitations inherent in all theoretical systems and concepts which attempt to explain 
and predict human behaviour. The existential/phenomenological movement, by rejecting 
the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy, subject/object split, and the presumed gap between 
human consciousness and the world, criticised the foundations of modem sciences 
(which are based on a Newtonian system) and focused on ontology and lived 
experience. Contra Descartes^, existential philosophers argued that human beings are 
always in the world and in relation to one another and cannot therefore be objectified and 
observed in isolation. Similar views are indeed expressed in tiie seminal textbook of 
counselling psychology by Woolfe, et al. (2003).
In my view, existential phenomenology can teach us a number of important lessons, but
above all, how to observe and explore the phenomenon of being human in the context of
the lived experience/world. If therapy, apart from a helping profession, is also an attitude
® For a detailed account of existential philosophers’ critique of Cartesian epistemology refer to my 
Literature Review.
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of wonder, an “attempt to remain as open as possible to whatever presents itself to our 
relational experience” (Spinelli, 1997: 8), then existential philosophy, with its devotion 
to description and clarification, can assist us in our attempt to be open to the phenomena 
we encounter. Moreover, it can teach us - through the application of phenomenological 
reduction - how to monitor our assumptions, biases, and preferred theoretical 
frameworks so that we can avoid (as much as possible) positioning our clients according 
to our own understanding and worldviews.
For existential philosophers both listening and understanding are dialogical acts: they do 
not happen in isolation or after detached observation. In other words, meaning is always 
a co-construction between two people (e.g., therapist and client) and so it presupposes 
engagement with the other. As argued by Heidegger (1927) at the centre of each 
person’s being lies an attitude of concern or care for other people and the world around 
us. In other words, we reveal the beings we are in our mteractions with others and our 
engagement with the world through our choices, activities, and projects (Heidegger, 
1927; Sartre, 1943). This view is in line with counselling psychology’ s philosophy, 
which emphasises “the meanings, beliefs, context and processes that are constructed 
both within and between people and which affect the psychological well being of the 
person” (Regulations and Syllabus for the Qualification in Counselling Psychology, 
2004: 2). Moreover, it is a view central to the practice of counselling psychology, which 
is dialectical and values the importance of the therapeutic relationship (Woolfe et al. 
2003) and it fully supports and complements recent developments in cognitive theories 
(Harré and Gillett, 1994; Harré, 2002) which conceptualise understanding as a co­
construction between people, that is the product of engagement with activities and 
discourses that are constructed jointly by persons within sociocultural groups.
Counselling psychology’s emphasis on the role of the relationship to therapeutic 
practice and change can be enriched by the existential position, which conceptualises 
human existence as always in relation to the world and others. Spinelli’s (2003) notion 
of self-in-relation can be particularly helpful as it also touches upon two other central 
aspects of counselling psychology, namely personal development and the therapist’s use 
of self (Woskel, 2003). Specifically, the idea of a selF°, which is always in relation, 
fuses the subject/object dichotomy and therefore ‘obliges’ the therapist to be critically 
aware of her own experiences when attempting to enter the experiential reality of her 
client This stance is very similar to that of the ‘reflective practitioner’, who emphasises 
“the joint creation of meaning within the therapeutic alliance” (Regulations and 
Syllabus for the Qualification in Counselling Psychology, 2004:3).
For a detailed account of the existential notion of personhood and views of the concept of self refer to 
my second year research
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Four Existential/Phenomenological Philosophers and their Contribution to the Field of 
Counselling Psychology
I will now turn to four existential/phenomenological philosophers, whose ideas are 
pertinent to this portfolio and who enriched my own training, supervision, and 
understanding of my clients’ subjective world and difficulties. As these thinkers have to 
offer ‘insights’ about our everyday existence and problems in living, I consider their 
work to be of relevance to the field in general and to our work as practitioners in 
particular. Their ideas can assist our effort to communicate with our clients and to 
understand the meanipg of their existence, difficulties, and conflicts.
I have chosen to present the insights of the following thinkers for two main reasons: 
firstly because they have been at the centre of my client presentations in supervision and 
secondly because they have enriched and enlightened my practice as a counselling 
psychologist. As will be seen these ideas do not seek to explain but rather to describe 
and understand the human predicament (i.e. the worries, fears, anxiety, and insecurity 
that entail human existence). It is for this reason that they are a useful complement to the 
range of approaches used in counselling psychology, which focus on specific disorders. 
This I believe is particularly the case with anxiety issues. Existential therapy (Deurzen, 
2002; May, 1977) views anxiety as an indication of a person’s level of awareness, one’s 
capacity to reflect and be aware of his or her own responsibility and involvement with 
life. Contraiy to other approaches, it does not seek to promote an anxiety-free state, but 
to assist the client in her efforts to face her anxiety, understand its meaning, and ‘use’ it 
constructively.
The use of the existential-phenomenological paradigm can promote and strengthen the 
present interest in eclectic and integrative approaches and their efforts to go beyond the 
scope and boundaries of one therapeutic modality (Corrie & Milton, 2000; Hollanders, 
1996; Lapworth, Sills, & Fish, 2001). The following extract shows how the 
existential/phenomenological attitude of description and clarification complemented my 
psychodynamic work with Karen who presented with high levels of anxiety and 
occasional panic attacks. Together with interpretation of Karen’s intra-psychic conflict, it 
contributed to an understanding of her subjective concerns and difficulties on both 
internal and ontological levels.
Karen: Yesterday was one of these days, I started thinking of my difficulties 
with Philip and then I lost it! It was almost like a chain reaction, before I 
knew it I found myself feeling overwhelmed, panicky (brief silence) I can’t 
cope with myself, I want to find a way to get rid of these feelings 
Therapist: You mean the tension and anxiety you are experiencing every time 
you think of your difficulties with Philip
Karen: Yes, don’t want to feel like that, I want my peace of mind, to be able to 
relax and feel happy and content
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Therapist: And yet when you reflect on your relationship, your disagreements 
with Philip, your feelings of suffocation and the latest pressure about getting 
married, you recognise that things have changed between you, that you can 
no longer rely on your past experiences
Karen: Y qsI And this makes me so panicky. I feel angry and restless, why 
can’t he see that, why can’t he understand f A o f silence) I  sqq what
you mean, things have changed, I can’t pretend anymore, I have to face my 
new reality and see whether I can still be with him, I have to, no matter how 
anxious that makes me feel.
Karen was very committed; she stayed with her feelings of anxiety, which sprung out of 
her recognition that her relationship with Philip was changing in ways that she did not 
like. We also focused on her feelings of suffocation, which reminded her of her past 
experience with her mother. Karen, began to realise that ‘sorting out’ her relationship 
with Philip invoked a considerable amount of anxiety as it involved a change in her self, 
a questioning of her views, ideas, and beliefs. Gradually, she began to use her feelings of 
uneasiness and tension in a constructive way; she became yeiy attuned with her 
emotions, which she began to view as her “inner compass”.
I owe my capacity to work with the tension created by the confrontation of life’s 
opposite polarities (i.e. happiness-misery, inclusion-exclusion, active-passive, doubt- 
faith, etc) to the work of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Following the Socratic dictum 
'Know thyself, Kierkegaard challenges his reader to question him/her self, values, 
assumptions, and beliefs and to face life with courage and conunitment. Hé has - in my 
view -come as close as possible to an understanding of what it is to be a person m the 
midst of uncertainty and doubt. From his writings we can leam an enormous amount 
about the nature of anxiety and its central role in our efforts to reach our potential and 
self-knowledge. Indeed, for Kierkegaard (1844) to try to get rid of anxiety equals getting 
lid of one’s self! Through reading his texts and discussing/using them in supervision, I 
came to understand the constructive aspects of anxiety and the importance of living in 
the tension and knowledge of one’s finitude and fragility. His ideas continue to be 
reflected in my clients’ struggles to fulfil their dreams, overcome their fears, and believe 
in themselves and their capacity to choose their lives.
Nietzsche (1844-1900) is another existential philosopher whose insight in relation to the 
tragic aspects and paradoxes of human existence has been invaluable to me and has 
informed my practice of counselling psychology. His emphasis on will and agencv and 
his critique of established morality can teach us how to face and challenge our 
limitations and how to transform a passive living into an active living. His famous dictum 
what does not kill me makes me stronger is an invitation to live life to the full despite its 
struggles and difficulties. Nietzsche’s work can inform our understanding and attempts
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to challenge our clients’ values and views and to help them reflect on the things that lead 
them to resentment in life and to a ‘slave morality’ (i.e., self-pity). His Dionysian view 
of life with its tragic and comic elements is a passionate attitude to life that when 
embraced can free us from the constraints we set for ourselves and can lead us to 
perceive life as a creative act rather than a thoughtless accident.
I consider both Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s ideas to be invaluable to the practice of 
counselling psychology which emphasises an exploration of clients difficulties and 
insecurities without attempting to pathologise their nature (Woolfe et al., 2003). Both 
writers, by focusing on the inherent paradoxes of the human predicament and by 
describing the inevitable tension and conflict that lie at the heart of our involvement with 
the world and other people, can emich the practice of counselling psychology without 
undermining the contributions and wealth of its psychological theories.
In addition Heidegger’s (1889-1976) focus on ontological concerns and the meaning of 
existence can sharpen our monitoring of our cliehts’ relation to the world, other people, 
and their own private spheres of existence. His work, although not always easy to follow, 
is I believe fundainental to one’s understanding of human existence. It c ^  infomi our 
efforts to describe the givens of human living and to challenge the particular aspects of a 
person’s modes of being in the world. In my essay on Heidegger's Notion o f Dasein 
and its Application in Existential/ Phenomenological Approach to Therapy, I provide a 
detailed account of his conceptualisation of human beings and consciousness and the 
ways in which it challenges our understanding of human existence and counselling 
psychology practice.
Finally, Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905-1980) writings are particularly relevant as they can be 
directly applied to counselling psychology practice and supervision. Specific^y, his 
insights on pre-reflective and reflective modes of consciousness {Being and 
Nothingness, 1943) can serve as a mental exercise while we are working with clients or 
offering supervision. They can sharpen our capacity to observe and constructively listen 
to our clients’ narratives as well as to understand our own mental processes and 
assumptions. From his later work on the Critique o f Dialectical Reason (1963) we can 
enrich our understanding of the dialectical process which is at the heart of therapeutic 
work. In this work Sartre (1963) described the dynamics of praxis the process by 
which individuals proceed in the materialisation of their projects) and the ways it is 
counteracted by totalization, {Le,, the formation of concrete, static theories). He argues 
that we need to opt for z. dialectical totalization, which allows the space for creative 
discourse, re-evaluation and re-construction of theories. I believe that the idea of 
‘dialectical totalization’ is pertinent to counselling psychology practice, which 
emphasises the importance of our clients’ subjective experience and world. It can assist 
our attempts to remain open to our clients’ being and use their experience in order to re­
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define (instead of concretising) psychological theories in ways that aid our 
understanding of them. In this way, theories become tools for understanding rather than 
explanatory templates.
Moreover, through his essays and plays, we come to understand the price of self- 
deception, the consequences of avoiding responsibility and of denying one’s freedom. 
Together with Kierkegaard, Sartre showed us how human beings often choose to deceive 
themselves (i.e. got to know themselves) in order to evade responsibility and ownership 
of their own actions and life. These issues are often ignored or encouraged by other 
models, which aim at an explanation/interpretation of the client’s predicament and which 
therefore underestimate the importance of one’s responsibility towards herself. For 
Sartre there is no such thing as human nature; ‘existence precedes essence’ and so one 
cannot depend on explanations by reference to a given/fixed human constitution. It 
follows that the existential/phenomenological stance of counselling psychology stresses 
the importance of engaging with our clients as they are rather than who they ‘should 
be’.
Despite popular opinion Sartre’s existentialism is not a doctrine of pessimism or an 
attack to human solidarity. His philosophy is one of action; it declares that “every truth 
and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity” (Sartre, 1993: 32). 
In other words, no personal goal can be achieved without thorough consideration of 
other people and the context within which we live and act. This shift to intersubjectivity 
is evident in his later works, where he emphasises the importance of reciprocity in 
human relations and projects. Sartre’s attitude and concerns are I believe central to 
counselling psychology’s attention to personal development and professional issues. As 
noted in the ‘Regulations and Syllabus for the Qualification in Counselling 
Psychology’ (2004), practitioners have a commitment to abide to the contextual, legal, 
and ethical frameworks of the society and to exchange their ideas with other practitioners 
in order to ensure the quality of their work and professional responsibilities.
III. Conclusion
This paper has clearly identified areas of counselling psychology that overlap with 
existential/phenomenological therapy (EFT); it has considered the challenges that EFT 
poses, but also the ways in which it enriches the application of counselling psychology 
to therapeutic practice. It has also been argued that the existential/phenomenological 
paradigm can strengthen practitioners’ integrative and eclectic stances as it attempts to 
combine a number of different methodological, psychological, and psychotherapeutic 
standpoints. EFT can therefore offer a “meta-model of human existence” (Milton, et al. 
2003: 131), which can enrich, complement, and challenge the mainstream assumptions of 
psychology and therapeutic practice.
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